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Recent critical reappraisals have undermined the coherence – and validity – of the 
principles defining modern art and artistic production. Traditional art historical 
categories, periodizations, sub-periodizations, even the very divisions modernism and 
postmodernism, while useful, are no longer sufficient to define a history of the artistic 
object, or artistic identity for the modern age. I propose that a biopolitical perspective, 
with a shift in focus away from the object and towards the artistic body restores, in part, a 
coherent narrative to a modern art history. This thesis sketches the contours of an artistic 
sub-category I have coined “bio-aesthetics” within the framework of biopolitics, drawing 
on the ideas of Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben and Roberto Esposito. I locate a set of 
clinical mechanisms within the domains of aesthetics, artistic perception, subjectivity and 
performativity. My primary thesis is that the drive toward embodiment, toward the 
referent, or perhaps more precisely toward the real, expressed in formalism’s zeal for 
medium specificity, and in the modern aesthetic project of grounding artistic experience 
within the somatic, was set into play by a clinical configuration that emerged from the 
eighteenth century’s laboratories and clinics, expounding a life science of bodies.  
The corpus of my dissertation focuses on four significant moments within an 
archaeological schema spanning the eighteenth to the late twentieth centuries. Each 
chapter focuses on significant historical materializations of the bio-aesthetic, and together 
 iv 
form a historical progression from a biological corporealisation of the sensate, to the 
psycho-medical individualization of the artist subject, or perhaps, the clinical performer. 
My corpus begins with the eighteenth-century formalization of a somatically-based 
aesthetics, culminating in the aesthetics of Immanuel Kant. By separating the action of 
aesthetic contemplation from rational logos, Kant positioned aesthetic experience and 
artistic creativity in a place of peculiarity or pathology. I then trace the repercussions of 
bio-aestheticization both in the emergence of the flat picture plane as an index of the 
clinicalization of artistic visual consciousness, and in the concurrent psycho-medical 
conflation of artistic subjectivity with pathology in nineteenth-century texts on 
degeneracy. I conclude with the development, in the later part of the twentieth century, of 
a new modality of clinical performativity, taking up the self-identification of artists with a 
psycho-medical identity, and the embracing of medical themes and ordeals as artistic 
subjects. This collapse of a metaphoric position of aesthetic difference with an actual 
medical history and body is explored on two levels: first, in a consideration twentieth-
century high-modernist criticism and in an examination of minimalist and performance-
based works, including those of Beuys, Wilke, Morris and Gober. The irony that emerges 
from my study is that coherence is achieved within the heroic modernist pursuit of purity 
of medium and individual genius by a corresponding a master narrative of illness.  
 v 
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The last forty years have seen significant changes in the ways artistic modernism is 
understood, as a project, a style, a moment in time. Many core modernist characteristics 
and presumptions, including the autonomy of art, the emphasis on formal aspects of art, 
authenticity, genius, good taste, the periodization of artistic movements, and the linear 
organization of these periods into a progressive developmental scheme, have been 
criticized by several generations of scholars. Critiques put forward by previous 
generations of art historians, philosophers, political theorists and others, have effectively 
taken apart the master-concepts that underwrite our histories. Semiotic theory, feminism, 
deconstruction, queer theory, and post-colonial studies, all contained within the larger 
rubric of postmodernism, have questioned and found wanting, modernism’s basic 
assumptions of avant-garde genius, progressive development and formal refinement. 
Jean-François Lyotard and Fredric Jameson wrote important critiques that equated 
postmodernism with developments of late capitalism, considered the collapse of master-
narratives, and identified the emergence of new artistic practices developing from 
critique, quotation, paraphrase and pastiche.
1
 In questioning originality, something new is 
born. 
In light of these developments, efforts have been made to reset modernism along new 
aesthetic and historical lines. Gene Swenson, in 1966, suggested a counter-history of 
                                                 
1
 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, 
The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); Brian Wallis, Art After 
Modernism (New York and Cambridge, Mass.: The New Museum of Contemporary Art and MIT Press, 
1984); Russell Ferguson and Martha Gever, Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Culture (New 
York: New Museum of Contemporary Art, 1992); Arthur C. Danto, After the End of Art: Contemporary Art 
and the Pale of History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).  
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artistic modernism focused on imagery and reference. In his landmark exhibition “The 
Other Tradition” held at the Philadelphia Institute of the Arts. Swensen’s genealogical 
selection, extending from Dada and Surrealism to Pop Art, dispensed with the orthodox 
formalist narratives of medium-specificity and abstraction propounded by Clement 
Greenberg and his follower, Michael Fried, and instead, focused on oppositional and 
idiosyncratic use of imagery and an emphasis on popular-derived content.
2
 Almost thirty 
years later, Rosalind Krauss’s The Optical Unconscious (1993) drew on psychoanalytic 
theory to challenge the optical rationalism of the formalist narrative. Krauss’s history of 
modernism was grounded in the unconscious and in psychic drives.
3
 That same year, 
Yves-Alain Bois’ Painting as Model re-framed the oppositional binaries of form and 
content, abstraction and representation, plastic and literary that underlay Greenberg’s 
theories. Using structuralist and post-structuralist semiotic analysis, Bois recast 
modernism's reflexive turns of medium specificity and reductivism, as symptomatic of a 
general problem of “the referent.”4 Bois did not reject formalism, but showed that 
modernism consists of a plurality of sometimes competing and antagonistic formalisms. 
Swenson rejected the reduction of modern art to formalism, while both Krauss and Bois 
emerged from the Greenbergian tradition, but all three took critical positions and 
proposed theoretical and historical alternatives to what was, at the time, the dominant 
way of seeing the modern.  
More recently, philosopher Jacques Rancière has challenged the distinction between 
modernism and post-modernism. He questions the views that posit post-modernism as a 
radical break from modernism, and argues that, since the eighteenth century, vanguard 
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 See: Gene Swenson, The Other Tradition (Philadelphia: Institute of Contemporary Art, 1966). 
3
 Rosalind E. Krauss, The Optical Unconscious (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). 
4
 Yves Alain-Bois, Painting as Model (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1993).  
 3 
culture has engaged in a sustained battle over the meaning and value of representation 
and mimesis. Rancière contends that this struggle is epitomized by a “paradox of the 
spectator.”5 He argues that the ideal of aesthetic distance and passive spectatorship 
indicative of modernism has always been grounded by more aesthetically and politically 
engaged forms of “vital participation”6 in which the spectator is active, and traditional 
distinctions between seeing and doing, aesthetic perception and political action are 
blurred. For Rancière, this paradox has formed the productive core of modern artistic 
culture, be it in painting, performance, or film, since the mid-eighteenth century, and he 
draws a genealogy of significant figures from Denis Diderot to Berthold Brecht and 
Antonin Artaud to support his views. 
My project, like those of Swenson, Krauss, Bois, and Rancière, is to propose another 
way of understanding the aesthetic and intellectual impulses that have underpinned 
cultural production since the eighteenth century. I do so, not to replace those offered by 
others, but to add a new archaeological category to modern and contemporary art history. 
I am motivated by my interest in developments in the field of critical bio-politics, 
particularly as (re)defined by Michel Foucault in his late work, and by a desire to place 
crucial developments of modern and more recent artistic culture within a bio-political or 
bio-aesthetic schema, which I call “bio-aesthetics.” It is my central thesis that the 
historical transformation as proposed by Foucault in A History of Sexuality: An 
Introduction (1980), from an Aristotelian understanding of human life and personal 
identity, to a biological one beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, is manifested in 
new forms of artistic subjectivity, aesthetic philosophy, and material practice. According 
                                                 
5
 Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, trans. Gregory Elliot (London and New York: Verso), 2. 
6
 Rancière, Spectator, 2. 
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to Foucault, the intersection of politics and modern biology is indicated by a shift in focus 
to the biological existence of individuals and populations, in the political mechanisms – 
legal, medical, military, moral – that organize society. Foucault writes that these 
mechanisms are “bent on generating forces, making them grow,” and are “situated and 
exercised at the level of life, the species, the race and the large-scale phenomena of 
populations.”7 I contend that a distinct bio-aesthetic mentality emerges in the eighteenth 
century and spreads beyond the biological and medical sciences and into artistic 
production and critical thought. In the larger cultural domain, this mentality is transposed 
onto conventional art historical divisions of modernism, post-modernism, and 
contemporary art. I will define this bio-aesthetic mentality in the broadest sense; 
however, it is my contention that this mentality is inscribed into artistic theory and 
practice as a set of decidedly clinical methods, methods that evolve around the new forms 
of analytic and subjective reflexivity Foucault adumbrated in his lectures and writings on 
bio-politics. My specific effort will be to show how these mechanisms have shaped 
domains of critical thought, aesthetic perception, and artistic subjectivity, and by doing 
so, to posit a new category of clinical performativity bridging modernity and post-
modernity, and continuing unabated, perhaps even stronger, today.  
This is not to say that bio-aesthetics does not adhere to many aspects of traditional 
accounts of modernism; it does. The philosophy and aesthetics of Immanuel Kant provide 
an epistemological and historical fulcrum around which bio-aesthetics pivots. Kant’s 
epistemology establishes a set of basic structures and refrains of thought, which are re-
interpreted throughout the historical period I examine, and which, I contend, reflect the 
                                                 
7
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1980), 136, 137. 
 5 
transformational effect of the emerging life sciences on speculative reasoning and 
aesthetics in the early years of our bio-political age. While his centrality to philosophical 
discourse is undisputed, Kant typically emerges in art history as an outdated figure,
8
 and 
his concepts, such as aesthetic disinterestedness have been vilified.
9
 Arguing against this 
marginalization of Kant, I contend that the Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of 
Judgment are symptomatic of the traumatizing effects the new scientific and mechanistic 
conceptualization of the individual body as a biological entity, had on speculative 
thought, thought that was at the same time vitalized by life’s propulsive effects. Kant 
incorporated the new terminologies of somatic and corporeal experience into what had 
been traditionally understood as the dis-embodied precincts of idealist philosophy.  
The Critiques progress from the more properly philosophical to the aesthetic.
10
 Kant’s 
formulations of the apriority of space and time, of sensibility, taste, purposiveness and 
genius make up a core set of suppositions upon which all modernist aesthetics are based, 
even those that argue against Kant. These are also key concepts on which bio-aesthetics 
is developed. As I demonstrate, Kant’s drift from philosophy to aesthetics is an 
encapsulation of a general trend toward the corporeal in art and criticism that continues to 
the present day. It is this corporealization, this embodiment, of artistic identity and 
experience that I capture under the rubric of bio-aesthetics. It is my contention that, 
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 See: Amelia Jones, Body Art: Performing the Subject, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1998), see also: Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, (London: Blackwell, 1990). 
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 See: Rachel Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgment, 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Odo Marquand, “Aesthetics and 
Therapeutics,” The New Schelling, ed. Judith Norman and Alistair Welchman, trans. Judith Norman 
(London and New York. Continuum, 2004), 21; Paul Crowther, “Fundamental Ontology and 
Transcendent Beauty: An Approach to Kant’s Aesthetics,” in Art and Embodiment: From Aesthetics to 
Self-Consciousness, (Oxford: Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, 1993).  
 6 
within this bio-aesthetic schema, we may compose an archaeological picture that 
stretches from Kantian philosophy and the many eighteenth-century discourses that 
wrestle with art’s relationship to the biological body, through nineteenth-century treatises 
linking artistic subjectivity to degeneracy, to the flat modernist picture plane, and finally 
to post-minimalist performance art. 
Before I map my journey through this terrain in chapters, and identify my 
methodological considerations, I will provide an overview of the term bio-politics, and 
review the significant texts from within art history that have examined the impact of 
modern clinical epistemology on artistic culture.  
Intellectual and Art Historical Context  
Foucault’s concept of bio-politics provides the general context for my study. Foucault 
was not, however, responsible for the term’s coinage. As Roberto Esposito, the theorist of 
bio-politics, has described, the word appeared initially in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century in discourses on political science.
11
 Rudolph Kjellen’s Outline for a Political 
System (1920) was the first text to use the term ‘biopolitics’ to denote a “discipline which 
defines human society according to the characteristics of biological life.”12 A number of 
studies following Kjellen, including Jakob von Uexkull’s Biology of the State (1920)13 
and Morley Roberts’s Bio-politics: An Essay in the Physiology, Pathology and Politics of 
the Social and Somatic Organism (1938)
14
 further conflated biological science with 
politics. In these discourses on bio-politics, an analogic relationship between the social 
                                                 
11
Roberto Esposito, Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2008), 16.  
12
 Esposito, Bios, 16. 
13
 Jacob von Uexkull, Staatsbiologie (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library, 1920). 
14
 Robert Morley, Bio-politics: An Essay in the Physiology, Pathology & Politics of the Social & Somatic 
Organism (London: Dent, 1938). 
 7 
body and a biological one is assumed. Society and biology are collapsed, frequently to 
emphasize the detrimental impact of ‘pathological’ processes on the social body, and the 
theme of ‘pathology’ assumes the stature of a master concept.15 In an effort to re-define 
bio-politics along less biocratic lines, social theorists in the 1960s called for a more 
humanistic, spiritual and ethical definition of biological life. The establishment of the 
International Political Science Association for Politics and the Life Sciences in 1973
16
 
marks the development of bio-politics along ‘naturalistic’ lines; now, it is grounded in 
recent developments in genetic science.
17
 
Significant inroads have been made by cultural historians to define a trend in post-
Enlightenment artistic and literary practices along bio-cultural lines. Decades before 
Foucault, scholars were concerned with identifying epistemic features common to 
scientific and cultural fields, in parallel with Foucault’s early bio-political thought. An 
example is found in the work of twentieth-century linguist and historian of Romantic 
science Alexander Gode-Von Aesch, who introduced his concept of biotic in his study 
Natural Science in German Romanticism (1941). He contends that the domains of 
Romantic literature and science are “epistemologically identical,” and “are to be studied, 
not in terms of the influence which one may have exerted upon the other, but, briefly and 
boldly, in their physiognomic identity.”18 Using cross-disciplinary readings of Romantic 
scientific and literary texts, he proposes that both domains be viewed as simultaneously 
constituted by a concept of life “as a living process.”19 In 1973, Jacob Opper wrote of 
                                                 
15
 Morley, Bio-politics, 17. 
16
 Morley, Bio-politics, 22. 
17
 For a representative socio-biological discourse see: Elliot White, Genes, Brains, and Politics: Self-
Selection and Social Life (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1993).  
18
 Alexander God-Von Aesch, Natural Science in German Romanticism. (New York: AMS Press, 1966), 12.  
19
 Aesch, Natural Science, 12. 
 8 
correspondences between the transition in the sciences from eighteenth-century “logico-
mathematical cosmology” to nineteenth-century “natural-history biology” and similar 
transitions in music from the mathematical rationality of classical music to the 
“biological metaphors” of early German romantic music.20  
Ideas and writings such as these form the background when, between 1975 and 1978, 
Foucault introduced a constellation of bio-political concepts in his lectures at the College 
de France.
21
 The lectures focused on the shift from sovereignty to disciplinary power, and 
provided the theoretical template for his later work, pursued most intensely in the first 
volume of the History of Sexuality, in which Foucault lays out a constellation of terms 
under a bio-political rubric, among them “bio-history,” 22 and “bio-power.”23 The “era of 
bio-power” he writes begins with the “entry of life into history.” This set into play “two 
poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations.” The 
first pole, which develops in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, he 
contends, 
Is centered on the body as machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its 
capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its 
docility, in its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was 
ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines: an anatamo-
politics of the human body.
24
 
The second pole was established in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and 
exponentially diversified and multiplied this political anatomy into what Foucault coins 
the species body. In the domain of species bodies “the individual becomes the basic 
                                                 
20
 Jacob Opper, Science and the Arts: A Study in Relationships from 1600-1900. (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 1973), 35.  
21
 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979, trans. Graham 
Burchell (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008), 243-245, 253-265. 
22
 Foucault, Sexuality, 143. 
23
 Foucault, Sexuality, 140. 
24
 Foucault, Sexuality, 139. 
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biological unit of a biological-historical process, a unit of propagation, births and 
mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that 
can cause these to vary.”25 Key to these developments is modern clinical knowledge and 
its new regulatory principle, the norm, which is pursued and defined with particular 
fervour in the medical laboratories and psychiatric hospitals of the time: 
The discourse of disciplines is about a rule: not a juridical rule derived from 
sovereignty, but a discourse about a natural rule, or in other words a norm. Disciplines 
will define not a code of law, but a code of normalization, and they will necessarily 
refer to a theoretical horizon that is not the edifice of law, but the field of the human 




In the early nineteenth century, doctors and scientists enter into an exchange with judges 
and “in the name of the modernization of justice”27 juridical power becomes bound up 
with clinical expertise and its methodologies, and with the medical paradigm of the 
normal and abnormal. Foucault notes that within this medical-juridical schema, new 
clinical “testing rituals” are devised. These “techniques for producing truth” include the 
methods of observation and demonstration drawn from the laboratory, and the adoption 
of religious rituals of confession into the clinical domain.
28
 Individualized confession was 
developed by the Roman Catholic Church and deemed a sacrament, in the early thirteenth 
century. Foucault contends it acquired its modern value as a mode of self-regulation in 
the bio-political age, as emerging public health apparatus transformed the mechanisms of 
religious observation into a clinical tool. Confession was to become crucial to the 
development of psychiatry and psychoanalysis,
29
 and to the new science of sex that 
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focused on the reproductive functions of individual subjects and transformed “sex into 
discourse.”30 The modern confessional is not contained within the modalities of 
clinically-codified self-reflexivity of family, medicine, sexuality, the courts, the schools. 
Foucault proposes that it is also at work in vanguard culture; “Confession and freedom of 
expression,” he stated in a lecture in 1975, “face each other and complement each 
other.”31 Oppositional and complementary, the confrontation of self-confession and self-
expression exposes the paradox underlying the aesthetic being in the modern age. This 
clinical-confessional mechanism, as I will show, is at work in the performance and body 
art practices that incorporate artists’ autobiographies, and particularly those performance 
works that deal with artists’ clinical ordeals.  
Giorgio Agamben, philosopher, historian of law, and author of a number of books on 
modern and postmodern aesthetics, has developed Foucault’s bio-cultural thesis. While 
the topic is not explicit in his more recent work The Open: Man and Animal (2002), 
which explores the discursive construction of difference between man and animal in 
religious, philosophical, literary and scientific texts from the ancients to the moderns, at 
every turn the study invokes Foucault’s concepts of bio-power and bio-politics. Agamben 
introduces his concept of the “anthropological machine,”32 as a discursive structure 
emerging in the nineteenth century, that, while it blurs the biological distinction between 
animals and humans, simultaneously reasserts the primacy of man and his humanity over 
and above his biological animal origins. Man, as the measurer of all things, thus becomes 
the measure. Other animals function as supplements.  
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In his earlier book, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995), Agamben 
consolidates Foucault’s concepts on bio-power, and applies them as an archaeological 
device, as a bio-cultural zone into which man and animal and man-as-animal enter. For 
man, the acknowledgement of the dueling, and ostensibly conflicting, definitions of man 
as biological species and metaphysical being, introduces a profound anthropological-
philosophical anxiety – the “problem of problems.”33 For Agamben, the bestialization of 
man as Foucault calls it, is reflected in the erosion of the Aristotelian distinction between 
man’s zoë, or ‘living being,’ and his bios, or life as cultivated subject of politics, public 
life, art and learning. Agamben writes that the “zoë expressed the simple fact of living 
common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and bios … indicated the form or 
way of living proper to an individual or a group.”34 This distinction, Agamben contends, 
is at the epistemic foundation of western political rationality up until that historical 
moment when civilization passed Foucault’s “threshold of biological modernity.” Zoë 
and bios, the unproblematized conception of humans as biological creatures and 
political/cultural beings, enters into a zone of bio-political un-decidability. If the human 
brain, and with it the human consciousness that measures its difference from other 
beings, is merely the single-celled organism extended and expanded through evolution in 
linear time, then the assertion of human difference becomes problematic. “This 
politicization of bare life as such,” Agamben writes, “constitutes the decisive event of our 
modernity and signals a radical transformation of the political-philosophical categories of 
classical thought.”35 The horizon of modern bio-politics is blown open by the fusion of 
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zoë into bios in the eighteenth century, and the repercussions of that implosion continue 
to be felt today.  
I set my concept of the bio-aesthetic together with its clinical methods into this set of 
historical-theoretical concepts established in Foucault’s bio-political articulations of bio-
force and bio-power. Bio-aesthetics, as the biological, medicalized, circumscribing and 
curtailment of aesthetic expression and freedom, shares with Foucault’s bio-political, the 
emphasis on the body, measurement against the norm, the reflexive confessing subject, 
and the ritualized protocols of clinical analysis. Equally, the bio-aesthetic is embedded in 
the transformation of philosophical epistemology sparked by the subsumption of bios by 
zoë, discussed by Agamben. As Foucault and Agamben aimed to situate situating 
developments in modern social and political life within a biological understanding of 
bare life, I advance bio-aesthetics as a complementary concept functioning as a link 
between this bio-political episteme and modern forms of artistic subjectivity, perception 
and practice.  
There are precedents for this approach. In the fields of art history, aesthetic theory and 
cultural studies, a number of texts that address the bio-clinical relationship between the 
visual arts and the emerging biological sciences have been published in the last several 
decades. Ludmilla Jordanova’s Sexual Visions, Images of Gender in Science and 
Medicine between the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1989), was one of the first 
studies to explore comprehensively the impact of the clinical sciences on visual culture, 
and to situate the objects of investigation within a network of Foucauldian discursive 
operations.
36
 Jordanova text, a diverse corpus organized as a series of connected but 
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independent essays, contends that since the eighteenth century, under the auspices of 
masculine reason, science and medicine have anchored knowledge on the female body, 
visualized and materialized in a number of ornate, even fantastical figures, including 
nineteenth-century medical wax models, selections of Mozart’s operas, Michelet’s 
historical writings, and late twentieth-century pharmaceutical advertisements. 
Anthea Callen’s The Spectacular Body (1995) examines the ways Edgar Degas’s 
paintings and drawings were shaped by, and come to serve as indexes of, nineteenth-
century clinical epistemology. Firmly based in traditional art historical practice with a 
focus on a single artist, her precise skill and great pleasure in the formal analysis of 
Degas pictures, Callen’s approach is equally interdisciplinary, perhaps in 
acknowledgment of the interdisciplinarity of Degas’ practice. As she moves from 
artworks to contemporaneous clinical texts, treatises on public health, anthropology, 
psychopathology and hysteria, Callen organizes her material thematically around a set of 
key headings. Degas’s sculpture and pastel paintings are treated as visualizations of 
socio-scientific ideas, including clinical binaries of “health and disease, hygiene and 
dirt.”37 A significant example is Degas’ use of glass cases around his wax dancer figures, 
which, she contends, reflects the use of glass display cases in laboratory and natural 
history museums.
38
 Such display techniques are now a staple of post-modern and 
contemporary aesthetics. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
37
 Anthea Callen, The Spectacular Body: Science, Method, and Meaning in the Work of Degas (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), ix. 
38
 Callen, Spectacular Body, ix.  
 14 
Several scholars in visual studies have focused on topics of clinical perception, 
specifically Foucault’s postulation of the “clinical gaze”39 in The Birth of the Clinic: An 
Archaeology of Medical Perception (1961). Jonathan Crary’s Techniques of the 
Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (1990) examines the 
constitutive role of nineteenth-century clinical discourse in the historical construction of 
modern subjectivity and visual perception.
40
 Crary focuses on the development and 
application of the camera obscura to a range of techniques that were developed to 
harness and refashion the sensorium, and visual sensibility, of mid-nineteenth-century 
urban subjects particularly in the lucrative domains of commerce and leisure. Crary’s 
subsequent work develops this line of inquiry further: Suspensions of Perception: 
Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture (1999), is a critical and historical analysis of 
the emergence, in the nineteenth century, of ‘attention’ in clinical, physiological, 
aesthetic, artistic, recreational and psychological discourses.
41
 Relevant to my exploration 
of the relationship between clinical and artistic perception is Crary’s interest in visuality, 
which he ties to a larger theme of modern “embodiment” and the “embodied subject,”42 
and from there, to a network of clinical and artistic modalities of empirical perception 
that take shape starting in the mid-nineteenth century. 
A related body of writing explores the impact of clinical discourse on artistic 
subjectivity. Sander L. Gilman’s Pathology and Difference: Stereotypes of Sexuality, 
Race and Madness (1985) focuses on pathological stereotypes in a cross disciplinary 
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exploration of an array of materials, visual as well as textual, from the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Like Jordanova, Gilman analyzes pathology as a discourse 
structured as a binary confrontation of health and sickness, doctor and patient, and 
explores the paradoxical conjunction of artistic subjectivity and psychopathology in the 
nineteenth century. According to Gilman, melancholia and genius have been joined 
concepts in the western understanding of the artist since the ancients, but she shows that, 
since the nineteenth century, this connection shifted from ‘notional’ to a scientific 
‘truism’, to borrow Foucault’s terminology, with the emergence of clinical 
psychopathology.
43
 Gilman’s historicization of truisms such as the ‘psychopath as artist’ 
are particularly relevant to my study.
44
 
Similarly, David Lomas has examined the conflagration of clinicalized artistic 
subjectivity and biography. In “Body Languages: Kahlo and Medical Imagery” (1993), 
Lomas focuses on the medical imagery in Frida Kahlo’s paintings. He begins with a 
critique of the dominant studies of Kahlo’s work, which he contends have trivialized her 
achievements. He is averse to the realist conceits of biographical genre, which assume a 
naturalist transparency with respect to what is portrayed. For Lomas, the term ‘medical 
imagery’ denotes a semiotic category, that encompasses “the depiction of medical(ised) 
events”45 together with the use of “an overtly medical or anatomical iconography.”46 Yet 
Lomas also proposes a new biographical method with regard to Kahlo, one that suspends 
her art between biographical motivations of physical trauma and the medical and 
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anatomical illustration that was available for making medical experiences known. Lomas’ 
biographical method is relevant to my examination of the new roles works of art assume 
with relation to the lives of artists in the bio-political, clinical age. A central thesis of my 
project is that during this time artists and their works move into a new bio-aesthetic zone 
of indiscernability. In this zone, the ‘living being’ of artists, their individualized ‘bare’ or 
biological lives, enter into new ‘biographical’ arrangements with their artistic production. 
At its most developed, bio-aesthetic art takes the form of medical biography, as I intend 
to show. 
Mark A. Cheetham has written a ‘narrative of infection’ threading through the history 
of abstract painting. Abstract Art Against Autonomy: Infection, Resistance, and Cure 
Since the ‘60s (2006)47 places modernist abstraction’s drive toward purity, its formalist 
effort to attain medium specificity and aesthetic autonomy, within an epidemiological 
paradigm. According to Cheetham, modern and post-modern abstraction is fashioned 
within a discourse of bacteriological and viral contagion, radiological exposure, 
antibodies, antidotes and the treatment protocols of aesthetic purification. He points to 
the ‘medical metaphorics’ of abstraction, from Robert Rauschenberg’s and Yves Klein’s 
1950s monochromes to AIDS-related multi-media works by the Toronto-based collective 
General Idea and the post-Chernobyl abstractions of Taras Polataiko. These images and 
bodies of work are situated within a larger historical framework of ‘infectious’ 
abstraction dating back to Kasmir Malevich, who produced a discourse on painting that 
was “consistently medical”, and discussing art “in terms of diagnosis, incubation, 
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inoculation, and resistance.”48 Cheetham’s study is a precedent for my efforts to draw the 
clinical contour on modernism’s flat picture plane. More importantly, Cheetham’s 
epidemiological model bolsters my interpretive approach to the critical and theoretical 
exchange in the mid-1960s between art critic Michael Fried and artists Donald Judd and 
Robert Morris in the fourth chapter. I treat their exchange as an auto-immune ordeal, in 
which ‘the body’ erupts from its formalist skin, and into the theatrical space of 
performance.  
Other recent literature on the topic of medicalization and the biological in art history, 
cultural studies, critical and aesthetic theory, tend to sideline historical concerns and 
focus on specific clinical incorporealizations of the body in cultural domains. Foucault 
gets less mention. For example, Jose van Dijck’s The Transparent Body: A Cultural 
Analysis of Medical Imaging (2005) examines the convergence of modern medical and 
media technologies in popular contemporary visualizations of the body.
49
 Claudia 
Benthien’s Skin: On the Cultural Border Between Self and World (2002) posits the 
body’s clinicalized surface as a cultural tissue on which a history of modern subjectivity 
from the eighteenth to early twenty-first centuries is written.
50
 Petra Kuppers’ Scar of 
Visibility: Medical Performances and Contemporary Art (2007) examines the role of the 
clinically-identified ‘disabled body’ in contemporary visual and performance art,51 while 
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Art historical interest in the history of medicine is an indication of a broader cultural 
fascination with the body, a fascination that, arguably, assumes its most pronounced 
visual form in performance art. What I am offering is, in some sense, an account of a 
corporealization of the artistic body. RoseLee Goldberg’s Performance: Live Art 1909 to 
the Present (1979)
53
 is the first study to formalize an overview of the use of the body in 
performance art. Goldberg links late-twentieth century body art to earlier Dada 
performances at the Cabaret Voltaire in Zurich at the outbreak of World War I, and to 
Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty in the 1930s. Since Goldberg’s study, a stream of texts 
treating the topic of performance from a range of perspectives have been published. 
These include, C. Carr’s On Edge: Performance at the End of the Twentieth Century 
(1993),
54
 a political history of late-century performance works, which focuses on the 
vibrant New York club scene from the late 1970s to the 1990s, and places the 
performances of Lydia Lunch, Linda Montano, Karen Finley, and others within the 
contentious and volatile context of the American culture wars. Peggy Phelan, a 
Performance specialist, has published a number of studies from a perspective that 
combines feminism, Derridean deconstruction and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Her 
Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (1993)
55
 confronts, in a theoretically dense and 
challenging fashion, the problematic, politically charged and undecidable ordeal of 
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visibility in performance. Phelan broadens the category of performance to include film, 
dance, staged plays, and political demonstrations, including anti-abortion rallies. Paul 
Schimmel’s Out of Actions: Between Performance and the Object (1998)56 situates the 
performance of Joseph Beuys, Lygia Clark, Chris Burden and others in the context of 
post-war painting and sculpture, paying particular attention to the material effects 
generated, such as stage props and implements of performance art.  
The concept of embodiment is crucial to my examination of body and performance art. 
Amelia Jones’ Body Art: Performing the Subject (1998) set out to define a concept of 
embodiment in the performance and body art practices taking shape in the aftermath of 
Abstract Expressionism and continuing to the end of twentieth century. She contends that 
the work of Jackson Pollock first expresses a drive toward embodiment, a performative 
impulse that gathers from the skins of his large drip paintings and projects onto the inter-
subjective field of performers and spectators. Citing the seemingly fortuitous appearance 
of Hans Namuth's photographs of the artist “theatrically performing the act of painting” 
in Life Magazine in 1951,
57 
Jones proposes these images, together with critical texts by 
Harold Rosenberg, Mikel Dufrenne, and others, brought a seemingly subtle, but 
ultimately subversive notion linking modernism’s flat surfaces to action and performance 
into artistic discourse. She contends that the performative category constructed by this 
assemblage of paintings, texts, and photographs, which she calls the “Pollockian 
Performative” 58 coincides with a radical shift in the philosophical understanding of 
subjectivity associated with post-structuralism. She goes further, proposing this concept 
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of a performed and relational subjectivity departs drastically from the “normative 
subjectivity” of the “intentional individual or originary subject” associated with both 
Kant’s genius, and Descartes’ cogito.59 
Jones draws theoretical support from twentieth-century phenomenology. Reading 
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception through Lacanian psychoanalysis, post-
structuralism, feminism, gender studies, semiotics and queer theory, she formulates a 
concept of artistic embodiment that is personally, politically and artistically engaged. She 
follows these theoretical considerations with a sequence of case studies that trace the 
“Pollockian Performative” to a series of late 1950s and early 1960s actions including 
those by Yves Klein and Alan Kaprow, and the events, and performances of the 1960s 
and early 1970s in artists’ bodies are unveiled or revealed as sites of ongoing, ever-
changing engagements with desire, gender, and sexuality. Lynda Benglis, for example, 
performs both an homage  to and parody of Pollock in re-enactments of his painting-
performance that  deflate its masculine cultural authority, its “veiled phallus”.60 Two 
decades after Benglis’ détournement, Keith Boadwee carried out a queer hyper-parody of 




Jones’s category of the Pollockian Performative provides an important model for my 
category of artist as case history, which I will examine in the third chapter. There, I take 
up the topic of the psycho-medicalisation of artistic subjectivity and examine the case of 
vanguard dramatist and artist Antonin Artaud. Aspects of Jones’ account of embodiment, 
however, depart significantly from my own. She is critical of Kantian aesthetics, which 
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she contends suppresses and supplants corporeal life with transcendental “pure creative 
thought,”62 and further, proposes Kant’s critiques are tethered to seventeenth-century 
Cartesian rationalism that opposes mind to body and is presided over by its all-seeing 
cogito.
63
 I contend that Kant's philosophy and aesthetics comprise a discourse of 
embodiment. While the body is not specifically represented in the Critiques, it pervades 
Kant’s discourse as an ever-encroaching ordeal of signification, a referent, a biological 
substance or force. The crucial concept of “purposive unity,” although Kant brackets it as 
a heuristic idea, hints at an underlying organic logic. More significantly, the general drift 
of Kant’s critical cycle (we must imagine the tectonic scale of this drift!) is in essence a 
journey from the seemingly heady domain of reflexive consciousness, into the 
experiential tissues of the body and sensibility that give it structure. It will be my purpose 
to thematise the progress of bio-aesthetics as a pulsive, corporeally driven movement 
from the aesthetics of embodiment – first comprehensively articulated by Kant’s Critique 
of Judgment – to a more full-bodied aesthetics, or if you will, of performance, in 
particular, of clinical performance epitomized by the work of the late Hannah Wilke.  
My project may be placed alongside the afore-cited art historical writings, which are 
themselves part of a larger set of discourses that explore, in an interdisciplinary fashion, 
the role of modern technology and medicine in modern aesthetics and artistic 
subjectivity.
64
 Within this expanded context, art historians have incorporated material that 
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was formerly not ‘proper’ to the discipline, and have embraced new methodological 
opportunities. In an effort to avoid the nebulous unities of modernist historicism (zeitgeist 
for example) most have shied away from making larger historical claims. For all their 
methodological diversity, most approaches to the topic of art’s relationship to modern life 
sciences are specific with regards to corpus and limited in their chronological and 
archaeological outlook.  
Chapter Outline and Corpus 
I have divided my dissertation into four chapters, each reflecting the clinicalization of 
artistic experience in the domains of theory, perception, subjectivity and performativity. 
Chapter One explores the clinicalization of aesthetics. This entails an examination of the 
terminological exchanges between the burgeoning biological sciences and new forms of 
critical and theoretical discourses on art that emerge in the eighteenth century. I will treat 
this as a site of discursive origin, reading significant texts from the domains of medical 
science and aesthetics by Albrecht von Haller, Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Johann 
Joachim Winckelmann, and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. My effort will be to elucidate the 
ways these texts share a set of terms, and how treatises on art adapt the analytical 
methods made available by the emerging laboratory life sciences. I will examine the ways 
each of these texts grapples with the bio-corporeal referent: that of the sensate, finite 
biological body as it is posited (enthusiastically in the case of La Mettrie) by the 
emerging medical and physiological sciences. In the last part of this chapter, I examine 
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those concepts of Immanuel Kant that touch directly on my project. As indicated earlier, 
my purpose is to suggest an understanding of Kant’s discourses that opens to the 
possibility of the bio-aesthetic, and thus reconsider his relevance to art history in the post-
modern, perhaps post-aesthetic era. I will examine his first and third critiques, The 
Critique of Pure Reason and The Critique of Judgment, with the purpose of elucidating 
the ways these texts incorporate corporeal and somatic concepts from the emerging life 
sciences. I will further explore how the overall transition from philosophy to aesthetics in 
Kant’s epistemology is indicative of a larger epistemological shift toward a bio-cultural 
rationality.  
Chapter Two examines the profound similarities between modern clinical and 
aesthetic perception. My purpose will be to demonstrate the ways medical and artistic 
modes of perception, with their comparable emphases on the empirical surface and the 
disinterested gaze of an objective observer, are determined by the same epistemic 
changes. A comparative reading of texts by Michel Foucault, particularly The Birth of the 
Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception, and Clement Greenberg, “Towards a 
Newer Laocoön,” and “Modernist Painting,” is central to the chapter’s organization. 
Efforts will be made to show how the forms of visual reduction articulated by both 
authors may be placed within a larger Kantian framework, particularly with regards to 
Kant’s conception of space. The chapter concludes with a review of recent articulations 
of this intersection of clinical and aesthetic perception, including scholarly studies by 
cultural historians Rachel McGraith and Lisa Cartwright, and the philosophical-aesthetic 
manifestos of Gilles Deleuze, and Deleuze and Felix Guattari. 
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Chapter Three examines the impact of clinical epistemology on artistic subjectivity, 
and identifies a category of artistic subjectivity I am calling artist case history. This will 
entail first a review of the salient theoretical supports by Foucault, Derrida, Marquand 
and others,  examines the ways an incipient clinical mentality is reflected in certain 
critical treatments of artistic and literary works, and the manner in these treatments often 
reduce vanguard artistic production psycho-medically, to mental illness or madness. The 
chapter is divided into two parts. The first traces a genealogy of modern artistic genius 
from its identification in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, through its nineteenth-century 
forensic elaboration in the criminology and socio-medical criticism of Cesare Lombroso 
and Max Nordau, who equate artistic subjectivity with ‘degeneracy’, and finishing with 
later psychotherapeutic treatment in Freud’s writing. The second part of the chapter 
examines a specific case, the 1922-1923 epistolary exchange between vanguard 
modernist performer, writer, and visual artist Antonin Artaud and literary critic Jacques 
Rivière. Their correspondence will be considered for the manner in which Artaud and 
Rivière assume the positions of patient and doctor, respectively. With this exchange, I 
contend, Artaud’s highly confessional responses to Rivière’s clinical assessments of his 
writings, assume a critical and performative position as artist case history. Such a 
position is deeply embedded in preexisting understandings of aesthetic genius, which, I 
argue, are inextricably bound to bio-aesthetic considerations. 
The final chapter sets out to identify the emergence of what I will call “clinical 
performativity” through the examination of a specific artistic caseload. This will involve, 
first, an examination of the concept of aesthetic embodiment as it relates to 
performativity, as it is articulated in the critical writing of Amelia Jones. I will place my 
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own performative category in relation to her concept of the “Pollockian Performative.”65 
The onset of this strain of clinical performativity can be traced to those waning years of 
high modernist formalism in the early to mid-1960s, and so the first case is made up of a 
seminal critical exchange between Michael Fried, and the minimalist artists-critics 
Donald Judd and Robert Morris. I seek to show how a series of articles and reviews 
published mostly in the pages of Artforum engage with significant clinical-critical themes 
found in Artaud’s exchanges with Rivière. The writers also become swept up in the logic 
of an aesthetic-empirical drive as they come into contact with an underlying bio-aesthetic 
referent; each offers ever more precise articulations of medium specificity, and of the 
place of “the body” in visual art. In the case of Judd and especially Morris, a drive toward 
embodiment and performance expresses itself as Fried, in reaction, assumes the position 
of diagnostician and hopes to maintain the traditional sanitary cordons around the 
mediums.  
The second case is that of American “performalist” artist Hannah Wilke.66 A synopsis 
of the artist’s career will be relevant as it extends from her association with a group of 
feminist formalist-based artists of the early 1960s who were immersed in the issues raised 
by the Fried-Morris-Judd exchanges, to her final works in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
as she struggled with fatal lymphoma. What is particularly important about Wilke’s case 
to my postulation of bio-aesthetics and its clinical tactics is the manner in which her 
career biographically recapitulates this particular stretch of postmodern art history, and 
concludes with a powerful autobiographical display – through photographs, videos, 
drawings, paintings, prints, sculptural objects, of her final medical ordeal. 
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Methodology 
For my purposes Foucault’s work is eminently significant, not least for its critically 
détourned definition of biopolitics which supplies my historical context, but also for its 
“genealogical-archeological” methodology. In a brief essay published in 1971 titled 
Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, Foucault described the genealogical aspect of his method 
as one of tactical excavation (which mostly follows chronological conventions). 
“Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary,”67 he writes, and it avoids 
“the meta-historical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies (and) 
opposes itself to the search for origins.”68  
Foucault elaborated on the archaeological component of his approach in his 
theoretically expansive works on the history of epistemology. He proposes in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language (1969) that archaeological 
analysis is concerned with identifying “statements,”69 with outlining the “discourses” 
these statements form, and with the “positions” that individuals come to occupy within 
these schemes as “subjects.”70 All of these movements and determinations may then be 
placed within a larger historical framework that Foucault calls the “episteme.”71 For 
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Foucault this concept denotes an underlying “positive unconscious”72 that structures and 
orders what is known and experienced. In The Order of Things (1966) Foucault posits the 
“classical” episteme as having the form of a flat ordering table on which each branch of 
knowledge ordered its objects. In the biopolitical age discourses on natural science as 
well as those on economics share an epistemic “organic structure,” with a new emphasis 
on the mobile and time-based structures of evolution and progress.
73
 
These archaeological aspects of Foucault’s method are often overlooked, or dismissed 
as the remnant of a structuralist method of historical analysis that procures simplifying 
abstract schema, as opposed to the ostensibly verifiable tracking of chronological data 
carried out by the more rigorous (genealogical) methodologies. Foucault’s emphasis on 
the constitutive role of discourse in the production of the subject has been especially 
excoriated as tending toward a species of discursive determinism, or what Judith Butler 
calls “discursive monism.”74 Slavoj Žižek dismisses Foucault as a “detached positivist” 
and his archaeological framework for presenting power as a “neutral tool,” 75 thus 
circumventing the Marxist problem of ideological struggle. Žižek further contends that 
the subject of Foucault’s archaeology is an empty schema, a remnant of philosophical 
idealism, lacking in psychoanalytic and/or Marxist substance. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul 
Rabinow have, like Butler, dismissed the archaeology for its emphasis on the linguistic 
and on “autonomous discourse” which provides diaphanous backdrop and does not 
penetrate into the actual scenery of historical and institutional events; they further 
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There is a significant example within the field of art history, a work of post-modern 
critique, which makes use of Foucauldean archaeology in an effective way. Douglas 
Crimp’s On the Museum’s Ruins challenges art history’s “historicizing system of 
thought” and its tendency to “psychologize” and, in Foucauldean parlance, individualize 
historical developments into ostensibly “compatible” sequences of chronologically 
cohesive developments.
77
 Crimp does not propose a general archaeological category, 
however, he does adopt Foucault’s theoretical concept to challenge traditional narrative 
accounts, and to situate the ostensibly transcendent pursuits of individual artistic 
“geniuses” as contingent upon a set of heavily enforced discursive operations that involve 
the museum and its devices of “public relations” and “private property.” He cites works 
by artists who themselves seem to take up an archaeological approach, who dispense with 
the “romantic point of view” and work out a new form of institutional critique, artists - 
such as the Belgian installation artist Marcel Broodthaers; these artists focus not on 
individual works of art themselves, but on the museum that, with its “links to power,” 
constructs and bestows value on individual works and the artists who produced them.
78
 
Crimp’s landmark discourse gave critical and theoretical coherence to an emerging body 
of post-modern, mostly photograph-based works that, in the spirit of Kantian critique, 
approached works of art as effects or props of an elaborate institutional mechanism. I will 
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return to Crimp’s text in the conclusion of this thesis, which will take up more recent 
examples of clinicalized museum practice. 
It must be stated that, while my motivation is archaeological, what I will endeavor 
does not entail a wholesale application of a ready-made critical system (archaeological or 
otherwise) upon a corpus. Hence, it is not my purpose to adhere strictly to Foucault’s 
structuralist informed archaeological program (Foucault didn’t even do that!). But 
archaeology, as Foucault has pointed out, is not the unifying inflexible interpretive 
system his critics have in mind. “Archaeology,” he writes, “is a comparative analysis that 
is not intended to reduce the diversity of discourses, and to outline the unity that must 
totalize them, but it is intended to divide up their diversity into different figures. 
Archaeological comparison does not have a unifying, but a diversifying effect.”79 Hence, 
what I will carry out in the following pages is a strategic, albeit labile, commentary on a 
succession of very specific texts and artworks within what is a rather expansive and even 
diffuse historical stretch from the eighteenth to the late twentieth centuries. Under the 
general archaeological rubric of bio-aesthetics I will be able to locate a set of 
mechanisms; these mechanisms or methods are clinical and may be linked to a great 
diversity of effects in the artistic domains that are linked to the clinicalization of 
individuals within a larger bio-clinical historical process. These include new modalities 
of empirical observation, aesthetic judgment, self-referentiality and medium-specificity 
(the two are not unconnected I contend), self-portraiture, confessional biography, and an 
insurgent pulsive artistic drive toward embodiment and performance.  
The corpus of my dissertation focuses on four significant manifestations or moments 
within an archaeological schema that spans the eighteenth through late twentieth 
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centuries. Each chapter sets out to capture what I consider to be significant historical 
materializations of the bio-aesthetic: the eighteenth-century formalization of a 
somatically-based aesthetics, the emergence of the flat picture plane as an index (a 
pervasive one) of the clinicalization of artistic visual consciousness, the psycho-
medicalisation of artistic subjectivity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and 
finally, the development, in the later part of the twentieth century, of a new modality of 
clinical performativity that takes up the medical ordeals of the artist as its subject. While 
each of these bio-aesthetic instantiations is quite specific, they do form something of a 
historical progression from the biological corporealisation of the sensate, to the psycho-
medical individualization of the artist subject, as Foucault might say, to the late-twentieth 
century artist as clinical performer. Each of these bio-aesthetic instantiations shares 
certain valences with, or recapitulates, previous developments.  
With regard to the temporal scope of my thesis: it is structured primarily as a dialogue, 
of sorts, between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. While I have taken up 
anthropological and criminological discourses on artistic subjectivity by Cesar Lombroso 
and Max Nordau in order to better understand later developments in the twentieth 
century, the nineteenth century has been largely circumnavigated. I have not included 
discussions of specific artists or works of art from that period, aside from a cursory 
examination of the late paintings and letters of Paul Cezanne, who I treat as a twentieth-
century figure. A bio-aesthetic examination of nineteenth-century art would entail a 
different set of problems and issues. The legacy of the eighteenth-century certainly 
played differently for nineteenth -century artists than it did for twentieth-century artists, 
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and in the macro-historical scheme, bio-aesthetics and its clinical modalities assume a 
variety of configurations in different historical moments.   
Such a study of nineteenth-century bio-aesthetics might examine the relevance and 
relationship of Claude Bernard’s physiological concept of “interior milieu”80 to the 
highly individuated and self-reflexive turn of Romantic artistic subjectivity. It might also 
map out the clinical instrumentalization of visual perception and its influence on realist, 
impressionist and post-impressionist painting. This would necessitate an examination of 
developments in nineteenth-century physiology by the great neo-Kantian neuro-physicist 
von Helmholtz, and his student Wilhelm Wundt, who wrote extensively on the 
physiology of sense-perception.
81
 Such an investigation would not simply focus on the 
artistic applications of scientific discourses by artists such as Seurat and Signac, but 
would also underscore the general bio-aesthetic drift toward a body- or aesthetics-based 
understanding of art. On another register, investigations into the relationships between 
Gericault and Van Gogh and their psychiatrists would examine the role of clinical 
discourses, psychiatric and anthropological, on the formation of nineteenth-century 
artistic subjectivities.   
Earlier drafts of this thesis had much to say, for example, about the role of the clinical 
in Gericault’s studies of severed heads and limbs in Paris morgues (ca. 1818), as well as 
his portraits of asylum residents painted for his friend the alienist and advocate for the 
humane treatment of psychiatric patients, Dr. Étienne-Jean Georget. Courbet’s early self-
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portraits have also been considered for the ways they instantiate a clinically inflective 
artistic self-reflexivity, and a new empirical sense of the flat painting surface.  
I have elided the nineteenth century and focused on the ties between the eighteenth 
and the twentieth centuries, and have not been tempted to continue into the new 
millennium. In ending my dissertation with Hannah Wilke’s final performance, 
coincident with the catastrophic early years of the AIDS epidemic, I have chosen not to 
continue my study of clinicalized practice and the proliferation of the body in 
performance and activism in the 1990s and 2000s. My task as I have determined it, is one 
of mapping an archaeological terrain within which to situate subsequent developments, 
and establishing an early- or pre-history of what has informed and shaped post-modern 
and contemporary art’s intense interest in “the body.” This terrain is daunting for its 
breadth, and methodologically risky. My approach is analytic and synthetic. My research 
is not in primary art history, but crosses through disciplines, in order to identify a new 
epistemic territory for art-history to use, a new archaeological picture, if you will, in 
which to situate the explosion of corporeality in contemporary art making and writing. 
While work has been done to situate artistic practices, perceptions, and subjectivities 
within the larger discursive field of bio-cultural developments, a general archeological 
category such as the one I propose is new to the discourse. 
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Chapter One  
Clinicality and Aesthetic Theory 
 
I would say that the notion of life is not a scientific concept; it has been an 
epistemological indicator of which the classifying, delimiting, and other functions had an 
effect on scientific discussions, and not on what they were talking about. 
(Michel Foucault) 
 
(The) biological, with the notion of inevitability it entails, becomes more than an object of 
spiritual life. It becomes its heart. (Emmanuel Levinas) 
 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to trace an emerging clinical mentality in aesthetic and 
critical discourses of the eighteenth century. This mentality is characterized by a gradual 
shift away from traditional referencing of beauty as the grounding principle of the fine 
arts, toward an aesthetics of corporeal and perceptual experience. This mentality is 
manifested in a ferocious reflexive empirical probity and the formulation of a clinical 
approach that cuts a distinctive contour and attains discursive coherence in the laboratory 
notes of experimental physicians, and subsequently migrates to treatises on artistic 
creation and experience, and the materiality of artistic production. Texts from philosophy, 
art, physiology and medical materialism form the basis of my study, including those by 
Swiss physiologist Ablrecht Von Haller and French medical philosopher Jules d’Offray 
de La Mettrie, and canonical aesthetic and art historical treatises by German neo-
classicists, Alexander Baumgarten, Joachim Winckelmann, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, 
and Johann Gottfried Herder.  
Perhaps due to an erosion of the reflexive turn to beauty as the encapsulation of artistic 
meaning, representations of physical suffering assume a significant place in most of these 
discourses. The ancient Laocoön group, depicting the agonizing destruction of the priest 
and his sons is singled out and elevated to exemplary status, in these art historical texts. 
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While pain in itself is not central to the new clinical-aesthetic mentality, the subject of 
pain and its representation is significant in these scientific and aesthetic discourses as a 
point of departure, an object and a limit of investigation. Research physicians expended a 
great deal of experimental effort to identify the nerve matrix and codify the bodily 
mechanics of somatic, perceptual and cognitive experience. In natural-science 
laboratories, pain was produced, observed and measured in live, animal test-subjects. 
Theoretical, critical and aesthetic writings of Enlightenment critics and aesthetes, 
particularly German Idealists, responded to these studies of pain. Adapting the clinical-
empirical methods of the new laboratory sciences, and adjusting to the latest scientific 
understanding of sense-based perception, they reformulated the problem of mimesis in 
the arts, and opened the material specifications of the artistic mediums to critical scrutiny.  
Following an examination of these texts, which establish a primary clinico-aesthetic 
discursive scene, I turn to the significance of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy and aesthetics. 
The new clinical and biological modalities of thinking have a profound impact on Kant’s 
thought. The first critique, The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) emphasizes the empirical 
domain of the sensate, and incorporates the terminology of the new life sciences and 
aesthetics into a theory, or metaphysics, of consciousness. The scientific, clinical method 
figures in Kant’s approach as a ferocious reflexive criticality, that isolates a reasoning 
capacity within the philosophical subject and then subjects it to a thorough clinical 
examination. The Critique of Judgment (1790), the third of Kant’s Critiques, sets out to 
establish aesthetics as a distinct domain of knowledge. The philosopher supposes a 
faculty of judgment as a natural component of the aesthetic subject, then situates the 
experience of artistic and natural beauty within the somatic realm of individual 
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subjectivity. I will explore Kant’s organic tendency as it is manifested in his concept of 
purposiveness, and of the importance of this organicism to the later emergence of 
vitalism in Romantic philosophy and aesthetics. This entails an examination of the 
philosophical system of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, which sets out an 
elaborately purposive nature and posits human subjectivity, particularly artistic 
subjectivity, as nature’s self-conscious instantiation. In Schelling, traditional concepts of 
artistic beauty move beyond the corporeal-aesthetic threshold and into the domain of 
what might be called biological (or bio-aesthetic) immanence.
82
  
The Aesthetic Transfiguration of Ideal Forms into Sensate Discourses 
Aristotelian, Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic medieval aesthetics posited a 
transcendent realm of beautiful forms distinct from human corporeal existence. Kantian 
scholar Rachel Zuckert describes this pre-Kantian, pre-subjectivity-based aesthetics as a 
“metaphysics of perfection” and works of art as “instantiations of perfection”83 as 
opposed to “purposive” forms linking human cognition to nature through purposiveness. 
Medieval thought about art, Joseph Margolis proposes, drawn from St. Augustine, was 
concerned with the idea of beauty, which itself was understood as reflective of a 
transcendental order, essentially a Neo-Platonic position.
84
 The apprehension of beauty, 
for Augustine, partakes of an entirely supra-sensible divine realm.
85
 Thomas Aquinas 
blends Aristotelian and Neo-Platonist notions to arrive at a classicizing conception of 
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beauty, with proportion, harmony and clarity functioning as its Trinitarian foundations.
86
 
In the seventeenth century, as Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf have pointed out, the 
academic institutionalization initiated a ritualizing of the arts. Each discipline reflected 
and reproduced the ‘epistemology of state reason.’ This process affected not only the 
ways individual works of painting, sculpture, drama, dance or music were theorized and 
conceived, but also the manner in which these forms functioned as effects or props in 
large state spectacles. For example, the highly organized, indeed ritualized modalities of 
spectatorship at the salon and theatre entailed a codified repertory of stock movements 
and gestures patterned after those of the king and his court.
87
 This ritualization involved 
an elaborately cultivated corporeality; however, this wasn’t the natural corporeality of 
life science and sensate discourse, but rather was a highly artificial one. The transition 
from an aesthetic of idealized, non-corporeal forms to the bio-aesthetic may be mapped 
as a shift from Platonic ideality, through a realm of ritualized bodies, to an aesthetics of 
natural life grounded in biological being. 
As Charles Taylor proposes, there is a general trend toward the naturalization of 
philosophy and art beginning in the seventeenth century with Descartes, and extending 
into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During this historical span, the concept of 
‘nature’ was injected into the larger sets of ideas making up philosophical, religious and 
scientific thought-systems.
88
 Taylor cites Leibnitz, Locke, Spinoza and other significant 
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thinkers who attempted to re-write or supplant traditional high-minded discourses with 
the terminologies of a vigourizing nature.  
It is in the work of Alexander Baumgarten (1714-1762) that a vitalized eighteenth-
century philosophy takes a distinctly modern turn in the shape of a formulation of 
aesthetics that bridges corporeal and artistic discourses. It is a crucial indication of the 
clinical-aesthetic shift toward a perception-based understanding of cultural production, 
that Baumgarten does not discuss aesthetics in terms of beauty. According to Terry 
Eagleton, Baumgarten’s Aesthetica (1750)  (figure 1.1) used the Greek term in its original 
form to denote “the whole region of human perception and sensation, in contrast to the 
more rarified domain of conceptual thought.”89 Some fifteen years before the publication 
of Aesthetica, Baumgarten did use the term aesthetics in its modern sense to denote a new 
cognitive science of the sensate, with artistic-poetic experience providing his point of 
elaboration. Philosophical Meditations on some Matters pertaining to Poetry (1735) was 
the first text to propose a science of aesthetics, to ground poetic and artistic experiences 
in somatic existence and to explicitly identify poetry, painting and music as “sensate 
discourses.” Baumgarten proposed that aesthetic experience and abstract reasoning are 
distinct forms of knowledge and conform to different rules and structures. He offers an 
outline for the new aesthetic discipline made up of a number of domains including 
analytical and evaluative criticism: “By ‘poem’ we mean a perfect sensate discourse, by 
‘poetics’ the body of rules to which a poem conforms, by ‘philosophical poetics’ the 
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science of poetics, by ‘poetry’ the state of composing a poem, and by ‘poet’ the man who 
enjoys that state.”90 
Baumgarten’s writings, according to Eagleton, staged an ideological confrontation 
between rationalist philosophy, from the side of absolutist sovereign power, and 
empiricism, from the ‘creaturely life’ of the folk. In this reading, there is in Baumgarten’s 
text an insurrection of the senses from the ‘lower faculties’ of the body into higher more 
rigid echelons of abstract logic. Empiricism, with its power lodged in experience and 
sensation, Eagleton suggests, is on the side of democracy and the people. Eagleton 
contends that Baumgarten takes an ideological-political position, and Aesthetica is to 
some degree a polemic, as indicated in passages of Baumgarten’s treatise such as the 
following:  
[To] those who may object that the lower faculties, and the flesh, should be combated 
rather than aroused and strengthened, I respond: (a) [That] the lower faculties require 
control and not tyranny, (b) that aesthetics, as far as this can be achieved by natural 
means, in fact leads them towards this condition by the hand, as it were, and (c) that 
the lower faculties, as long as they are corrupt, should not be aroused or strengthened 
by aestheticians, but rather directed by them, so that they should not become even 
further corrupted by inexpert practice, or lest the use of a talent bestowed by God be 
abolished on the easy pretext of avoiding its misuse.
91
 
I concur with Eagleton’s assessments, both on the role that the transformed class system 
played in the modern discourse of aesthetics, and on the identification of aesthetics’ 
normative or disciplinary role. However, as with Foucault, Agamben and Esposito, I 
propose there is a concurrent, comparably radical reformulation of the human subject and 
the state – a reformulation that is irreducible, in the strict sense, to the more traditional 
class-based models of historical understanding outlined by Eagleton and Gebauer-Wulf. 
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Esposito writes, citing Foucault and Agamben, that in the late eighteenth century the 
biological conception of life “becomes encamped in the center of every political 
process.”92 This strain of biological thinking has its roots in earlier eighteenth-century 
bio-medicine, and the dissemination of these biological concepts and percepts throughout 
the political and cultural domains marks the emergence of bio-politics in its developed 
state. It is from this discursive-experimental matrix that bio-aesthetics emerges, and it 
produces the discursive milieu in which Baumgarten pens his discourse. Indeed, it is not 
too much to state that the term aesthetics, prior to and at the time of Baumgarten’s usage, 
was most applicable in the emerging life sciences, particularly in physiology and 
neurology.  
In the first half of the eighteenth-century scientists in these new fields sought to 
explain the mechanisms of sensation, movement and cognition in the non-metaphysical 
terminologies of a nascent bio-physics. Even that most paradigmatically eighteenth-
century aesthetic concept, sensibility was bound to the physical sciences. The idea of 
sensibility, together with its discursive counterpart irritability, was introduced by the 
Swiss physiologist Albrecht Von Haller (1708-1777) in his Dissertation on the Sensible 
and Irritable Parts of Animals (figure 1.2). The physiologist was also a popular lyric 
poet, whose verses extolled the natural beauty of the alpine landscape. Haller the 
physiologist proposed that vitalized nerve and muscle forces were responsible for 
voluntary and involuntary movements and sensations respectively. He went on to argue, 
in opposition to anatomical traditions established by Vesalius, that true biological forms 
could only be apprehended by observing skeletal and organ structures alive, that is to say, 
not simply in space (anatomically) but also in time, animated by these voluntary and 
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involuntary movements. His text, composed in the 1740s and first published in 1749, 
became widely available when it was published in Latin in 1752. Over the ensuing 
decades, its vitalist concepts migrated to political, moral, philosophical and artistic 
thought.
93
 G. J. Barker-Benfield posits the origins of an Enlightenment “culture of 
sensibility” in discourses like Haller’s, as well as in earlier texts by British Empiricists 
including Locke.
94
 Contemporary treatises by medical philosophers and scientists such as 
La Mettrie, Helvetius and others borrowed heavily from Haller’s research, and 
propounded a physiological aesthetics replete with grisly descriptions of live animal 
experiments, and laboratory scenes of elaborately staged vivisection and dismemberment. 
To fully comprehend the significance of the emergence of the sensate body into aesthetic 
philosophy, Baumgarten’s thought must be placed in the context of these developments. 
While Baumgarten was still a rationalist – that is to say he privileged the intellectual or 
logical faculty over the “sensitive perceptions,” and is cited by Kant as a source for his 
late eighteenth-century critiques, his aesthetization of philosophy uses the somatic 
terminology of sensibility articulated in new science-based “pyschoperceptual systems”95 
such as Haller’s physiology. 
What follows is a reading of selected scientific, aesthetic and philosophical texts that 
are part of this larger discursive bio-cultural assemblage. These works, including 
Baumgarten’s treatises, reveal a number of bio-cultural developments crucial to bio-
aesthetics. They mark the emergence of Enlightenment medical philosophy and illustrate 
the ways that the emergence of modern physiology coincides with what Agamben calls 
                                                 
93
 Anne C. Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology: Sensibility in the Literature and Medicine of Eighteenth-
Century France (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 15. 
94
 G. J. Barker-Benfield. The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Chicago: 
Univerisity of Chicago Press, 1992).  
95
 Barker-Benfield, 3. 
 41 
the progressive “animalization of man.”96 These texts also examine the migration of 
scientific developments, particularly Haller’s laboratory physiology, into discourses on 
artistic form and practice, and their application to artistic analysis and interpretation, 
particularly of representations of physical suffering. The art historical texts I have chosen 
by Winckelmann and Lessing, reflect the influences of this emerging bio-clinical 
epistemology on neo-classical critical and artistic discourse. These writings, particularly 
Lessing’s, indicate the epistemic encroachment of Haller’s physiological gaze on critical 
understanding, evidenced by Lessing’s ruminations on the experience and representation 
of physical suffering in the Laocoön group. These discourses open onto a primary 
clinical-aesthetic scene, in which pain faces off against beauty, and which sets into play a 
clinical-aesthetic mimetic ordeal returned to repeatedly for centuries to come.  
Machine Man 
Julien Offray de La Mettrie’s Machine Man (1747), (figure 1.3) which is dedicated to 
Haller, is exemplary for the ways it applies Hallerian physiology to a bio-medical 
definition of the human subject; the text perhaps qualifies as the first comprehensive 
example of modern medical philosophy and, significant to bio-aesthetics, it includes 
musings on the nature of artistic subjectivity. Despite its relative brevity, the work 
encompasses a significant number of determinations that make up what we might term a 
bio-cultural set; these include the clearing of an indeterminate life zone of man and 
animal forms, the accessioning of philosophy by a rising medical authority, and the 
epistemological ascendance of materialism as a species of modern knowledge. La 
Mettrie’s text is not a discourse on aesthetics in the cultural or artistic sense; it is a 
medico-philosophic-polemic. This discourse does, however, articulate these tenets from 
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the emerging biological domain, and renders a biological-materialist description of the 
subject. Haller’s notion of “irritability” is deployed by La Mettrie to challenge Cartesian 
dualism in favour of a materialist-vitalist definition human life. While this introjection of 
biological processes into the subject by the emerging bio-medical sciences is central to 
bio-politics and the emergence of clinical-aesthetics, a still more explicit indication of 
clinical-aesthetic epistemology is to be found in the way La Mettrie meshes his 
descriptions of artistic subjectivity with the mechanisms body and disease, specifically in 
the figure of “genius.” 
A medical doctor by training, La Mettrie produced texts that may be placed within the 
constellation of notorious French materialist works, among them those by Denis Diderot 
and others associated with the French Enlightenment.
97
 Significantly La Mettrie’s writing 
stages a bio-cultural polemical confrontation between what he coins “spiritualism” which 
is epitomized in the philosophy of Descartes, and the “followers of Father Malebranche,” 
in favor of a non-dualistic medical materialism, bolstered by recent developments in 
English empiricism (he copiously cites Locke) and notably the scientific theories of 
Haller and his followers.
98
 Still, La Mettrie’s use of the term “machine” as a descriptor 
for the human organism is not new, and has a long genealogy in rationalist French 
thought. Georges Canguilhem contends that the first discourse from the ranks of 
scientific philosophy to register a significant shift toward a “machinic” or physiological 
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conception of the human subject is Rene Descartes’ Treatise of Man published in 1662.99 
While Descartes’ thought style is decidedly rationalist or “innaeist” his description of 
human corporeality clearly indicates an incipient physiological understanding. 
Canguilhem has shown that with Descartes’ theory of the animal-machine “an anatomical 
form has been substituted for a dynamic one.”100 Descartes, however, maintained a strict 
division between the materiality of the body and the immateriality of the soul, between 
the mechanistic domain of physics and the invisible animating realm of metaphysics. La 
Mettrie sets out to challenge this dualism with his adventurous new strain of vitalism.
101
  
Reflecting on Haller’s vitalization of anatomy, La Mettrie goes further to posit in the 
base materiality of the body an energy-rich corporeal reservoir from which a material 
soul is constituted; he attributes man’s moral and aesthetic sense to the inner movements 
of a “sensitive substance.”102 Much to Haller’s chagrin La Mettrie posited “irritability” as 
the fundamental vitalist force at work in both muscles and nerves, men and animals, 
bodies and souls. Haller, by contrast, had privileged “sensibility,” which he associated 
with the nerves, and with higher functions of feeling and abstract thought. In Haller’s bio-
mechanics this aspect is more developed in humans, and functions as the physiological 
conduit to the immortal soul, a soul whose non-materiality Haller, a devout Catholic, was 
intent on demonstrating. This was perhaps the scientific rationalization upon which 
vivisection was, and continues to be, morally justified. For Haller, who insisted on an all-
surveying gaze of clinical detachment, the cries and agonized movements of dogs and 
cats subjected to live dismemberment were automatic reflexes, and devoid of sensibility. 
                                                 
99
 see: Rene Descartes, Treatise of Man, trans. Thomas Steele Hall, Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2003. 
100
 Canguilhem, 230. 
101
 La Mettrie, 3. 
102
 La Mettrie, 20. 
 44 
Haller contended that pain for animals lacks complexity, soul, experience, La Mettrie’s 
globalization of “irritability” had the effect of demolishing these distinctions, and of 
pointing more accurately toward the life forces that make up all organisms. Moreover, 
and this was certainly part of La Mettrie’s polemical purpose, by democratizing the 
irritable force in a coherent bio-philosophical Enlightenment discourse he made a highly 
plausible case for a materialist, Godless, animal-human soul. 
Another important development is concomitant with this new powerful drive to open 
dead and living bodies and is significant to the emergence of bio-aesthetic percepts. A 
paradoxical conjunction is at work in this exteriorization of the inside that is carried out 
in the Hallerian life science laboratories. As bodies are opened and more discourses on 
physiology and the sensate proliferate, an ambiguous reversibility between inside and 
outside comes into play. This produces a new kind of visual experience that will be found 
in certain forms of bio-aesthetic artistic perception. The gaze of the physiologist, the 
surgeon, and later as we shall see, the painter, penetrates its objects and the visualization 
of the ‘inside’ (of the body, of the picture) will take on the form of a highly malleable 
surface. “(Let) us open up the entrails of men and animals,” La Mettrie exclaims with 
dissectionistic jouissance, “how can we know human nature if we have not been 
enlightened by an accurate comparison of the structure of men and animals!”103 Of 
particular interest to the physiologist’s gaze is the comparative analysis of animals’ brains 
which, again, under the power of this gaze, take on the appearance of a formally labile 
surface, particularly as the brains’ tissues progressively morph from species to species:  
[Man] has a very large pons varolii and then, decreasing progressively, come the ape 
and the other animals … while the calf, ox, wolf, sheep, pig etc., in which this part’s 
volume is very small have very big nates and testes … such variety cannot be the 
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result of nature’s meaningless games. They prove at least the need for a good and 
ample organization, since in the whole animal world the soul becomes firmer together 
with the body and acquires wisdom as it gains physical strength.
104
 
This passage indicates how the concept of organization emerges as a physiological one. 
Later, it migrates into artistic aesthetics. Winckelmann will ascribe the ‘soul’ with 
organizing powers, for its capacities to compose beautiful artistic form, and for the noble 
grandeur of the ancient character. Lessing, too, will write of the significant moment of 
artistic form, while Kant’s concept of purposiveness in the experience of the beautiful in 
both nature and works of art, must be understood as originating in this early strain of 
organicism.
105
 The excerpt illustrates how the concept of zoë, as Agamben discussed, has 
merged the categories of man and animal, thus opening a seemingly paradoxical 
discursive scene composed of shared, variously configured, biological materiality. “From 
animal to man,” La Mettrie deduces from his reflections on others’ experiments, “there is 
no abrupt transition, as true philosophers will agree.”106 However, we also find in La 
Mettrie the tenet of a modern anthropological discourse (for Agamben, an “apparatus”), 
that evolutionary rationality that re-asserts man’s distinction in an ascendant order of 
species. La Mettrie elaborates a set of ‘qualitative’ conclusions concerning the 
correspondences between the anatomical form of the brains of different life-forms – its 
volume, surface folds, the softness and consistency of its tissues –  and the dispositions 
and intelligence of the different species’ brains he examined, arranged in an anatomically 
progress. Those beings with smaller brains, he contends, are more ferocious, while those 
with larger brains are more intelligent at the expense of instinct. Sander Gilman has 
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pointed out, this naturalist anatomical schema will be expanded in evolutionary science 
and superimposed over ‘man’ in the racist anthropologies of the nineteenth century.107 
More importantly here, this comparative, bio-typographical scheme comes utilized to 
deduce artistic ‘types’ and their pathological tendencies.  
A crucial aspect of La Mettrie’s discourse to bio-aesthetics is the central position 
accorded to man by medical definitions and, stemming from this, the formulation of a 
comprehensive medical philosophy. La Mettrie grants considerable authority to medical 
doctors in the diagnostic and therapeutic treatment of maladies, and in the ontological and 
philosophical understanding of human beings:  
(Experience) and observation alone should guide us here. They are found in 
abundance in the annals of physicians who were philosophers. Physicians have 
explored and thrown light on the labyrinth of man; they alone have revealed the 
springs hidden under coverings which keep so many marvels from our gaze. They 
alone, calmly contemplating our soul, have caught it a thousand times unawares, in its 




He proposes that pathological medical processes are at work in the machinations of 
deficient mental and spiritual ones, and that the expressive form of the materialist soul 
becomes visible as its corporeal base is agitated, diseased, or distressed with pain; this 
physiological model of the soul affected by pain will find its comparable art historical 
manifestation in German neo-classical texts. La Mettrie’s introjection of the pathological 
into cognitive processes further asserts the mind’s materiality and marks an important 
turn in biocultural epistemology. He writes with irony, even sarcasm:  
In sickness, sometimes the soul disappears and gives no sign of life and sometimes it 
is so transported by fury that it appears to be doubled; sometimes imbecility is 
dissipated and convalescence turns an idiot into a clever man. Sometimes the finest 
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genius becomes stupid and no longer knows himself; farewell all that splendid 
knowledge acquired at such cost and with so much effort!
109
 
In his rumination on the “hereditary” basis of what were considered moral vices La 
Mettrie argues for a constitutionalist understanding of crime and social transgression, 
proposing that in light of these hereditary links to lawlessness a new caste of judges be 
established who are also trained as physicians.
110
 This is relevant to Foucault’s 
observations about the new role that medical authorities will assume in biopolitical 
judicial systems, and to the rise of a new psychiatric class of physicians.
111
 
These observations coalesce around the special figure that haunts La Mettrie’s text, a 
figure that occupies an exemplary position between nature and culture, more precisely as 
nature’s cultural incarnation: the artistic genius. La Mettrie’s rumination on this figure 
marks out the linking of a medical-philosophical aesthetics to artistic subjectivity, and in 
a more general and clinically explicit fashion (and three years before the appearance of 
Baumgarten’s Aesthetica) an early indication of the emergence of bio-aesthetics. Decades 
before Kant’s and Schelling’s ascription to artistic genius the status as nature’s special 
subject, La Mettrie calls on genius to perform as nature’s primal pedagogue:  
Who was the first to speak? Who was the first tutor of the human race? Who invented 
the means to make the best use of our organism’s aptitude for learning? I do not know 
[for] the names of those first welcome geniuses have been lost in the mists of time. 
But art is the child of nature, and nature must have long preceded it….Would it be 
absurd to believe that those first mortals tried like animals and dumb people (who are 
another sort of animal), to express their new feelings by movements dictated by the 
economy of their imagination and then, as a result, by spontaneous sounds particular 
to each animal; this was a natural expression of their surprise, joy, emotions or needs. 
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For doubtless those whom nature endowed with more refined feelings were also given 
greater facility to express them.
112
 
The figure of the artistic genius, no matter how endowed or naturally refined, assumes an 
ambiguous, miscreant aspect in La Mettrie’s text, and the pathologization of modern 
artistic subjectivity begins to take on a subtle physiognomic form. La Mettrie deduces 
from a portrait of “the famous A. Pope” a connection between injury, trauma, physical 
pain and artistic or literary talent. The choice of Alexander Pope, who is, we are told, “the 
English Voltaire,” to draw out these natural threads may seem odd, but students of 
literature are as aware of the poet’s verse as they are of his osteopathic deformity (he was 
a hunchback). In a footnote, La Mettrie suggests this condition might be “the effect of the 
mother’s imagination or strong emotions on the foetus.” The explicit reference to the 
disfigured physiognomy of genius anticipates the more clinically developed pathological 
profiles of artists and others elaborated in nineteenth-century criminological tomes. He 
writes: 
The efforts and nerves of his genius are etched on his physiognomy; it is totally 
convulsed, his eyes are starting out of their sockets and his eyebrows are lifted by the 
muscles of his forehead. Why? Because the source of his nerves is in labour and all his 
body must feel the effects of such a difficult birth. Where would all these phenomena 
come from if there were no internal string pulling thus on the outer ones?
113
 
La Mettrie’s Machine Man does not, like Baumgarten’s treatises, draw from scientific 
critical method to formulate a science of artistic aesthetics. Rather the text is a work of 
medical philosophy and posits the operations of intellection, feeling, and the ‘soul’, in the 
corporeal materiality and physiological mechanisms of the body. In its articulation of 
sensate life the treatise blurs the boundaries between man and animal, zoë and bios, and 
asserts the authority of medical doctors in the management of this state of affairs. 
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Pathological processes, injury, pain and their physiognomic traumatic traces form what 
we might call an ‘aesthetics of the laboratory’. These same biological processes begin to 
migrate to artistic subjectivity. La Mettrie weaves the threads of medical biography to 
those of artistic genius; the artist’s own difficult birth is linked to both his deformity and 
his genius, and then, by a discursive mirror to a much larger birth scene – a bio-aesthetic 
allegory of artistic creation itself.  
Discourses on Beauty and Pain 
La Mettrie, who had himself painted and engraved as a second Democritus, laughs on the 
first time we look at him. Look at him oftener, and he grows from a philosopher into a 
fool. His laugh becomes a grin. (Lessing) 
Having sketched the emergence of the biocultural or biomedical discourses culminating 
in the special subjectivity of the artistic genius in La Mettrie’s Machine Man, I would like 
briefly to examine the first significant art historical discourses that reflect the influence of 
these developments on the emergence of early clinical-aesthetic form. The texts I have 
chosen by Winckelmann and Lessing are eighteenth-century neoclassical discourses that 
entail analyses of pain as depicted in the famous Laocoön group. With these texts, 
physical suffering asserts its ‘facticity’ against the ‘factitiousness’ of artistic 
representations. Pain assumes the stature of a ‘master referent’ which no artistic 
representation can adequately contain or exceed, and which confounds and transfigures 
art’s traditional ‘master signifier’, transcendental beauty. These discourses set the 
representation of the body and its sensory extreme as the natural limit for the conception, 
production and experience of art and literature. This new limit also produces a new 
awareness of the spatial and temporal properties of the artistic mediums themselves, an 
awareness likewise derived from the empirical life sciences, and sets into play a bio-
 50 
aesthetic discursive and mimetic ordeal which will be returned to by artists and theorists 
of the ensuing centuries.  
Laocoôn, the Rhodian sculpture (figure 1.4) depicts the Trojan priest Laocoön and his 
sons Antiphantes and Thymbraeus crushed to death by giant sea snakes. The sculpture 
has been attributed to the artist ‘collective’ (gleaned by Winckelmann and other 
historians at the time from a text by Pliny) of Polydorus, Hagesandros and Athenodoros, 
and has been dated 25 BC. It may be a copy of a much older Greek bronze. It was 
excavated from a site near the church of Santa Maria Maggiore in Rome in 1506. The 
statue attracted considerable attention as an object of critical and historical speculation 
and research in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, all focused on the nature of 
corporeal suffering and the representation of suffering in the plastic arts. I suggest that 
this reflects the growing influence of the biological and physiological sciences and the 
assertion of a biological ontology, and its bio-corporeal referent, the living body itself, 
and the encroachment of a bio-aesthetic understanding of art.  
In his study of “Laocoönean” discourse, Simon Richter proposes that the eighteenth-
century neo-classical aesthetics of beauty is actually an aesthetics of pain. He continues, 
suggesting that neo-classical aesthetic discourses and their ‘counter-discourses’, notably 
Haller’s physiology, “should no longer be artificially separated,” but should be 
considered as two aspects of an “historically specific understanding of the human 
body.”114 The distinguished Germanist’s study provides an important guide for my own 
understanding of these discourses and supports my claims for the biocultural intersection 
of clinical and artistic/critical thought forms. However, Richter’s treatment of these 
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discourses emphasizes their differences and is especially attuned to their linguistic 
contortions. For Richter, eighteenth-century German neoclassicism comprises a map of 
disparate discursive channels carved out by biographically entwined writers who at times 
purposely misread/mistranslate each other (and their primary sources) in order to project 
their own remarkable personal aesthetic theories onto the work. He also contends that a 
number of these important thinkers, Winckelmann and Lessing specifically, take on the 
topic in order to aggressively circumvent, or altogether repress the implications of 
corporeal suffering to the metaphysics of beauty; each of their discourses “seeks to avoid 
a direct confrontation with the problem of the representation of pain, and instead attempts 
to trope pain through one strategy or another.”115 Haller on the other hand confesses, at 
the opening of his famous dissertation, “I have indeed had to carry out hateful 
cruelties”116 which indicates to Richter the forthrightness of what Avital Ronell calls “the 
experimental disposition.”117 That Haller had, through an elaborately troped and 
disavowing anthropocentric rationality, formulated a theory of sensation depriving 
animals of the actuality of their pain in order to carry out his lab atrocities is not 
mentioned in Richter’s text.  
It is my contention, regardless of the differences, linguistic nuances and strategies of 
avoidance and one-upmanship at work in these texts, that taken together they reflect the 
saturation of the cultural and critical field by emerging biomedical science and its 
sensory-corporeal referent. All these texts bear witness to the gradual bio-aesthetic 
absorption of modern pain as it was clinically rendered in the new life science 
laboratories, even if they do so in the manner of avoidance, reversal, or denial. I further 
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contend that the agonistic antinomy of pain and beauty marks out the bio-aesthetic origin 
of modern artistic and literary formalism. Neo-classical aestheticians took from Haller’s 
laboratory practice the methods of clinical perception including an empirical 
disinterestedness that comes into play in the modern appreciation and analysis of works 
of art.  
Johann Winckelmann’s Reflections on the Initiation of Greek Works in Painting and 
Sculpture (1755)(figure 1.6) is the first of these discourses to consider the intersection of 
pain and beauty as represented in the Laocoön sculpture. The father of art history ascribes 
to the work a “noble simplicity and quiet grandeur”118 that he contends is characteristic of 
ancient Greek art in general. “Just as the depths of the sea always remain calm however 
much the surface may rage,” he writes, “so does the expression of the figures of the 
Greeks reveal a great and composed soul even in the midst of passion.”119 In 
Winckelmann’s account of the Laocoön group there are traces of a vitalistic aesthetics in 
the description of the ways in which pain travels and is formally articulated in every 
material particle and spatial turn of the work. Winckelmann’s focus on the face, which 
seems uncannily calm to the great Hellenist, and more specifically on the contorted forms 
of isolated individual muscle groups, indicates a physiological-clinical turn:  
Such a [noble and grand] soul is reflected in the face of Laocoön – and not in the face 
alone – despite his violent suffering. The pain is revealed in all the muscles and sinews 
of the body, and we ourselves can almost feel it as we observe the painful contraction 
of the abdomen alone without regarding the face and other parts of the body.
120
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Winckelmann further contends, that despite such a physiological ordeal, which ultimately 
leads to the “destruction” of Laocoön and his sons, the priest’s paternal dignity remains 
intact. 
This pain … expresses itself with no sign of rage in his face or in his entire bearing. 
He emits no terrible screams such as Virgil’s Laocoön, for the opening of his mouth 
does not permit it; it is rather an anxious and troubled sighing … The physical pain 
and the nobility of soul are distributed with equal strength over the entire body and 
are, as it were, held in balance with one another. Laocoön suffers, but he suffers like 
Sophocles’ Philoctetes; his pain touches our very souls, but we wish that we could 
bear misery like this great man.
121
 
For Winckelmann, the depiction of pain must not attain simply to a skillful rendering of 
“suffering alone,” and spectacles of “passion and violence” characteristic of religious art 
must be avoided.
122
 The German neo-classicist takes a swipe at the exaggerated 
emotionalism of baroque art, devotional works, and Italian high mannerism, which he 
detested. Rather, the eruptive moment of Laocoön’s cry is stifled, and systematically 
folded into the ‘noble grandeur’ of the entire work. Winckelmann frames the antimony of 
beauty and pain as a struggle of forces, a physiological-semiotic ordeal of suffering and 
expression, presided over by a calm and disinterested soul that pacifies and holds the 
horrible scene together. This I contend is the clinical-aesthetic birth scene of modern 
formalism, and we will find this scene (re)enacted in Lessing’s discourse, and again in 
the surface gaze of Greenbergian retinalism. The following passage sums this scene up: 
The more tranquil the state of the body the more capable it is of portraying the true 
character of the soul. In all positions too removed from this tranquility, the soul is not 
in its most essential condition, but in one that is agitated and forced. A soul is more 
apparent and distinctive when seen in violent passion, but it is great and noble when 
seen in a state of unity and calm. The portrayal of suffering alone in Laocoön would 
have been parenthyrsos; therefore the artist, in order to unite the distinctive and noble 
qualities of the soul, showed him in an action that was closest to a state of tranquility 
for one in such pain. But in this tranquility the soul must be distinguished by traits that 
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are uniquely its own and give it a form that is calm and active at the same time, quiet 
but not indifferent or sluggish.
123
  
Winckelmann’s wistful rumination asserts the signifying and formative power of beauty 
over the destructive forces of pain; yet aesthetic form visibly manifests to mortal eyes 
when the soul responds to painful stimulation, hence the text mirrors both Haller’s and La 
Mettrie’s observations of the soul made clinically visible in the agitated states of disease 
and dismemberment.  
Another aspect of Winckelmann’s discourse points to the emergence of bio-aesthetics; 
he contends that the successful treatment of pain and beauty in the overall conception of 
the Laocoön is indicative of the moral and spiritual nobility of the ancient Greek race:  
The expression of such nobility of soul goes far beyond the depiction of beautiful 
nature. The artist had to feel the strength of this spirit in himself and then impart it on 
his marble. Greece had artists who were at once philosophers … Wisdom extended its 
hand to art and imbued its figures with more than common souls.
124
  
Winckelmann seems to suggest (which might seem at odds with his formalism, though I 
would suggest that these discourses, like all discourses, carry the discursive seeds of what 
might later evolve into competing discourses) an early expressivist model of art, one in 
which the artist’s inner contents, which are the biocultural crystallizations of culture and 
race, are projected into artistic form. Those cultures, races and/or nations that produce 
artists who are also philosophers are the most advanced. What begins as a reflection on 
the beautiful representation of pain in art expands into a bio-political art historical 
program that links art (specifically beautiful representations of extreme pain), to the 
biocultural matrix of culture, race, soul and the anthropological staples of character 
strength, talent, and disposition. 
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Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry 
(1766) (figure 1.5) takes up with Winckelmann’s discourse and develops a lengthy, 
somewhat prolix, and more programmatic and clinically inflected understanding of the 
Laocoön group.
125
 Lessing’s discourse introduces a new form of reflexive empiricism 
into the calculations of bodies and artistic forms, and problematizes anatomy and art 
through a novel figuration of space and time into the beauty/pain equation. His analysis 
of the artistic and literary representation of pain opens onto a compelling attempt to 
formulate, in Baumgarten’s sense, a comprehensive aesthetic system linking the formal 
and signifying capacities of visual art and poetry to the specifications of the respective 
mediums themselves. Thus begins one of the significant threads of bio-aesthetics, 
characterized by a clinical-empirical drive toward medium specialization in the arts. 
Lessing’s text stages a disruptive encounter between the old Horatian doctrine of poesis 
et pictura and a new empirical sense of mediums and forms derived from the methods of 
observation developed in the clinics, between the old anatomy of Vesalius and the new 
physiology rendered in sculptural form. 
Lessing begins his discourse by first acknowledging that art and literature must face 
the current pressures of social and scientific developments. Not without a trace of 
remorse, even resentment, he admits as a modern that while the ancient Greeks focused 
on the portrayal of beautiful bodies “art has been given a far wider scope in modern 
times. It is claimed that representation in the arts covers all of visible nature, of which the 
beautiful is but a small part.”126 He concurs with Winckelmann that pain presents a 
potentially catastrophic challenge, an un-representable limit, to the visual and literary arts 
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as they had been understood. Lessing reverently samples Winckelmann’s reflections on 
the Greeks, though he fundamentally disagrees with the historicist’s adherence to ancient 
Horatian doctrine, and takes aim at Winckelmann’s soul-based aesthetics in favour of his 
reductive-formalist aesthetics which demands of art a rigorous beauty grounded in form: 
The master [of Laocoôn[ strove to attain the highest beauty possible under the given 
condition of physical pain. The demands of beauty could not be reconciled with the 
pain in all its disfiguring violence, so it had to be reduced. The scream had to be 
softened to a sigh, not because screaming betrays an ignoble soul, but because it 
distorts the features in a disgusting manner.
127
 
Lessing further contends that “the reasons why the master of the Laocoön was obliged to 
exercise moderation in expressing physical pain”128 are inextricably linked to the 
representational and formal structures “that have been derived from the special nature of 
the visual arts (themselves), their limitations and their requirements.”129 According to 
Lessing, explicit representations of suffering in painting and sculpture, although not those 
in literature or poetry, are excessive and ultimately fail because they overshoot their 
representational task, producing overwhelming effects that are shocking, grotesque, 
comic, or combinations thereof. He explains this is so because the formal and material 
requisites of sculpture and painting, and those of poetry require entirely different formal 
and material maneuvers. He imagines the mouth of the Laocoön had it been sculpted at 
the moment of calling out:  
Simply imagine Laocoön’s mouth forced wide open, and then judge! Imagine him 
screaming, and then look! From a form which inspired pity because it possessed 
beauty and pain at the same time, it has now become an ugly, repulsive figure from 
which we gladly turn away. For the sigh of pain provokes distress; however, the 
distress should be transformed, through beauty in the tender feeling of pity.
130
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Lessing’s text is replete with descriptions of physical suffering as well as the affects of 
disgust, offence, humour, compassion, that these depictions elicit in the spectator. 
Richter, leveling a familiar post-modern critique at this formalism, contends that 
Lessing’s text weaves an elaborate rhetorical “veiling” of the corporeal suffering 
represented in the work.
131
 This may point to, as Richter suggests, Lessing’s conflicted 
fascination and revulsion with corporeality and its representations; however, it is my 
contention that this veiling, this discursive suppression, is an indicator of the 
encroachment of clinical empiricism on aesthetic experience and discourse. It is not 
simply the artistic representation of mortal physical suffering that is distressing to 
Lessing, but also, much like a live animal in the life science laboratory, the obtrusion of 
the actual sculptural thing into the space of the spectator.   
Lessing averts his eyes from the signs of pain, but fixes his clinical gaze on 
distinguishing between the mediums themselves. Key to understanding these distinctions 
are the specific roles that time and space play in the material and formal specifications of 
each. The old doctrine of Homeric mimesis held that poetry and painting produced the 
same effects and resonances in readers and viewers, that poetry and painting formed a 
single field of artistic coherence. Lessing applies a more precise empirical probity to the 
analysis of visual and poetic works, treating the two forms as very distinct objects. Like 
the physiologist he assigns to each a temporal and spatial specificity entirely bound up 
with the material and signifying capacities of each. Lessing assigns very low aesthetic 
merit to descriptive or ‘landscape poets’, contending that landscape is the proper subject 
of painters, and not poets. Ironically it was this genre of verse that Haller produced and 
upon which his literary reputation was based. In any case, according to Lessing painting 
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and sculpture are strictly plastic or spatial arts, and derive their signifying powers from 
the ‘natural signs’ derived from space: colour, line, contour, volume. Literature, drama 
and poetry are time-based arts, and hence produce aesthetic significance through the 
temporal structures of sequence, plot, versification, rhythm, analogy, and so forth. 
Lessing further contends that, although the visual arts are spatial, works of art must 
function in a complex network of relations that includes the position of the spectator. He 
instructs us that sculpture and painting must focus or culminate in a singular moment of 
significant form plucked from a stream of representations and forms:  
If the artist can never make use of more than a single moment in ever-changing nature, 
and if the painter in particular can use this moment only with reference to a single 
vantage point, while the works of painter and sculptor are created not merely to be 
given a glance to be contemplated – contemplated repeatedly and at length – then it is 
evident that this single moment and the point from which it is viewed cannot be 
chosen with too great a regard for its effect. 
132
  
He goes on to tease apart the finer points that distinguish visual from literary arts, and 
sets forth a semiotics of art that locates the distinctive spatial and temporal domains of 
their sign systems. “I reason thus,” he writes: 
That if it is true that in its imitations painting uses completely different means or signs 
than does poetry, namely figures and colors in space rather than articulated sounds in 
time, and if these signs must indisputably bear a suitable relation to the thing signified, 
then signs existing in space can express only objects whose wholes or parts coexist, 
while signs that follow one another can express only objects whose wholes or parts are 
consecutive. 
Objects or parts of objects which exist in space are called bodies. Accordingly, bodies 
with their visible properties are the true subjects of painting. 
Objects or parts of objects which follow one another are called actions. Accordingly, 
actions are the true subjects of poetry.
133
 
Lessing’s adoption of a scientific style of rationalization reveals a deeper epistemological 
affinity with the emerging bio-physical sciences. In the ontological world of referents, of 
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natural objects, which the contemporaneous empirical life sciences made an incontestable 
case for, works of art and literature must be regarded as distinctive and complex objects 
in themselves. Hence, the temporal-spatial limits Lessing imposes on each of the 
mediums sets into play a layered and complex matrix made up of three ‘bodies’, 
reflective of an incipient clinical methodology: artworks, representations, and spectators. 
Bodies in space are also bodies in time, and it is the spatial and temporal materiality of 
the mediums themselves, and the distinctive properties of their means and signs, that 
determine the spatio-temporal nature of representation they produce. This semiotic 
understanding is preceded and indeed authorized by the challenges of Hallerian 
physiology which, we recall, temporalized anatomy: 
Bodies do not exist in space only, but also in time. They persist in time, and in each 
moment of their duration they may assume a different appearance or stand in a 
different combination. Each of these momentary appearances and combinations is the 
result of a preceding one and can be the cause of a subsequent one, which means that 
it can be, as it were, the center of an action. Consequently, painting too can imitate 
actions, but only by suggestion through bodies … Painting can use only a single 
moment of an action in its coexisting compositions and must therefore choose the one 




Again, Richter contends that the lines Lessing draws around the mediums, and the 
signifying and formal properties proper to each involves a kind of discursive avoidance 
that suppresses explicit representations of pain in favor of an overall ‘aesthetic system’. 
This approach reflects a particular post-modern outlook of the 1980s and 1990s which 
insisted on representation against late modernist formalisms. While it is true that 
Lessing’s text seems to skirt the issue of the representation of pain with a formalist 
scheme, I contend that Lessing’s suppression or deferral of represented pain in favour of 
an overall temporal and spatial configuration of forms is analogous to, and draws its 




approach from, Haller’s clinical physiology. Haller’s infusion of time into the old fixed 
anatomical structures pointed to a new biological mechanics that focused on spatial-
temporal interactions, processes and structures and his revolutionary concept of organic 
form was quite literally drawn from the living bodies of his test subjects. The following 
passage from Haller’s lab notes, with their brutal description of his laboratory procedure, 
is in shocking contrast to Lessing’s discourse; however, it displays a clinical aesthetic 
disinterestedness that is also in Lessing’s text: 
I exposed that part in living animals of several species and various ages that was in 
question. I waited until the animal was calm and had stopped screaming, and when it 
was quiet and peaceful I stimulated the exposed part by blowing, by heat, alcohol, 
with the knife, with corrosive stone … I then observed whether the animal were 
brought out of its calm and its silence by touching, splitting, cutting, burning or 
ripping; whether it threw itself back and forth, or drew the limb into itself, and 
twitched with the wound, whether cramped twitching showed in this limb, or whether 
nothing of all this occurred. I recorded the repeated results as they happened.
135
  
Haller’s clinical approach, as Richter points out, bears out what Elaine Scarry describes 
as “the objectification of the subjective attributes of pain.”136 In this manifestation of the 
clinical gaze, to quote Foucault, the “empirical contents [are] detached from 
representations” to reveal the “[physiological] principles of their existence within 
themselves.”137 It no longer matters that the cat is suffering inexcusably but that its 
anguished movements signify the forces at life’s source. Haller records what he sees as 
he carries out his procedures in a placid clinical discourse that defers or reduces the 
actual anguish of his laboratory subjects to an overall scientific formalism; laboratory-
induced live indications of suffering are abstracted into the empirical components of a 
larger scientific program, a kind of clinical formalism which emphasizes the appearance 
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of agony (the physical form that pain assumes – twitching, etc.) rather than on its content 
– or the idea that pain is happening. 
Lessing does not reference Haller’s physiological studies or his laboratory 
observations in his essay – though he does dismiss his landscape verse.138 Still, he adopts 
an analogous aesthetic distance in his analysis of the Laocoön. At the same time there is, 
as in Haller’s text, an abundance of explicit descriptions of and reflections on the nature 
of mortal suffering. Despite the effort Lessing makes to soften the signs of pain in the 
artistic depiction of extreme suffering to the overall purposes of aesthetic form, the 
“shrieks” of the dying priest, as well as those of Philoctetes, Oedipus, Hercules and 
Lichas, reverberate throughout the discourse like disruptive, rhythmic textual stigmata. 
While Lessing ruminates on the relative merits of open mouths and contorted furrows in 
the literary and sculptural formalizations of Laocoön’s pain, the suffering father’s cries 
erupt throughout the text as indexes of what Lessing calls “actual performances.”139 
These cries scriptively mark the surface of serene discourse as indexes of an unsignifiable 
real worked out in the modern laboratory perhaps, or on the modern battlefields, actual 
performances which exceed, trouble and animate the factitious domain of cultural 
production. 
Lessing’s text would indeed instigate further critical efforts to conflate physiological 
science and a science of the arts; Johann Gottfried Herder, proto-Romantic philosopher 
and Haller’s medical student, developed a more precise theory of medium specificity that 
linked Haller’s and La Mettrie’s physiology (though Herder was a fierce Francophobe) to 
artistic experience. Taking issue with Lessing’s space-visual art/time-poetry schema, 
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Herder posits music within the sensate temporal dimension of auditory experience, and 
contends that painting and sculpture must be divided along the lines of the visual and the 
tactile, respectively. The effect was to further “somatize” the aesthetic, making the 
various arts “plastic” articulations or appurtenances of the human body and its sensory 
apparatus .However, Baumgarten’s call for a science of “sensate discourse” – a science of 
sensitive perceptions, of sensibility and aesthetic pleasures and forms, finds its most 
comprehensive and compelling response in the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant not only 
fleshes out, if you will, a domain of the aesthetic that is distinct from the domain of 
metaphysics and abstract reason, he critically refurbished metaphysical speculation with 
concepts and terminologies derived from the emerging life sciences, and from 
Baumgartean aesthetics. 
The Clinical Epistemology of Kant’s Philosophy and Aesthetics 
In the following pages I turn to the philosophy and aesthetics of Immanuel Kant, as it is 
my contention that Kant’s cycle of critiques functions as a summa of the epistemological 
transformations borne of the biological conception of life, of zoë or bioforce, and of the 
aesthetic trends described in this paper. Furthermore, Kant adapts key terminologies from 
the natural sciences and aesthetics to explain cognitive processes and mental states that 
until this time had been explained in extra-corporeal terms. He also adopts a decidedly 
clinical method in his critical approach. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant turns the 
critical powers of reason in reflexive fashion upon itself in order to empirically deduce its 
physiological workings. However, before taking up the bio-clinical mentality of Kant’s 
critiques, it will be worthwhile first to place his efforts within the context of the central 
philosophical ordeal of the eighteenth century; like neo-classical art criticism, the old 
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queen of all sciences had to wrest with the new biological finitude of live bodies, and 
with clinical protocols of an emerging experimental laboratory life science. 
As we have seen in the previous section, the emergence of a biological conception of 
life radically altered traditional artistic experience; it brought with it a whole new set of 
conceptual and representational ambiguities, and these entailed the inadequacies of 
traditional metaphysical concepts to account for this new and unavoidable biological 
force. We might coin this new problematic scheme the ordeal of the bio-referent. The 
problematising power that life exerted over these discourses was partly bound up with its 
discursively undecidable status.  
Philosopher and aesthetician Giorgio Agamben has written that any “undertaking (of) 
a genealogical study of the concept of life in our culture, one of the first and most 
instructive observations to be made is that the concept never gets defined as such.”140 
Yet, he continues, this thing (he indeed refers to it as a thing, as it is inseparable from the 
body) regardless of how indeterminate it may seem, has been “articulated and divided 
time and again through a series of caesurae and oppositions that invest it with a decisive 
strategic function in domains as apparently distant as philosophy, theology, (and) 
politics.”141 In philosophical terms, what the new biological referent disrupted or skewed 
was the traditional metaphysical distinction between matter and spirit and its seemingly 
endless chain of derivatives. As the new biological sciences probed deeper into the 
dynamic structures of this referent, evolving from an anatomical to physiological 
understanding of living beings – laying down a great vivisectionist swath as it did, there 
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emerged a new “zone of indiscernability”142 in which divisions between mental activity 
and corporeal existence, man and animal, inside and outside – indeed the bifurcations that 
make up the divided character of Western rationality – were no longer so clear. The 
philosophical problem set into play by the emerging biological sciences was to define the 
interaction of mind and matter within a single human organism.
143
 This was precisely the 
bio-philosophical ordeal at the core of Haller’s laboratorial effort, as he struggled to pry 
apart those processes and bloody structures of living material within the formalized 
cruelty of the laboratory with the purpose of nailing down the physical site, the nerve, 
fiber or coil that served as the soul’s portal into mortal, physical life.  
In the higher precincts of eighteenth-century philosophical thought, this ordeal was 
expressed as an antagonism between two opposing schools. The first was rationalism 
grounded in the Classical philosophy of Rene Descartes and whose representative figures 
included Christian Wolff (one of the most successful academics of his day and 
affectionately referred to by his university acolytes as Wolfius) and Nicolas Malebranche. 
The rationalists held that the phenomenal world and its empirically observable aspects are 
ordered by a transcendent set of laws or first principles accessed by reason and the 
application of logic and mathematics. The rationalists adhered to the Aristotelian 
protocols of substance according to which each thing has unique properties that constitute 
it. For example, for Aristotle, consciousness is the constitutive or substantive property of 
the mind, and extension (length, breadth, depth) the essential property of matter.
144
 As 
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Kantian scholar W. T. Jones has pointed out, Descartes exaggerated this distinction in an 
effort to put the new sciences “on a firm philosophical ground” and “(divided) reality into 
two distinct substances, matter and mind.”145  
British empiricists took up against the rationalists and contended that reason, not 
empirical sense, was prone to flux and fanciful flights. David Hume, motivated by a 
remarkable if unrelenting skepticism, insisted that reason if left to its own devices 
invariably devolves into solipsistic phantasm or subjectivism. Worse, Hume ascribes to 
the speculative philosophical drive the germinate zeal of religious, puritanical 
irrationalism. He famously writes in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
(1748): 
The passion for philosophy, that for religion, seems liable to this inconvenience, that, 
though it aims at the correction of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may 
only serve, by imprudent management, to foster a predominant inclination, and push 
the mind, with more determined resolution, towards that side, which already draws too 
much, by the bias and propensity of the natural temper. It is certain, that, while we 
aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philosophic sage, and endeavor to confine 
our pleasures altogether within our own minds, we may, at last, render our philosopher 
like that of Epictetus, and other stoics, only a more refined system of selfishness, and 
reason ourselves out of all virtue, as well as social enjoyment.
146
  
The great British empiricist voices a familiar skepticism associated with Enlightenment-
era empirical thought, one that will be incorporated into Kant’s critical approach to 
reason and aesthetics. Hence, for Hume the path to knowledge was bound to sound 
observations made within the strict clinical-empirical limits of things-in-themselves.  
Kant approached this rationalist-empirical aporetic divide head-on. In retrospect, of 
course, Kant’s critiques must be deemed highly speculative – he was after all a German 
idealist, and his philosophy retains significant aspects of rationalism. Yet, I contend that 
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regardless of this idealist turn, his speculations on the mind’s capacity to formulate 
concepts and representations which correspond to the world reflects an incipient bio-
cultural rationale and entails a clinical analytical approach as well as a cautious but 
comprehensive shift toward aesthetics and the science of corporeal being.  
Kant took Hume’s skeptical empiricism very seriously and posited a vast domain of 
inchoate materiality, a space made entirely of Humean things-in-themselves that 
encompasses individual subjects and the epistemological communis they occupy. He 
coins the term noumenon or noumena for this uncanny material enclosure.
147
 The 
noumenon, which might be likened to the Lacanian real, is the material substrate from 
which human consciousness, or for Kant, the “transcendental aesthetic,”148 pieces 
together its knowledge of phenomena.  
Another significant aspect of Kant’s philosophical cycle is its clinical methodology. In 
the first Critique Kant introduced a new modality of critical reflexivity, what Avital 
Ronell calls “a structure of incessant research,”149 which, in the manner of an arduous 
thought experiment, turns philosophical probity back upon itself in order to test its own 
limits, thus establishing for philosophy a new scientific relationship to truth. Kant also 
conceived of his philosophical endeavors under the general rubric of critique; as practice 
critique – modeled on the testing protocols of scientific method – entails the empirical 
excision of philosophical concepts from their conventional understandings in order to 
establish the epistemological basis, the validity, and soundness of these concepts 
according to their own logic.  
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Kant ultimately fixes his analytical gaze on the cognitive apparatus of the 
philosophical subject itself. In The Critique of Pure Reason Kant posits a faculty of 
reason within the thinking individual and from there, in the manner of a physiologist of 
the mind, teases apart its structures and limits, and maps out its inner movements. Kant 
even turns this clinical gaze inward:  
I deal solely with reason itself and its pure thinking and to gain comprehensive 
acquaintance with my reason I need not search far from myself. For I encounter it 
within myself, and common logic already provides me with an example (which shows) 
that all simple acts of reason can be enumerated completely and systematically.
150
  
Kant contends the need for this critical reflexivity has been made necessary by the 
‘flourishing’ of the natural sciences and their rapidly-developing methodological rigor. 
The rigor of the experimental method must also be applied to philosophy and 
metaphysics. For Kant, reason must enter into a “disagreement with itself” and turn its 
own capacities for critique upon itself: 
Our age is properly the age of critique, and to critique everything must submit. 
Religion and legislation commonly seek to exempt themselves from critique, religion 
through its sanctity and legislation through its majesty. But in doing so they arouse 
well-deserved suspicion and cannot lay claim to unfeigned respect; such respect is 
accorded by reason only to what has been able to withstand reason’s free and open 
examination…151 
He underscores the importance of scientific method in the subjective auto-critique of 
reason in a later passage: 
[The] task of [this] critique of pure speculative reason consists in the described attempt 
to transform the procedure previously followed in metaphysics, by subjecting 
metaphysics to a complete revolution, thus following the example set by the 
geometricians and investigators of nature.
152
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We have in Kant’s text a most remarkable manifestation of modern clinical self-
reflexivity; in this case the ‘truth’ protocols of the emerging empirical sciences are traced 
into a new species of philosophical subject. In keeping with the general clinical-aesthetic 
introjection of reason into the subject, the philosopher pulls cognition and speculation 
down from the rationalist ether and posits reason within the biological finitude of the 
individual, thus introducing into his philosophy the modern anthropological conception 
of ‘man’ as the subject of his own scientific, philosophical and artistic study.  
Another aspect of Kant’s aesthetic epistemology articulated in the first critique to 
carry profound implications vis-à-vis the new bio-clinical outlook is the positing of space 
and time and as the a priori formal structures of human intuition. The philosophical 
exposition of the apriority of space and time, which is truly a revolutionary challenge to 
the traditional Aristotelian and Cartesian doctrines of substance, is established in the first 
pages of the critique:  
[What] are space and time? Are they actual beings? Are they only determinations of 
things, or for that matter, relations among them? If so, are they at least determinations 
or relations that would belong to things intrinsically? Or are they determinations and 
relations that adhere only to the form of intuition and hence to the subjective character 
of our mind, so that apart from that character these predicates cannot be ascribed to 
anything at all? For the presentation of space must already lie at the basis in order for 
certain sensations to be referred to as something outside me … the presentation of 
space cannot be one that we take from the relations of outer appearance by means of 
experience: rather, only through the presentation of space is that outer experience 
possible in the first place.
153
  
Kant contends that time, like space, is not discursively or abstractly deduced from the 
phenomenal world but is a ‘subjective condition’, an ‘internal intuition’ which precedes 
understanding and its objects. Through this extraordinary inversion of traditional 
philosophical schema., the empirically deducible formal properties of things themselves – 
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space and time – are refigured as the properties of human thought in its most rudimentary 
form. Again, we find a strange and beautiful turn of physiological thought, in which the 
older metaphysical anatomy of fixed substances and essences, is supplanted with a 
receptive subject-based spatio-temporal thinking structure.  
Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1792), the third and final installment of his philosophical 
cycle, approaches the topic of aesthetics as a distinct domain of knowledge and sets out to 
formalize through, again, a scrupulous clinical methodology, a science of judgment. The 
work follows the format of his first critique and is divided into two sections, “The 
Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” and the “Critique of Teleological Judgment.” Like his 
epistemology of reason, Kant’s aesthetics is subject-based. He posits a distinct a-priori 
cognitive faculty of judgment, which functions as the subjective link between the higher 
capacities of reason and understanding outlined in the first critique.
154
 
The first section, “The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” is concerned with the 
subjectively grounded somatic experiences of pleasure, of delight, the particulars of 
gustatory experience, and also with the more nuanced operations of aesthetic judgment in 
the appreciation and creation of works of art. With this first section Kant introduces a set 
of concepts that are regarded as staples of modernist aesthetics, including his elaborations 
on the beautiful and the sublime, and his definitions of artistic culture, taste, quality, 
artistic genius, and aesthetic form (which is derived through feeling and not deduced 
through concepts, as in classical aesthetics). The second section, “The Critique of 
Teleological Judgment,” addresses the role of subjective judgment in relation to  
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the overall comprehension of natural and biological design, and hence assigns to aesthetic 
judgment a role in scientific understanding.  
The clinical turn is also evident in Kant’s aesthetics and not only in its methodological 
approach to the topic but also in the subtle movement of aesthetic experience itself. Kant 
introduces a modality of aesthetic intellection, a reflective counterpart if you will, to the 
critical reflexivity posited in the first critique.
155
 For Kant, the reflective modality of the 
aesthetic couples taste with a non-desiring modality of attention he coins “disinterested 
interest.”156 Aesthetic understanding “necessarily follows the bent of its own nature 
without ulterior aim” and he further contends that “(one) must not be in the least 
prepossessed in favour of the existence of the thing, but must preserve complete 
indifference in this respect, in order to play the part of judge in matters of taste.”157 Such 
an indifferent perspective - a paradoxically subjective yet extremely detached and areal 
attitude– I suggest, shares certain features with the observational methods of the 
previously discussed clinical scientists who assumed empirical indifference in their 
laboratory procedures. A similar attitude of disinterestedness becomes particularly 
refined in the early nineteenth century with the advance of the anatomical-clinical 
methods of the new physicians and surgeons. The new diagnostic procedures, as we will 
see in the subsequent chapter, entailed a certain instrumentalisation of visual sense, of 
what Foucault’s calls “the medical gaze,”158 through which the clinician observes the 
medical subject and the pathological processes as an assemblage of pictorial elements on 
a flat surface plane. 
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It must be pointed out, and this attests to how Kant’s conception of the experience of 
the beautiful radically departs from classical understanding, that a “judgment of taste” is 
bound up with the subjective and “is entirely independent of the concept of 
perfection.”159 For Kant, traditional beauty is understood in terms of “determinate” 
concepts, of ideals, but according to the aesthetic understanding, “there can be no 
objective rule…by which the beautiful can be defined.” For every judgment of taste “is 
aesthetic (and) its determining ground is the feeling of the subject, and not any concept of 
an object.”160 
In the third Critique Kant introduced the revolutionary notion that both nature and 
mind appear to make up a structurally interactive assemblage of inner and outer worlds, a 
kind of ‘embodied’ thought that suggests certain forms and laws of nature are reflexively 
compatible with the capacities of human intellection. Kant calls this apparent nature-mind 
interactivity “purposiveness,” and it is the complexity of this idea, perhaps more than any 
other, that has been lost in more recent art historical assessments of Kant’s ostensibly 
disembodied idealism.
161
 Purposiveness-subjectively unites “particular experiences into a 
connected system of nature.”162 In these subjective experiences of unity in nature, Kant 
writes, there are revealed “the possible existence of some among the many products of 
nature that, as if designed with special regard to our power of judgment, are a form 
particularly adapted to that faculty.”163 These experiences procure in the subject the most 
pleasurable sense of finality,
164
 and formal sufficiency. These linked concepts of 
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purposiveness and end pose a fundamental challenge to the Aristotelian notions of mental 
and material substance, the two concepts that underwrite opposing branches of the 
rationalist-empiricist philosophical divide. For Kant, purposiveness and objects as ends 
are threaded together by larger, teleological understanding of design, the analysis of 
which is taken up in the second part of the critique, “The Critique of Teleological 
Judgment.”  
Near the end of the third critique, in a compelling reflection on a tree as its own 
‘natural end’, Kant hints at, although guardedly, a biological basis for purposiveness that 
segues into a remarkable bio-cultural reflection on “the concept of an end of nature.”165 
In this passage, the reciprocal relationship of purposiveness to end is multiplied and 
expanded into a bio-geographic network that encompasses the entire natural world. The 
concept of life insinuates into Kant’s nature aesthetics as a kind of temporal-spatial 
extender; the addition of teleological time into the natural scheme stretches the ends of 
natural things into the ends of other natural things, hence in a significant way introducing 
a hit of life’s boundary- bending indeterminacy. If a tree is to be understood as a natural 
end in itself, he writes, it can only be so relative to the purposiveness and ends of other 
natural objects; its existence as an “individual” is entirely caught up in a marvelous 
network of natural-organic means: 
Rivers in their course carry down earth of all kinds that is good for the growth of 
plants, and this they deposit sometimes inland, sometimes at their mouths. On some 
coasts the high-tide carries this alluvial mud inland, or deposits not along the sea-
shore. Thus the fruitful soil is increased, especially where man helps to hinder the ebb 
tide carrying the detritus off again, and the vegetable kingdom takes root in the former 
abode of fish and crustaceans. Nature has in this way itself produced most accretions 
to the land, and is still, though slowly continuing the process…166 
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At the apex of purposiveness, Kant places works of fine art. “Fine art,” he states, “is an 
art, so far as it has at the same time the appearance of being nature.” Works of art, Kant 
contends, while products of artistic intention “must not have the appearance of being 
intentional. i.e. we must be able to look upon fine art as nature, although we recognize it 
to be art.”167  
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy contend that while Kant struggled to 
philosophically grasp the emerging biological understanding of life, his philosophical and 
aesthetic system (and its subject) halt and metaphysically disassociate in those very 
crucial passages where the concept of life asserts itself most strongly. For instance in the 
case of purposiveness, Kant seems to suggest a compelling formative link between 
consciousness and nature, for which works of art provide aesthetic embodiments; 
however, he critically dampens its implications by making it a heuristic or regulative 
device, a subjective modality of understanding.  
Kant’s reflexive critical (clinical) approach, according to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 
introduces a “hiatus…at the heart of the subject.” This hiatus, according to these authors, 
sets into play an epistemic motor, which they call “the will to system” 168 and which will 
be the force driving subsequent ‘subject-systems,’ from nineteenth-century positivism 
and pragmatism to late twentieth-century (post)structuralism. The great philosophical 
system builders (Hegel, Marx) forge ahead in an attempt to abolish, to fill the lack 
opened by this hiatus. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy also contend that the new relationship 
between philosophy and aesthetics which Kant’s cycle of critiques establishes provides a 
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“passage” to romanticism.169 Continuing this contention, I suggest, with Zuckert, that 
Kant’s postulation of purposiveness is crucial to developments in subsequent Romantic 
philosophy and aesthetics, and to the emergence of the organic conception, or vitalism, in 
philosophy and art.  
Schelling and Vitalism 
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the bio-philosophical instrumentalisation of 
Kantian purposiveness in early Romantic theory is the vitalist philosophy of Friedrich 
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. While Schelling’s work has yet to be as widely examined as 
his illustrious contemporaries, Hegel, Goethe and Hölderlin, his writings stage a 
compelling philosophical encounter with, in Foucauldean parlance, “life itself.”  
In Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1799), Kant’s clinical schema of 
critical self-awareness set forth in the “Transcendental Aesthetic” transmogrifies into the 
self-producing organic manifestation of nature itself. According to Schelling, Kant’s 
transcendental aesthetic did not go far enough to incorporate the emerging concept of life 
posited by the new sciences. Schelling’s system set out to bring the subject of Kant’s 
transcendental aesthetic into more explicit accordance with the biological spirit, with zoë. 
This would entail, in effect, a bio-emotionally charged (if you will) convergence of the 
reflexive and reflective subjects of Kant’s first and third Critiques. “The highest 
consummation of natural science would be the complete spiritualizing of all natural laws 
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into laws of intuition and thought ... The completed theory of nature would be that 
whereby the whole of nature as resolved into an intelligence.”170  
As historian of science Robert J. Richards points out, Schelling dispensed with the 
heuristic limits that Kant placed around the concepts of purposiveness and of the organic; 
Richards contends that for Schelling “the ubiquity of organic structures in nature” could 
be explained by the mind “only if mind, hence the world derived, revealed itself to be 
organic.”171 The mind, for Schelling, is organically omnipresent and “the still unwitting 
character of intelligence is already peeping through” even the most inanimate-seeming 
mineral forms. “Nature’s highest goal, to become wholly an object to herself,” he writes 
“is achieved only through the last and highest order of reflection which is none other than 
man.”172 
Schelling continues along the lines of a trend that individuates nature, and the clinical, 
auto-critical reflexivity of Kant’s “mental being,” is for Schelling the site of an original 
act of “becoming”; and each site (or subject) a particular instantiation of the “world 
system,” which, he writes, “is a kind of organization that has structured itself out of a 
common center.” Schelling ascribes to this common center an organizing “intentionality.” 
Hence, with this world system Kant’s purposiveness breaks out of its regulative limits to 
become nature’s own self-producing process:  
The continuous steady process of nature toward organization betrays clearly enough 
an active drive that, struggling with raw matter, at times conquers, at times is 
suppressed, now breaking more open, now into more limited forms. It is the universal 
mind of nature that gradually structures raw matter. From bits of moss, in which 
hardly any trace of organization is visible, to the most noble form, which seems to 
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have broken the chains of matter, and the same drive governs. This drive operates 
according to one and the same ideal of purposiveness and presses forward into infinity 
to express one and the same archetype, namely, the pure form of our mind. 
173
 
Schelling’s System moves away from the more discreet clinical-critical probity of Kant’s 
Critiques toward a natural philosophy of biological immanence, and an aesthetics of will, 
of biological will. We recall that in Kant’s teleology natural organisms are both ends-in-
themselves, and somewhat self-directed, while connected to a network of other ends. 
However, with Schelling, life forms are manifestations of a powerful singular bioforce 
that struggles in an infinite number of natural and subjective instantiations to attain self-
conscious being. And in this romantic scheme of things “the ideal world of art and the 
real world of objects are…products of one and the same activity,” namely the ongoing 
process of nature’s self-realizing consciousness.174  
Conclusion 
It has been my purpose with this chapter to map the features of an emerging clinical 
mentality the first traces of which may be found in the discourses of the emerging 
laboratory life sciences in the first half of the eighteenth century. The writings of the poet 
and physiologist Albrecht von Haller, and the treatises of materialist physician Jules 
d”Offary de La Mettrie, reflect a widespread effort at that time to explain the mechanisms 
of sensation, movement, and cognition in the non-metaphysical terminologies of a hard 
laboratory science. It is from these developments and their discourses – and the clinical 
method which the sciences devise to procure truth – that the paradigmatic eighteenth-
century program of aesthetic form derives its basic concepts and methods. Alexander 
Baumgarten is cited as the first cultural theorist to propose a “science” of artistic 
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experience, one that would approach the topic in terms of an “aesthetics,” or “sensate 
discourse.” However it is with the more formalized art historical and theoretical 
discourses of Winckelmann and, particularly Lessing, that the analysis of artistic works 
follows a clinical method; Lessing’s Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and 
Poetry, is simultaneously a semiotic study of the representation of mortal suffering and 
an early clinical-critical inquiry into the special features of the individual mediums 
themselves.  
The philosophy and aesthetics of Immanuel Kant provides a philosophical 
compendium of the emergence of this bio-clinical mentality. His critiques adopt concepts 
and terminologies developed by the new laboratory sciences, and the drift from 
philosophy to aesthetics reflected in the passage from the first to third critiques, is an 
index of a more general bio-cultural trend away from the traditional metaphysics of mind 
to a science of corporeality and the sensate. Kant’s hyper-critical approach to the analysis 
of reason and aesthetic judgment follows the same testing protocols that were being 
devised in the scientific laboratories at the time, and these protocols are in some ways 
instantiated in the hyper-reflexive/critical subject of the first critique. The modality of 
aesthetic intellection posited in the third critique – disinterestedness, shares a certain 
epistemological regularity with the detached observational techniques of earlier 
laboratory scientists; while the heuristic device of purposiveness subjectively links the 
forms of nature to an overall organic pattern or natural framework of reason. 
At the end of the eighteenth century, in the post-Kantian philosophical system of 
Schelling, purposiveness is deployed beyond the regulative encampment Kant confined it 
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to and the notion of organism and its cognates become “foundational concepts”175 in a 
new Romantic discourse that is at once philosophical, scientific and aesthetic. Schelling’s 
vitalism took up the organic turn of Kant’s aesthetic conception of purposiveness, and 
assigned to nature a creative will and an evolving stream of artistic motivations: in 
Schelling’s romantic biocentric system art and artists assume central roles in nature’s 
ordeal of bio-aesthetic immanence or self-realization. Schelling’s nature philosophy 
completes the eighteenth-century cycle of aesthetic clinicality I have attempted do draw 
out, and moves philosophical-aesthetic into the domain of bio-cultural immanence. This 
general framework of aesthetic clinicality, for which Kant’s philosophy supplies essential 
concepts, will function as a scaffold for the bio-aesthetic articulations of clinicalized 
perception, subjectivity and performativity taken up in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter Two 
Clinical and Aesthetic Perception 
 
Modern medicine has fixed its own date of birth as being in the last years of the 
eighteenth century. Reflecting on its situation, it identifies the origin of its positivity with 
a return – over and above all theory – to the modest but effecting leveling of the 
perceived. Michel Foucault 
 
Cubism undertook a completely two-dimensional transcription of three-dimensional 
phenomena…The world was stripped of its surface, of its skin, and the skin was spread 
flat on the flatness of the picture plane. Clement Greenberg  
 
…it is difficult to say where in fact the material ends and sensation begins; preparation 
of the canvas, the track of the brush’s hair… Deleuze and Guattari  
 
In the previous chapter I examined the effect of eighteenth-century empirical life science 
on early modern aesthetics, and placed these developments within the framework of an 
evolving biological-clinical mentality. In this chapter I seek to examine how these 
eighteenth-century developments have migrated to twentieth-century art and theory 
specifically as they pertain to the convergence of modern clinical and aesthetic 
perception, specifically the flat picture plane and its attentive surface gaze. It is my 
contention that the new empirical awareness of modern painting’s flatness is an index of 
the clinicalization of artistic perception, and of the assertion of what I identified in the 
previous chapter as the “bio-referent.”  
Flatness, indeed, makes a strong appearance in nineteenth-century modern painting; 
the realism of Gustav Courbet, and more profoundly the mature works of Edouard Manet 
embody a new consciousness of the flat canvas support. The highly activated retinalism 
of Impressionism and Pointillism, as well as the ecstatic assertion of color, pattern and 
the tactility of the matière in the works of the Nabis, Van Gogh, and other Post- and Neo-
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Impressionist painters are all produced by a new visual and tactile interaction with 
painting’s flat support.  
It is the late work of Paul Cezanne, produced in the early years of the twentieth 
century, that provides perhaps the most salient example – a first full-blown or index case 
of this new modality of aesthetic-clinical perception, if you will. While foregrounding 
facture through a tactile multi-sensory agglomeration of touch and sight, the late 
paintings together with the artist’s own comments about his project, also serve to 
underline the Kantian dimensions of clinicalized visual experience (figure 2.1). Jonathon 
Crary contends that the paintings from the middle of the 1890s to the end of his life in 
1906 – some appearing “unfinished” with exposed areas of unpainted canvas – comprise 
an artistic attempt to construct a position of sustained attention in the midst of modern 
life’s continuously accelerating sensory (over)stimulation; Cezanne’s assertion of the flat 
support, he contends, reflects a concerted effort to stabilize the stream of fragmented 
modern visual experience by grounding it in a new form of pictorial “substance.”176 
I suggest the painterly sensuality of Cezanne methods, and the particular species of 
artistic subjectivity that Cezanne embodies, must be placed within the larger archaeology 
of Kantian aesthetics and its clinically inflected modalities of reflective observation 
which I adumbrated in the previous chapter. Cezanne provided on-going commentary 
about his work in much discussed correspondences with a number of young painters – 
notably Joachim Gasquet and Emile Bernard. In these mostly short accessible letters, 
interspersed with observations about his health and Provence’s weather, the aged master 
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expounds to his admirers on “the truth about painting.”177 He returns repeatedly to a key 
set of notions that revolve around the topic of sensation, sensibility, and the compatibility 
of artistic temperament and the phenomenal world of the motif. In the following passage 
to Emile Bernard, Cezanne threads together a number of these significant concepts: 
I progress very slowly, for nature reveals herself to me in very complex ways; and the 
progress needed is endless. One must look at the model and feel very exactly, and also 
express oneself distinctly and with force. Taste is the best judge. It is rare. Art 
addresses itself only to an excessively limited number of individuals. The artist must 
scorn all judgment that is not based on an intelligent observation of character. He must 
beware of the literary spirit which so often causes the painter to deviate from his true 
path – the concrete study of nature – to lose himself too long in intangible speculation. 
The Louvre is a good book to consult but it must be only an intermediary. The real and 
immense study to be undertaken is the manifold picture of nature. 
178
 
Throughout these letters Cezanne emphasizes the role of empirical sensation, the 
specificity of the medium, the central place of nature, the difference between seeing and 
reading (seeing pictures at the Louvre amounts to a form of reading) as well as the 
sensibility – “the entire personality”179 of the painter. The letters abound with references 
to taste, to the “unity of the manifold,” as well as the special talents of the artist. Though 
Kant is not cited, Cezanne seems to have taken many of his ideas directly from the 
Critique of Judgment. Nowhere in these exchanges does Cezanne lapse into what Kant 
characterized as “beautiful formulas,” or a metaphysics of beauty, but remains firmly 
within the domain of subject-based aesthetics and “in the grip of sense-perceptions.”180 
“This is true, without any possible doubt,” his letter continues, “I am quite certain – an 
optical sensation is produced in our visual organs which allows us to classify the planes 
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represented by colour sensations as light, half tone or quarter tone.”181 With this, the 
mature painter seems to offer Bernard a physiologically instantiated account of artistic 
visual experience and of the a-priority of space, no doubt influenced by recent 
developments in optical physiology. 
In the following pages, I focus not on the flatness of modernist painting per se, but on 
a stream of mid- to late-twentieth-century critical and/or theoretical writings notably 
those by Michel Foucault, Clement Greenberg, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, which 
identify and reflect upon this new reflexive mode of visual perception. There is a 
powerful structural relationship in clinical epistemology between observation and theory, 
and clinical modalities of perception are accompanied by a strong critical and theoretical 
drive to analyze, describe and explain.
182
 While the texts I have chosen for this chapter 
identify and elaborate on significant manifestations of clinicalized surface perception, 
each text in its own way has also taken on the clinical zeal to identify and explicate. All 
of these discourses attempt to theoretically grasp the perceptual phenomena of the surface 
as it manifests in various clinical and artistic configurations, from the membranous 
structures of histological anatomy procured on the clinical examination table identified 
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by Foucault, to the new plasticity that works itself out on the table-like ground of 
Greenberg’s modernist painting.  
These writings also engage with central tenants of Kantian philosophy and aesthetics. 
The reflexive modalities of analysis and critique, the epistemology of purposiveness, and 
the clinical-aesthetic observational method of disinterestedness, all factor in to the 
theoretical and critical styles of these authors. My reading of these texts is also intended 
to underline their recapitulation of the bio-clinical theme – a bio-clinical meta-narrative, 
if you will – set forth in the previous chapter, which is continuously repeated and 
reworked throughout the historical terrain that this paper stakes out. Each text articulates 
a different and evolving strain of clinicalized perception; the representational ordeal of 
the bio-referent from Haller’s laboratory science to Kant’s aesthetics, to Schelling’s 
vitalism, is re-figured in the movement from the disinterested clinical-artistic formalism 
of Foucault and Greenberg, toward a vitalistic and engaged modality bio-aesthetic 
immanence articulated by Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari.  
Michel Foucault: The Operating Table and the Picture Plane 
The clinicalization of visual perception in the post-Kantian, medicalized space, and its 
manifestation as a reflexive exchange between the subject and object of observation in 
the form of a flat surface gaze, was suggested by Michel Foucault in Birth of the Clinic: 
An Archeology of Medical Perception (1963, English trans. 1973). Using the pseudonym 
of Maurice Florence, Foucault penned his autobiographical entry for a Dictionary of 
Philosophers, positioning himself within the Kantian critical legacy: “If Foucault is 
indeed at home in the philosophical tradition,” he writes, “it is within the critical tradition 
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of Kant, and his undertaking could be called A Critical History of Thought.”183 His 
doctoral dissertation comprises the massive History of Madness together with an 
extended commentary on Kant’s Anthropology. Foucault’s writings are replete with the 
reflexive critical mechanisms of Kantian critique and these seem mirrored by their 
menacing and spectral “other” in the structures of surveillance and subjectivisation that 
make up his society of discipline; these include the new panoptic designs of modern 
factories, hospitals and prisons. 
184
  
Foucault has devoted considerable attention to the ways modern writers and artists 
have introjected the new modality of clinicalized reflexivity into their working processes. 
His essays on Raymond Roussell and Maurice Blanchot explore the manner in which 
these modern writers assume positions as witnesses or spectators of their own thought, 
pushing Kant’s transcendental aesthetic and its position of disinterestedness to a limit at 
which language seems to reflect upon itself. For Foucault extreme forms of self-
reflexivity are a hallmark of modern subjectivity.
185
  
Foucault offers a description of this reflexivity of a work of art in his remarkable 
analysis of Velazquez’s Las Meninas (1656) that comprises the introduction of The Order 
of Things (1966). According to Foucault, the painting carries out the elision of its subject 
matter – the king and queen – with the purpose of foregrounding the machinery of 
painterly illusion; more significantly the reflexive device around which the entire illusion 
pivots is the flat referential surface of the painting itself which is alluded to at the center 
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of the painting as the depiction of the backside of the canvas on which the artist is 
working and which we, presumably, are looking at, at a later point in time. Foucault 
devotes considerable attention to this device as it functions as an extravagantly reflexive 
foil around which the entire scene pivots. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the 
device is the manner in which it points to the material conditions of painterly illusion – 
the flat surface of the painting itself, including the crossbars and supports. 
[We see] its texture, the horizontal and vertical bars of the stretcher, and the obliquely 
rising foot of the easel. The tall, monotonous rectangle occupying the whole left 
portion of the real picture and representing the back of the canvas within the picture, 
reconstitutes in the form of a surface the invisibility in depth of what the artist is 
observing: that space in which we are, and which we are not.
186
 
This labyrinthine play of reflexive visuality, Foucault suggests, is an indication of the 
demise of the classical episteme and its representational systems. Las Meninas seems to 
portend, in Foucault’s analysis of it, Kant’s a-prioritization of space, his positing of space 
as a formal property of the thinking subject (or transcendental aesthetic) and a modernist 
awareness of the mechanics of representation and of the empirical materiality of painting. 
In The Birth of the Clinic Foucault traced the clinical modalisation or 
instrumentalisation, of visual perception in the progress from classical to modern clinical 
diagnostics in the early nineteenth century. According to Foucault’s archeology the old 
bookish diagnostics which matched disease manifestations to their written descriptions in 
nosologies was supplanted with a new strain of clinical surveillance that focused on 
visible structures – particularly on organs and tissues. In the opening pages we find that 
the progress of modern medical consciousness involved a radical new spatialization of 
the human body. According to Foucault the emerging physiology replaced the traditional 
                                                 
186
 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Science (New York: Vintage Books, 
1994), 4. 
 86 
“Euclidean anatomy”187 with a temporally dynamic flesh-and-bone assemblage of 
biological activity. To demonstrate his point Foucault cites Morgagni’s De sedibus et 
causis morborum per Anatomen Indagatis (The Seats and Causes of Diseases 
Investigated by Anatomy) (1761), which defined the body as a volume made up of 
discrete and readily classifiable smaller volumes. While Foucault credits Morgagni with 
instrumentalizing and refining visual observation for medical laboratory use crucial to the 
emergence of modern pathology, his gaze was essentially “anatomical.” The introduction 
of time into anatomy by Haller, and the later “vitalist concept” of nature, according to 
Foucault, subjected this spatial datum to a sequence of folds; the body’s volumes 
reconfigure into a labyrinthine network of exterior and interior surfaces “whose spatial 
requisites are not necessarily those of classical geometry.”188  
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the understanding of disease as a 
spatio-temporal, bio-physiological process was a radical idea. Furthermore, the positing 
of disease as a biological process within the body represents a drastic diagnostic shift that 
produced a new medical subject while simultaneously lifting the body of this medical 
subject onto a new plane of visibility. Foucault emphasizes the historical novelty of the 
“visible body” as site of disease, and underscores this development as the most recent site 
of illness: 
The space of configuration of the disease and the space of localization of the illness in 
the body have been superimposed, in medical experience, for only a relatively short 
period of time – the period that coincides with nineteenth-century medicine and the 
privileges accorded to pathological anatomy. This is the period that marks the 
suzerainty of the gaze, since in the same perceptual field, following the same 
continuities of the same breaks, experience reads at a glance the visible lesions of the 
organism and the coherence of pathological forms, the illness is articulated exactly on 
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the body, and its logical distribution is carried out at once in terms of anatomical 
masses. The glance has simply to exercise its right of origin over truth.
189
 
The clinical “glance” procures, again, a new and individualized medical subject. Foucault 
writes of this new medical subject: “The patient is a geometrically impossible spatial 
synthesis, but for that very reason unique, central, and irreplaceable; an order that has 
become density in a set of qualifying modulations.” 190 
In the Kantian sense, the positing of the medical subject coincides with the general 
epistemic shift toward the individuated subject in the first and, more specifically, third 
critiques. It might also be pointed out that under the suzerainty of the medical gaze this 
new medical subject is regarded as something of an aesthetic artifact, and the 
discernments of the doctors entail aesthetic (visually based) judgments: 
Disease, which can be mapped out on the picture, becomes apparent in the body. 
There it meets a space with a quite different configuration: the concrete space of 
perception. Its laws define visible forms assumed by disease in a sick organism: the 
way to which disease is distributed in the organism, manifests its presence there, 
progresses by altering solids, movements, or functions, causes lesions that become 
visible under autopsy, triggers off, at one point or another, the interplay of symptoms, 
causes reactions, and thus moves toward a fatal, and for it a favourable, outcome. We 
are dealing here with those complex, derived figures by means of which the essence of 
the disease, with its structure of a picture, is articulated upon the thick, dense volume 
of the organism and becomes embodied within it.
191
 
The privilege accorded to optical vision, the ability to discern the coherence of illness ‘at 
a glance’ from a host of discreet figures and ‘pathological forms’, marks a radical break 
from classical forms of medicine. This new species of clinical perception Foucault calls 
the “anatomical-clinical method”192 – and its basic support or “first structure” consists of 
“the flat surface of perpetual simultaneity. Table and picture.”193 According to Foucault 
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the clinical method brought to the surface of the body’s immediate visibility (on the 
operating or dissection table) the individual features (lesions, swelling, pain, the 
expressive physiognomy of suffering) which make up the visible composition, a picture 
of disease. Foucault continues, pointing out that it is the radical understanding of life, of 
zoë, in the biological sense (of organisms as finite ends) that transforms medical thought:  
The order of disease is simply a ‘carbon copy’ of the world of life; the same structures 
govern each, the same forms of division, the same ordering. The rationality of life is 
identical with the rationally of that which threatens it. Their relationship is not one of 
nature and counter-nature; but in a natural order common to both, they fit into one 
another, one superimposed upon the other. In disease, one recognizes life because it is 
on the laws of life that knowledge of the disease is also based.
194
  
The epistemic shift Foucault discerns in the order of disease can be understood in Kantian 
terms: the abolition of the nature-counter-nature divide is borne of a new awareness of 
the purposive reciprocity of biological processes, and of the bio-epistemic reciprocity of 
life and the knowledge derived from it. The aesthetic, and the faculty of the aesthetic as 
Kant defined it, are crucial to the emergence of the new clinical modality of perception. 
The great avatar of anatomical-clinical perception, Foucault contends, was the post-
Revolutionary early nineteenth-century surgeon Marie Francois Xavier Bichat (1771-
1802). According to Foucault, Bichat challenged the old Euclidean anatomy, 
“planarizing” the organ structures of the Morgagnian model into a flexible “tissular” 
field. Bichat dispensed with the concept of organs as strictly discreet objects, and 
conceived of the interior of the human body as a living surface which has been 
elaborately folded. This surface forms a variegated flesh textile, a medium through which 
disease is literally absorbed and diffused. The fundamental discovery of Bichat’s Treatise 
on Membranes (1800) (figure 2.2), Foucault writes: 
                                                 
194
 Foucault, Birth of the Clinic, 6-7. 
 89 
Is a principle of deciphering corporal space that is at once intra-organic, inter-organic, 
and trans-organic. The anatomical element (a body defined by its organ volumes) has 
ceased to define the fundamental form of spatialization and to command, by a relation 
of proximity, the ways of physiological or pathological communication; it is now no 
more than a secondary form of primary space, which, by a process of winding round, 
superposition, and thickening, constitutes it. This fundamental space is entirely 
defined by the thinness of tissue. 
195
 
Foucault elaborates Bichat’s re-spatialization of the body, emphasizing its canvas-like 
elasticity; he also distinguishes it from the Morgagnian models in a manner that, I argue, 
could easily be applied to the transformation that takes place from classical to modern 
forms of painting, from classical painting modeled on Poussin’s volumetric compositions 
to the more flatly stated planes and figures of Manet, or indeed, of Cezanne: 
Morgagni wished to perceive beneath the corporal surface the densities of organs 
whose varied forms specified the disease; Bichat wished to reduce the organic 
volumes to great, homogenous, tissual surfaces, to areas of identity in which 
secondary modifications would find their fundamental kinships … Bichat is strictly an 
analyst …[reducing] organic volume to tissular space … Bichat’s eye is a clinician’s 
eye, because he gives an absolute epistemological privilege to the surface gaze.
196
  
The privilege that Bichat assigns, according to Foucault, to the immediate visibility of 
tissues: 
Thanks to Bichat, superficiality now becomes embodied in the real surfaces of 
membranes. Tissual expanses form the perceptual correlative of the surface gaze that 
defined the clinic. By a realistic shift in which medical positivism was to find its 




Foucault draws out an epistemological distinction between this new species of clinical 
perception and the older diagnostic techniques, a difference Bichat describes as one 
between the (new) “historical” and (older) “philosophical” methods which Foucault 
likens to the difference between seeing and reading:  
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A case that can be seen, a symptom that is gradually discovered, a principle that can 
be deciphered from its root do not belong to the order of ‘philosophical’ knowledge, 
but to a ‘very simple knowledge,’ which ‘must precede all others’ and which situates 
the original form of medical experience.
198
 
The historical method “embraces whatever, de facto or de jure, sooner or later, directly or 
indirectly, may be offered to the gaze”199 and constructs disease as a picture-like ‘event’ 
of which the symptoms are not the causes but the visible signs. It is the task of the 
clinician, rather like that of the modern visual artist – one recalls Cezanne’s decidedly 
laboratorial methods – to survey the “free field” and assemble from the array of 
“presentations” the visible composition of disease. The historical method is, Foucault 
writes, “directed upon that which is visible in the disease…and as it moves forward, the 
gaze is really retreating, since it reaches of the truth of disease only by allowing it to win 
the struggle to fulfill, in all its phenomena, its true nature.”200 The new diagnostic gestalt 
of the clinic is a species of aesthetic formalism in which redness, tumor, heat and pain are 
arranged like elements of a modernist collage on a “mute” flat surface: 
It is a question of defining a sort of fundamental area in which perspectives are leveled 
off, and in which shifts of levels are aligned: an effect has the same status as its cause, 
the antecedent coincides with what follows it. In this homogenous space series are 
broken and time abolished: a local inflammation is merely the ideal juxtaposition of its 
historical elements (redness, tumor, heat, pain) … Disease is perceived fundamentally 
in a space of projection without depth, of coincidence without development. There is 
only one plane and one moment. The form in which truth is originally shown is the 
surface in which relief is both manifested and abolished …201 
We have, with Foucault’s account of the modern clinic, a precise modality of medical 
perception that coalesces around a referent comprised of the flat examination or operating 
table together with the diseased body of the medical subject. This planar absorption of 
                                                 
198
 Foucault, Birth of the Clinic, 6. 
199
 Foucault, Birth of the Clinic, 6. 
200
 Foucault, Birth of the Clinic, 9. 
201
 Foucault, Birth of the Clinic, 9. 
 91 
figure into ground defines the clinic in all of its aspects – from diseased subjects and 
symptoms to the examination tables and rooms into which they merge, to the vast 
histological surface which configures diseased (and healthy) organisms throughout the 
larger social tissue.  
It is significant Foucault locates the first manifestations of this modality of clinical 
perception in a brief stretch of modern medical history that predates the planarization of 
the modernist picture surface; of an analogous surface perception in the visual arts, the 
first traces may be detected in the realist paintings of Gustav Courbet, but more explicitly 
in the work of Edouard Manet and, of course, Cezanne. This serves to underscore my 
underlying hypothesis that new clinical modalities of perception precede and migrate to 
artistic ones. What is further significant is the historical context of Foucault’s study; the 
publication of Birth of the Clinic in 1963 coincides with significant developments in 
artistic formalism which emphasized a similar surface gaze. In the early to mid-1950s 
developments in American modernist painting – notably Abstract Expressionist painting 
– emphasized painterly facture and the inherent flatness of the picture supports. The 
American art critic Clement Greenberg, avatar of modern pictorial flatness, offered his 
most concise and summary accounts of a modernist surface gaze in his essays “Modernist 
Painting” and “After Abstract Expressionism” which were published shortly before 
Foucault’s Birth of the Clinic, in 1960 and 1962 respectively. Hence, in the following 
pages I turn to a reading of these and other significant Greenberg essays. 
Clement Greenberg: the Clinical Specificity of the Modernist Picture Plane  
The American modernist art critic Clement Greenberg, who came to prominence in the 
post-World War II, New York art world, is noted for his positing of and insistence on an 
 92 
empirical mode of artistic perception linking visual perception to a flattened picture 
plane. His early career was devoted, as a member of the Partisan Review editorial team, 
to a critical-historical approach associated with Marxist theory. Despite his being a 
Marxist, eighteenth-century reverberations of Kant’s Critiques run through Greenberg’s 
oeuvre, as do the truth-protocols of the scientific method he suggests migrated to artistic 
and literary practices beginning in the nineteenth century. For example, in “Avant-Garde 
and Kitsch” (1939), Greenberg writes that advanced art evinces: 
A superior consciousness of history – more precisely the appearance of a new kind of 
criticism of society, and historical criticism – [which has] made [the avant-garde] 
possible … This criticism has not confronted our present society with timeless utopias, 
but has soberly examined in the terms of history and of cause and effect, the 
antecedents, justifications, and functions of the forms that lie at the heart of every 
society. Thus our present bourgeois social order has shown to be, not an eternal, 
‘natural’ condition of life, but simply the latest term in a succession of social orders. 
New perspectives of this kind, becoming a part of the advanced intellectual conscience 
of the fifth and sixth decades of the nineteenth century, soon were absorbed by artists 
and poets, even if unconsciously for the most part. It was no accident, therefore, that 
the birth of the avant-garde coincided chronologically and geographically too – with 
the first bold development of scientific revolutionary thought in Europe.
202
 
In another early essay, “Towards a Newer Laocoön” (1940), Greenberg put forward a 
program for mid-twentieth-century vanguard painting that recapitulates the essential 
aesthetic, philosophical, and scientific developments that have challenged the plastic arts 
since the eighteenth century. The breadth of Greenberg’s historical reasoning, together 
with his remarkable rhetorical abilities, allows the critic to redress “the theoretical 
confusion of the arts” posed by Lessing – notably the parasitical relationship between the 
visual and literary arts which, we recall, so troubled the German neo-classical dramatist 
and critic. Greenberg bases his claims for painting’s autonomy on the empirical assertion 
of the actual surface of painting and the inherent material properties of paint interacting 
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with the visual-perceptual capacities of the viewing subject. The modernist critic agrees 
with Lessing’s early argument for medium specificity, and contends, particularly in his 
criticism of certain forms of Surrealist art, that when visual artists submit themselves to 
the illustration of text, the text ultimately overpowers the plastic medium. Greenberg 
restates the old philosophical and aesthetic ordeal of  artistic embodiment articulated by 
Kant in the third critique, in terms of a battle in the visual arts between subject matter and 
form, and by Lessing as an ordeal set into play by a reflexive clinical empiricism that 
probingly grasps the material/formal specifications of the mediums as it simultaneously 
suppresses the encroachment of the corporeal referent (the body in pain). “Subject matter 
(is) distinguished from content…in the sense that every work must have content, but that 
subject matter is something the artist does or does not have in mind when he is actually at 
work.”203  
Central to Greenberg’s articulation of aesthetic content free of subject matter is the 
notion of indifference raised to the level of free aesthetic reflection in Kant’s third 
critique, where the experience of the aesthetic is linked to the areal attitude of 
“disinterested interest” or disinterestedness. For Greenberg disinterestedness is crucial to 
modern artistic experience and the specificity of the mediums, for it entails, he writes:  
A new and greater emphasis upon form, and it also involved the assertion of the arts as 
independent vocations, disciplines, and crafts, absolutely autonomous, and entitled to 
respect for their own sakes, and not merely as vessels of communication. It was the 
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Again, Greenberg links the ostensible freedom of the aesthetic to the freedom of the 
visual sense from the literary, and to nineteenth-century emancipatory modern politics, 
and further states that under the “totalitarianism of literature,” 
Everything [in painting] depends on the anecdote or the message. The painted picture 
occurs in blank, indeterminate space; it just happens to be on a square of canvas and 
inside a frame. It mighty just as well have been breathed on air or formed out of 
plasma…it tries to be something you imagine rather than see – or else a bas-relief or a 
statue. Everything contributes to the denial of the medium, as if the artist were 




This reduction of painting to its material surface (which functions as a referent) requires 
that all efforts be made to free painting from mimetic, imitative, or naturalist illusion. 
According to Greenberg modernist painting must break out of its “subservient” role to the 
other arts (such as literature) so that it would no longer be “susceptible to the temptation 
to emulate the effects …of illusion, (and) of other arts.”206 Hence, it is through this 
vehicle of a critical, clinically disinterested perception that the essential, in Kantian terms 
a-priori, elements of painting reveal themselves. The agent of this formal emancipation, 
Greenberg proposes, is the modern painter – who, like the modern scientist, has access to 
an immediate, empirical, concrete visual experience. The avatar of this new science of 
painting, according to Greenberg, is Gustav Courbet : 
Nineteenth century painting made its first break with literature (or metaphysics) in the 
person of the Communard Courbet, it fled from spirit to matter…Courbet was the first 
real avant-garde painter [for he] tried to reduce his art to immediate sense data by 
painting only what the eye could see as a machine unaided by the 
mind…Impressionism, reasoning beyond Courbet in its materialist 
objectivity…sought to emulate the detachment of science, imagining that thereby it 
would get at the very essence of painting as well as of visual experience.
207
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Greenberg’s uncanny empirical apparatus, “a machine unaided by the mind,” could only 
be conceived within, and reflects I believe, Kant’s initial (clinical) relocation of the 
sensate observer from the domain of purely rational concepts to the aesthetic and its 
“disinterested” mode of attentive observation and its “new attention to every inch of the 
canvas, regardless of its relation to the ‘centers of interest.’”208 This reference to “centers 
of interest” plays also on the bourgeois investment in framed naturalist painting, while 
the influence of positivist science and its determination of vision as a vehicle of 
unmediated visual data situates modern painting upon a “more stable basis than the 
crumbling bourgeois oecumene.”209 
Greenberg’s more developed thinking on the relevance of Kant’s philosophy to an 
understanding of modern art, as well as his insistence on the primacy of the flat picture 
plane are found later, in the late essays “Modernist Painting” and “After Abstract 
Expressionism” of 1960 and 1962 respectively. With these discourses Greenberg 
explicitly links Kant’s method of philosophical critique to medium-specificity, and the 
flattened surface of modern art: 
I identify Modernism with the intensification, almost the exacerbation, of (a) self-
critical tendency that began with the philosopher Kant. Because he was the first to 
criticize the means itself of criticism, I conceive of Kant as the first real Modernist. 
The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of the characteristic methods of a 
discipline to criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in order to 
entrench it more firmly in its area of competence.
210
  
According to Greenberg, Kant’s Critiques set out to clarify the procedures that were 
“proper” to philosophy and hence he carried out his critical reductions of reason not to 
subvert but to clarify it. “(While) Kant withdrew much from its old jurisdiction, logic was 
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left all the more secure in what there remained of it.”211 For Greenberg the effects of 
Kant’s reflexive critique through the course of the nineteenth century would exceed the 
discourse of philosophy to foster an attitude of immanent auto-critique that extends to the 
visual arts. “Each art,” he writes, “had to perform this demonstration on its own account. 
What had to be exhibited was not only that which was unique and irreducible in art in 
general, but also that which was unique and irreducible in each particular art.”212  
Of course, the painterly device to which this critical and clinical mode of aesthetic 
perception affixes itself is the flat picture plane. “Flatness alone,” Greenberg writes, “was 
unique and exclusive to (painting)…Flatness, two-dimensionality, was the only condition 
painting shared with no other art, and so modernist painting oriented itself to flatness as it 
did to nothing else.”213 For Greenberg this flatness, in the Kantian sense, becomes 
painting’s primary regulative principle. “The limitations that constitute the medium of 
painting,” Greenberg continues, are “the flat surface, the shape of the support, the 
properties of the pigment, (which) were treated by the Old Masters as negative factors 
that could be acknowledge only implicitly or indirectly.”214 
Greenberg describes the mutation of painting’s representational regime from classical 
to modern further: “The motto of the Renaissance artist, Ars est artem celare, is 
exchanged for.”215 Renaissance art, Greenberg contends, in order to procure its illusion, 
masked or concealed the very means through which it produced its illusions; modern art 
on the other hand progresses through the maximization and demonstration of its means. 
Again, Renaissance art, bound to illusion and illustration, is replaced by a demonstrative 
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mode that flatly affirms the shadowless two-dimensional materiality of its support, the 
canvas. For Greenberg, the retinalization of painting comprises “the instinctive 
accommodation to the medium.” The picture plane “grows shallower and shallower, 
flattening out and pressing together the fictive planes of depth until they meet as on and 
upon the real and material plane which is the actual surface of the canvas, where they lie 
side by side or interlocked or transparently imposed upon each other.”216 Under these 
new conditions “brush strokes are often defined for their own sake.”217  
Greenberg leaves is in no doubt: the transition was an ordeal. We find in the following 
passage from Greenberg a description of painterly space that is identical to the planar 
space wrested from the old pictorial which entails a certain clinical violence: 
Where the painter still tries to indicate real objects their shapes flatten and spread in 
the dense, two-dimensional atmosphere. A vibrating tension is set up as the objects 
struggle to maintain their volume against the tendency of the real picture plane to re-
assert its material flatness and crush them to silhouettes.
218
 
As formal developments of Modern painting progress, from Cezanne to Cubism, 
Mondrian, and beyond, Greenberg writes, “realistic space cracks and splinters into flat 
planes which come forward, parallel to the plane surface.”219 Recognizable or naturalistic 
fragments of representation recombine with graphic elements “destroy(ing) the partial 
illusion of depth by slamming the various planes together.” The effect of this slamming 
“emphasizes further the impenetrability of the plane surface”220 Again, it is at this 
impenetrable surface that the referent asserts itself, and that the reflexive ordeal of – the 
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drive toward -- modernist medium specificity manifests itself most explicitly in 
Greenberg’s aesthetics.  
Modernism begins for Greenberg, at that moment when the illusion of painting ends, 
and its material limits empirically determined. Greenberg’s discourse captures this mode 
of perception, and provides an extraordinary recapitulation of the central challenges 
posed by eighteenth century theorists. Thus, with Greenberg’s most advanced essays of 
the early and mid-1960s we have the basic questions posed by Baumgarten and Lessing, 
and the philosophical and aesthetic doctrines of Kant, refigured through the flat screen – 
Greenberg refers to it at one point as a “skin”221 – of the latest modernist painting.  
Blood Quadrant 
Taking a cue from Foucault, Lisa Cartwright studied the emergence of modern 
microscopic gaze, and suggested another compelling link to modernist aesthetics. She 
contends that microscopy, particularly as it fused with the latest developments in early 
twentieth-century photography, set its gaze to the surveillance of the ubiquitous living 
animal-human particulate that is organ and tissue – hence, corpuscle – namely blood.222 
She sites the work of the early twentieth-century New York physician Robert Lincoln 
Watkins, who created a device – the “micromotoscope” that combined microscopic 
technology with cinematic photography, and fixed this technique on the discernment, in 
Watkins own words, of the tiniest “premonitory symptoms…the pre-symptom or the 
symptom of the symptom” of incipient disease.223 
                                                 
221
 Greenberg, “On the Role of Nature in Modernist Painting,” Art and Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), 
172. 
222
 Lisa Cartwright, Screening the Body: Tracing Medicine’s Visual Culture (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1995), 88. 
223
 Cartwright, Screening the Body, 88. 
 99 
This techno-medical sensory apparatus, as Cartwright points out, emerges in a direct 
line from Bichat’s “surface gaze.” However, with modern photo-microscopy the bright 
flat visibility of the examination or operating table has been absorbed into a new 
technological configuration – that of tissue transparently splayed out over the flat brightly 
lit microscope glass slide (figures 2.3 and 2.4). Blood also becomes, according to 
Cartwright, “a broader metaphor for the object of medical perception.”224 This is 
indicative of both the manner and degree to which medical perception, by the beginning 
of the twentieth century, has come to saturate the social field; while its objects have 
become quite miniscule its field has indeed become large and elastic. According to 
Cartwright:  
Sight (has) become more like blood: fluid, pervasive, and unfixed from a locale. The 
researcher’s sense of sight is thus subject to all manner of technological augmentation, 
displacement, and verification: its authority is dispersed across instruments like the 
kymograph, the cinematograph, and the microscope. Perception becomes unhinged 
from the sensory body and is activated across an increasingly complex battery of 
institutional techniques and instruments.
225
 
Hence, according to Cartwright, by the early twentieth century the medical gaze assumes 
the fluid unfixed status of its object as it grasps its smallest corpuscular substrate; this 
double movement is a metaphor for the biomedical administration of human subjects in 
the new biopolitical sphere where, as Agamben and Foucault have pointed out, the 
concept of life or zoë becomes the central organizing-disciplinary concept of political 
life. Blood cells – which, in humans, lack central processing organelles known as 
“nuclei” and move throughout the circulatory system rather like zombies, that is to say 
both dead and alive – become, under the suzerainty of this microscopic gaze, metaphors 
for the modern bio-hordes. These corpuscular “grains” become, at the same time, tiny 
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indexical bio-fragments, or micro-gradients, of the pathological status of individual 
medical subjects themselves. As Cartwright points out, in fields such as chemical 
pathology and hematology, 
The body is segmented, drained, sliced, and otherwise fragmented, the microscope 
rendering its minute fragments largely unidentifiable except to the specialized viewer. 
Placing a specimen on the instrument’s stage and closing one eye to peer through the 
viewfinder the miscroscopist sees the body in a manner that effectively distances the 
observer from the subjective experience of the body imaged. Excised from the body, 
stained, blown up, resolved, pierced by a penetrating light and perceived by a single 
squinting eye, the microscopic specimen is apparently stripped of its corporeality, its 
function, and its history even as it serves as a final proof of the health, pathology, or 
sexuality of the subject whose body it represents.
226
 
The topic of a medicalized modern subjectivity and more specifically a 
psychopathological configuration of the subject (which for Cartwright the microscopic 
blood sample functions as the analog or encapsulation) and specifically the artistic 
subject will be taken up in the next chapter. In any case, Cartwright associates the flat 
spectralization of visual experience by the microscopic gaze with the advancements of 
vanguard painting, and indeed its specialized viewers; she cites the cubist paintings of 
Georges Braque. This “penchant for flatness” she contends “was symptomatic of a more 
pervasive cultural disavowal of the physical body as phantasm, as nightmarishly visceral 
and disorderly – a denial rationalized by a modernist demand for order, simplicity, 
particularity and clarity.”227 While this notion of a disavowed corporeality I find 
untenable – indeed, I contend that this flatness is indeed a manifestation of the bio-
aesthetic referent, of the modern clinical-aesthetic ordeal to represent the body – 
Cartwright’s analysis captures a significant historical moment in the genealogical 
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progress of Bichat’s surface gaze as it morphs or blends coherently with modern artistic 
experience in the early twentieth century.  
Cartwright offers a useful supplement to the Greenbergian history of avant-garde 
painting – like the fate of blood tissues smeared into the transparent plane of the 
microscope slide, the evolution of modern painting consists of a “progressive surrender to 
the resistance of its medium.” Just as blood surrenders its naturalist semantics (as bright 
red liquid signifying injury, life, birth, death, etc.) to the flat bright field of microscopic 
abstraction, painting concedes to the “picture plane’s denial of (any effort) to ‘hole 
through’ it for realistic perspective space.”228  
Cartwright’s observations on the links between the “microscopic gaze,” the bright red 
surface of blood tissues and Greenberg’s picture plane, provide a useful bridge between 
my discussions of Foucault and Greenberg, and the philosophical and aesthetic writings 
of Gilles Deleuze, and Deleuze’s collaborations with Italian psychiatrist Felix Guattari.. 
Deleuze, Deleuze & Guattari, and the Clinical Aesthetics of Percepts and Affects 
Schelling’s romantic vitalism, the drift of philosophy into aesthetics, the 
interpenetration of clinical and artistic epistemologies and modalities of perception, the 
animalization of man, and the shared bio-aesthetic resonances set into play by zoë – all of 
these find compelling articulations in the philosophy, critical theory and aesthetics of 
Gilles Deleuze, and in his collaborative writings with Felix Guattari. Again, a salient 
feature of Deleuze’s (and Deleuze and Guattari’s) writings is the flat surface of clinical 
perception. 
Deleuze’s oeuvre may be separated into three streams or modalities. The first 
comprises a series of philosophical texts that treat (often as clinical cases) individual 
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philosophers, writers or artists. His collaborative writings with Guattari form a second 
body of writing and may be understood as a somewhat more polemical project, as very 
often the two set out to critique political, philosophical, and psychoanalytic institutions. 
Deleuze’s later reflections deal more explicitly with artistic and literary topics, very often 
under the rubric of the “clinical-critical.” These works, mostly essays and occasional 
interviews, touch upon a wide range of topics including Kant’s a-prioritization of time, 
the fragmentary nature of Walt Whitman’s verse, and the aesthetics of “exhaustion” in 
the texts of Samuel Beckett. 
229
 
Crucially, Deleuze is among the first theorists to address a modern constitutive link 
between the clinical and the aesthetic. Deleuze takes up this theme in Nietzsche and 
Philosophy published in 1962, and cites Friedrich Nietzsche as the first thinker to propose 
the philosophical personae of “cultural physician” in Nietzsche’s unpublished text The 
Philosopher as Cultural Physician, written in 1873.
230
 In his study of Sacher-Masoch 
Coldness and Cruelty
231
 first published in 1967 Deleuze further elaborated on 
Nietzschean symptomatology as a form of cultural practice; the central thesis of the work 
is that medical diagnostics is a literary-artistic practice. As we shall see in a subsequent 
chapter on the clinicalization of artistic subjectivity, there is also precedence for cultural 
diagnostics in the late-nineteenth-century discourses on degeneracy propounded by the 
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criminal anthropologists Cesare Lombroso and Max Nordau. In an effort to suggest a 
positive and affirming concept of the clinical – that is to say, a clinicality unlinked from 
the pathological – Deleuze identifies certain devices shared by doctors and creative 
artists, and the flat plane of clinical perception is crucial. He writes: 
There is always a great deal of art involved in the grouping of symptoms, in the 
organization of a table where a particular symptom is dissociated from another, 
juxtaposed to a third, and forms the new figure of a disorder or illness.  
Clinicians who are able to renew a symptomatological picture produce a work of art; 
conversely, artists are clinicians, not with respect to their own case, or even with 
respect to a case in general; rather, they are clinicians of civilization.
232
  
Deleuze’s description of the figure of disease as a coalescence of symptoms into a new 
picture on a flat plane is resonant with the structure of clinical perception articulated by 
Foucault, and the flat modernist surface posited by Greenberg. Deleuze addresses the 
clinical-aesthetic modalities of painterly facture and the flat modernist picture surface in 
two important later works. The first, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (1981) is an 
extended reflection on the paintings of Francis Bacon; it is also a more formalized 
aesthetics of painting. The second, a collaboration with Guattari, What is Philosophy? 
(1992), is a reflection, in Kantian fashion, on the constitutive principles that distinguish 
philosophy, science, and art, but with the polemical purpose of exploring the “zones of 
indiscernibility”233 that stretch between them, and to demonstrate the ways in which 
aesthetics ties them together.  
In The Logic of Sensation, Deleuze grapples with the corporealization of 
representation and with the sensate specificities of modernist material facture, in a 
manner that at times seems to push beyond the more circumspect clinical 
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disinterestedness of both Foucault and Greenberg, toward the performative. There is, 
pace Greenberg, a concerted effort to unlink painting from the traditional “figurative, 
illustrative, and narrative”234 (in Greenbergian parlance, naturalist) uses of artistic 
representation and an insistence on the empirical. However, Deleuze contends that 
modernist “allover” abstract art is but one articulation of clinicalized aesthetics. He posits 
the persistence in Bacon’s work of the “figure,” which must not be confused with the 
“figurative.” Deleuze contends:  
Painting has neither a model to represent nor a story to narrate. It thus has two possible 
ways of escaping the figurative: toward pure form, through abstraction; or toward the 
purely figural, through extraction or isolation. If the painter keeps to the figure, if he 
or she opts for the second path, it will be to oppose the ‘figural’ to the ‘figurative.’235  
According to Deleuze the “figural”236 is captured at the physiological nexus of 
sensation and gesture for which the picture surface functions as conduit; the figural is 
expressed most clearly in the swept, spattered, drawn, blurred masses of animal-human 
forms which merge with the bright colour fields of Bacon’s most developed works. 
Again, the flat painterly surface is crucial to all of this, and has “a structuring and 
spatializing function.”237 Deleuze describes the coterminous function these fields hold 
with Bacon’s figures when he writes that “(they) are not beneath, behind, or beyond the 
Figure, but are strictly to the side of it, or rather, all around it, and are thus grasped in a 
close view, a tactile or ‘haptic’ view.”238 He further asserts that “when one moves from 
the Figure to the fields of color, there is no relation of depth or distance, no incertitude of 
                                                 
234
 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2003), 6. 
235
 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 6. 
236
 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, xiii. 
237
 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, xiii. 
238
 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, xiii. 
 105 
light and shadow.” Figure and field represent “the correlation of two sectors on a single 
plane, equally close.”239 
Deleuze describes Bacon’s efforts as a figural ordeal, one in which moments of 
violence and extreme physical anguish (anathema to classical art, and so troubling to 
Lessing) – “the violence of a hiccup, of a need to vomit, but also of a hysterical, 
involuntary smile,” are quite literally rendered from the painting field. And Deleuze’s 
text strives in a similar fashion to conflate corporeal and painterly referents, making 
unclear, quite purposefully, where bodies end and the surfaces of paintings begin: 
Bacon’s bodies, heads, Figures are of flesh, and what fascinates him are the invisible 
forces that model flesh or shake it. This is not the relationship of form and matter, but 
of materials and forces; to make these forces visible through their effects on the flesh. 
There is before anything else, a force of inertia that is of flesh itself: with Bacon, flesh, 
however firm descends from bones; it falls or tends to fall away from them (hence 
those flattened sleepers who keep one arm raised or thighs lifted from the flesh seems 
to cascade). What fascinates Bacon is not the moment, but its effect on an immobile 
body: heads whipped by wind, deformed by aspiration – but also all the interior forces 
that climb through the flesh. To make spasm visible. The entire body becomes plexus. 
If there is feeling in Bacon, it is not a taste for horror; it is pity, an intense pity: pity for 
flesh, including the flesh of dead animals.
240
  
We are a long way from Kenneth Clark’s study in ideal forms, or Lessing’s Laocoön, but 
also from the Greenbergian plane which, regardless of the swarms of indexical gestures 
that call it forth, is by comparison profoundly serene. Indeed, in stretches such as these 
the “figure” seems to wrest itself from its support and clinical perception opens onto the 
arena of clinical performance – a topic to be taken up in the fourth chapter.  
Deleuze does not consider the clinical accoutrements, such as examination tables, 
hospital bathroom fixtures, laboratory vitrines, and the like, which function as scaffolds 
or supports for the figures populating Bacon’s paintings (figure 2.5). What he does pay 
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attention to are the references to Foucault’s avatar of medical perception. Deleuze cites 
Bichat’s clinical tissues, and discerns in Bacon’s figurative agglomeration of brushwork 
scattered with “involuntary free marks” indexes of animality, meat, feces, vomit, blood, 
and even spirit. But spirit must not be understood in its traditional metaphysical sense. In 
the logic of bio-clinical sensation, it is tied to “bodily form, a corporeal and vital breath, 
an animal spirit...the animal spirit of man: a pig-spirit, a buffalo-spirit, a dog spirit, a bat-
spirit.”241 Bacon accomplishes this blurring of animal and human spirits not through a 
LaBrunian transposition, or in contemporary parlance “morphing,” of likenesses, of 
animal features over human ones, or vice versa, but through the actual material 
effacement through the modified colourfield, in the most extreme sense, techniques of 
flinging, scrubbing and/or sweeping away any signifying features.
242
  
Deleuze’s final collaboration with Guattari What is Philosophy? (1994) published 
posthumously, can be placed firmly within the Kantian archeology. In the opening pages, 
the authors write of the “sovereign freedom” of Titian, Turner and Monet, and more 
significantly of the Critique of Judgment, which they contend “is an unrestrained work of 
old age, which (Kant’s) successors have still not caught up with: all the mind’s faculties 
overcome their limits, the very limits that Kant had so carefully laid down in the work of 
his prime.”243 Indeed, the authors recapitulate the Kantian cycle of development, 
propounding on the differences between philosophical, scientific, and artistic experience, 
but emphasizing the shared constitutive role of the aesthetic in each, all the while 
addressing (more precisely – redressing) the complex and even dangerous status that the 
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concept of life (or zoë) assumes. Against the clinical cruelty of Bacon’s work and the 
Logic of Sense, this last collaboration is imbued with the warmth and light of Vuillard, 
(figure 2.6) and late Bonnard, whose works they elaborate so effectively and pleasurably 
upon. The authors take great liberties, and the names of philosophers, poets and artists, as 
well as philosophical concepts and artistic affects, are deployed freely and 
interchangeably throughout the text, following, in more free-wheeling fashion, the 
Kantian drift from the first to third critiques, from philosophy to aesthetics.  
The text is separated into three sections that approach the domains of knowledge – 
philosophy, science, art – separately. Deleuze and Guattari style their conception of the 
Kantian a-prioritization of space, positing a philosophical “plane of immanence”244 which 
resembles both the clinicalized operating table and the modernist picture plane (the visual 
art of Henri Michaux is often cited). Philosophical speculation transpires over a 
conceptual tableau that resembles modernist collage or assemblage: 
Philosophical concepts are fragmentary wholes that are not aligned with one another 
so that they fit together, because their edges do not match up. They are not pieces of a 
jigsaw puzzle but rather the outcome of throws of the dice. They resonate nonetheless, 
and the philosophy that creates them always introduces a powerful Whole that, while 
remaining open, is not fragmented … it is a table, a plateau, or a slice; it is a plane of 




This “planomenon” re-surfaces in artistic experience, and, like the operating table and 
picture plane of Foucault’s and Greenberg’s surface gaze, it comprises a flat material 
plane that is coterminous with aesthetic “sensations themselves …to the point of being 
part of them or indiscernible from them.”246 For Deleuze and Guattari aesthetic 
perceptions and affections form a conglomeration with this plane, and bio-manifest (if 
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you will) as autonomous “blocs of sensation.”247 Still, they articulate something like a 
theory of medium specificity, and attach specific blocs of sensation to specific methods 
and materials:  
As percepts, sensations are not perceptions referring to an object (reference): if they 
resemble something it is with a resemblance produced with their own methods; and 
the smile on the canvas is made solely with colors, lines, shadow, and light…The 
material is so varied in each case (canvas support, paintbrush or equivalent agent, 
color in the tube) and it is difficult to say where in fact the material ends and sensation 
begins; preparation of the canvas, the track of the brush’s hair, and many other things 
besides are obviously part of the sensation…(and) however short the time it lasts, this 
time is considered as a duration….By means of the material, the aim of art is to wrest 
the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject, to wrest 
the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another: to extract a bloc 
of sensations, a pure being of sensations.
248
   
While Deleuze and Guattari describe their aesthetics and these blocs of sensation as 
“vitalistic” and invoke many of vitalism’s biologically inflected terminologies. Indeed 
these blocs are made up of the forces that precede or set into play the interactions that  
make biological life possible. Hence, color, line, plane, texture, refrain, sonority, are the 
“imperceptible forces” that art “makes perceptible” and that “populate the world, affect 
us, and make us become.”249 There is an emphatic, polemic aspect to this aesthetics, and 
What is Philosophy? breaks into stretches resembling modernist manifesto; the Futurist 
and Vorticist manifestos of Marinetti and Lewis come to mind, and the text shares with 
these (and La Mettrie’s) discourses an aesthetic zeal for machines, for mechanistic 
assemblages, and for the uncanny impersonal expressionism of the gothic.  
Perhaps the most zealous and inventive aspect of Deleuze and Guattari’s aesthetics  is 
their effort to dismantle Agamben’s “anthropological machine,”250 the man-building 
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discursive device which posits the concept of the “animal” and “animality” as an easily 
debased and abused supplement to the “human” and “humanity,” and this is where their 
species of aesthetic vitalism departs quite drastically from the anthropocentric vitalism of 
Schelling: “Perhaps art begins with the animal,” they write, “at least with the animal that 
carves out a territory and constructs a house.” Deleuze and Guattari cite a particular case:  
Every morning the Scenopoetes dentirostrist, a bird of the Australian rainforests, cuts 
leaves, makes them fall to the ground, and turns them over so that the paler, internal 
side contrasts with the earth. In this way it constructs a stage for itself like a ready-
made; and directly above, on a creeper or a branch, while fluffing out the feathers 
beneath its beak to reveal their yellow roots, it sings a complex song made up from its 




In effect, we have with Deleuze’s writings, and with his collaborations with Guattari, a 
clinicalized aesthetics, and a modality of artistic perception that begins with a flat field of 
visuality; this surface plane, like the Kantian manifold assumes any number of forms 
including the planomenon of diagnostics, the philosophical “plane of immanence,” and 
the empty l’aplat of a painted field in a scene by Vuillard. However, for Deleuze and 
Guattari this surface, and the artistic experience of percepts and affects it channels and 
supports is not limited to the so-called human; indeed, the philosopher and his 
collaborator seem to have vitalistically instrumentalized Kant’s notion of 
“purposiveness,” and rather than treat it as a regulative idea proper to the domain of the 
aesthetic human subject, they have extended into the domain of the non-human, the 
“animal,” even the mineral; they have even suggested, in the case of Scenopoetes 
dentirostrist or Australian Stagemaker Bowerbird, that artistic subjectivity, indeed artistic 
genius, is not limited to any single species.    
Conclusion 
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In this chapter I have attempted to locate a modality of clinical-aesthetic perception, one 
that first affixes to or is constituted by the flat field of the modern clinic. Michel 
Foucault’s archaeology of medical perception located the first instantiations of this 
modality of perception in the early nineteenth-century post-revolutionary clinics of 
physiologist Marie Francois Xavier Bichat whose anatomical-clinical method 
instrumentalized visual perception over the old text-based nosological diagnostics, and 
recombined human anatomy along the histological protocols of a flat surface coterminous 
with the examination or dissection table. The critical writings of Clement Greenberg, 
significant examples contemporaneous with Foucault’s, offer an analogous surface gaze, 
one in which visual clinical probity empirically absorbs and foregrounds the flat material 
support as the singular and integral subject matter of painting. Late twentieth-century 
texts by Gilles Deleuze, and Deleuze and Felix Guattari, were examined for the ways in 
which the flat plane of clinical-aesthetic perception re-figures as Baconian figure, the 
diagnostic planomenon, and the sometimes dazzling, sometimes matte grey l’aplat of 
post-impressionist painting. All of these manifestations of clinical aesthetic perception I 
have attempted to place within a Kantian framework, in the context of the a-prioritization 
of space, touching upon Kant’s critical and aesthetic instruments of reflexivity, 
disinterestedness, and purposiveness, which in the previous chapter I grounded in the 
clinical advancements of earlier eighteenth-century life science. 
The chapter that follows takes up with the impact of the clinical gaze as it bears down 
on artists themselves, the first inclinations of which were detected in my first chapter 
readings of La Mettrie. Once again, however, Kant provides a general framework for the 
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clinicalization of artistic subjectivity, and the unique figure of the artistic genius 
elaborated upon in the third critique will provide a crucial point of departure.  
 112 
Chapter Three 
The Clinicalization of Artistic Subjectivity: The Artist as Case History 
 
If only there were moral doctors, who, like the physical ones, would concentrate more on 
individuals, and would publish reports on their methods of healing for the general good! 
(Karl Philipp Moritz) 
 
… Anguish which medicine does not know. Anguish which your doctor does not 
understand … (Antonin Artaud) 
 
The pedagogues are doctors who need to reproduce indefinitely the disabilities with the 
purpose to heal … the importance of the disabled is to get healed. (Jacques Ranciere) 
 
The work, which once had the duty of providing immortality, now possesses the right to 
kill, to be its author’s murderer …” (Michel Foucault) 
 
In previous chapters, I examined the effects of an encroaching bio-clinical mentality on 
aesthetic theory and perception. In this chapter, I explore the impact of this clinicality on 
artistic subjectivity, and of a new clinical category of artistic embodiment, that of the 
artist case history. My exemplary case is the 1923-24 epistolatory exchange between a 
young Antonin Artaud, perhaps the first interdisciplinary performance artist of the 
twentieth century, and Jacques Rivière, editor of the prestigious La Nouvelle Revue 
Française. More than any other modern literary exchange – one thinks of Kafka’s 
heartbreaking and unanswered Letter to His Father, or, years later, the correspondence 
between the psychiatrically incarcerated Ezra Pound and poet, Charles Olson – the letters 
between Artaud and Rivière provides a remarkable example of the mutualism, the 
“enigmatic conjunction”252 that Jacques Derrida describes in his commentary on Artaud, 
and that works itself out between the domains of clinical and artistic, literary and critical 
production during the modern period.  
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It will be my purpose to demonstrate, through a reading of Artaud’s exchange of 
letters with Jacques Rivière, how Artaud comes to embody a clinicalized artistic 
subjectivity as case history, with Riviére taking the role of the doctor, and how he 
radicalizes this form of clinical-critical confinement into a new position of artistic 
agency. Hence, a review of the theoretical groundwork for my concept of case history is 
in order. 
The term ‘case history’ originates in mid-eighteenth-century medicine and psychiatry 
and denotes a biographical-medical description of a patient by a clinician or medical 
expert for the purposes of diagnosing and treating illness. The case history may also take 
the form of ‘anamnesis’ in which the patient offers his own account of medical events. 
Either form of the ‘case’ may be cited in medical research as exemplification of a 
particular diagnosis, and in critical commentary as representative of a certain artistic or 
literary outlook, movement or period.
253
  
Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida are the first to comment on the development of 
artistic or literary ‘exemplarity’ or ‘case’ in parallel with the growing influence of 
medical and psychiatric discourses. Both Foucault and Derrida examined the 
convergence of clinical, critical and artistic discursive forms – each references the case of 
Artaud – and located a tendency in modern critical discourses to claim authority over the 
works and lives of artists through the language of clinical discourse. Each has noted a 
tendency to establish a conjunction “between madness and the work,”254 or to explain 
vanguard works of art in terms of psychic pathology or mental illness. As we shall see, 
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the critical and biographical commentaries on the work and life of Artaud follow this 
pattern. 
Foucault probed the genealogy of psychiatry through the anthropological sciences of 
the nineteenth century, specifically criminal anthropology, jurisprudence, physiognomy 
and anthropometry.
255
 Although his earliest foray into the human sciences was as a 
clinician under the supervision of the existentialist psychoanalyst Ludwig Binswanger, 
Foucault grew to be highly critical of psychoanalysis. In a review of Jean Laplanche’s 
psychoanalytic commentary on the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, he examined the discursive 
maneuvers psychoanalytic thought makes as it conflates or reduces poetic and artistic 
endeavours to psychological formations. Foucault contends, reflecting his Structuralist 
methodology of the time (1966), that “poetic forms and psychological structures”256 
assume a paradoxical structuring relationship to each other in the modern age. The 
clinical and the poetic define two ends of a discursive field within which the 
anthropological figure of the ‘mad poet’ is shaped according to a psycho-pathological 
profile. Foucault contends the lives and works of artists and poets, from Hölderlin to 
Nerval and Artaud, have furnished examples of poetry’s alleged links to psychology. 
Psychoanalysis uses poetic and artistic cases to establish its autonomy and authority 
within the cultural domain, and invokes these cases to support its theories and practices. 
On the other side, literary and cultural criticism’s adoption of clinical discourse and 
authority serves to elevate cultural commentary to the more powerful level of ‘truth 
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discourse’, that is to say, discourse “with a scientific status or discourses expressed 
exclusively by qualified people within scientific (or cultural) institutions.”257  
Derrida discerns a discursive ‘violence’ in the relationship between clinical and 
critical thought, going further than Foucault to implicate not only psychoanalytic thought 
in this violence but also the critical discourses of philosophers and literary commentators. 
In his essay on Artaud, La parole soufflé, Derrida contends, in a manner that elucidates 
and critiques Foucault’s position, “that if clinical commentary and critical commentary 
everywhere demand their own autonomy and wish to be acknowledged and respected by 
one another [as Foucault proposes], they are no less complicit – by virtue of a unity 
which refers, through as yet un-conceived mediations … to the same abstraction, the 
same misinterpretation, and the same violence.”258 While Derrida concurs with Foucault 
that critical and clinical discourses emerge from a ‘shared horizon’, he insists that when 
critical discourse attempts to rescue artistic or literary production from the clinical (as 
Foucault’s does) it facilitates the same violence of exemplification. Thus, Foucault 
commits the same discursive violence he critiques in Laplanche.  
At the moment when criticism (be it aesthetic, literary, philosophical, etc.) allegedly 
protects the meaning of a thought or the value of a work against psychomedical 
reductions, it comes to the same result … it creates an example. That is to say, a case. 
A work or an adventure of thought … is made to bear witness, as example or martyr to 
a structure whose essential permanence (as a transcendental structure) becomes the 
prime preoccupation of the commentary.
259
  
The case of Antonin Artaud would seem to demonstrate Derrida’s critical observations. 
More than any other modern example, Artaud’s case has been called upon to support an 
infinite array of critical and clinical claims. His exchange with Rivière has provided a 
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primary text from which many of these claims are built, and this might seem entirely 
appropriate, given Artaud presents himself to the littérateur as, in his own words, a “sick 
person” and a “mental case”.260 Rivière is prompted by the exchange, and by Artaud’s 
forthrightness, to assume a complementary role, pronouncing “like a doctor” his various 
“cures.”261  
Before examining the relevance of this exchange to my postulate of the clinicalization 
of artistic subjectivity, it is necessary to draw a broader historical and genealogical profile 
of the artist as case history. Hence, the chapter is divided into two parts. The first traces 
an historical trajectory from early formulations of the artist as case history in 
Enlightenment philosophy, to its later formalization in early Modern criminology, 
anthropology and psychotherapy. The philosophy and aesthetics of Immanuel Kant is of 
central importance, for it is Kant who differentiates the artist from the rest of humanity. 
Kant’s definition of ‘artistic genius’ in the Critique of Judgment situates the artist in an 
exemplary position between nature and culture, a special agent of nature’s rules. As 
special as this figure is, Kant registered misgivings; certain aspects of genius are 
undecidable, particularly the manner by which genius elicits and is to be discerned from 
its imitators. The examination of Kant’s genius will be followed by an analysis of key 
nineteenth-century discourses on degeneracy in which artistic and literary talent is 
conflated with moral and mental pathology. This will entail a genealogy of texts, 
specifically those by criminal anthropologists Cesar Lombroso and Max Nordau, and the 
psychoanalist Sigmund Freud, texts wherein artists and their works are treated as objects 
of a clinical-cultural forensics.  
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The second part of the chapter will turn attention to the case of Artaud. I will first 
examine the biographical and critical material the case has generated, with the purpose of 
demonstrating a clinical bias. I follow with a reading of Artaud’s exchange with Rivière. 
My purpose will be to show how Artaud shapes a new modality of artistic agency in these 
letters, simultaneously embracing the confines of clinical pathologization as case history 
and subverting clinical power through creative non-compliance. 
 
Part One: Genius and Degeneracy 
 
In the following pages, I trace a discursive arc of the clinicalization of artistic subjectivity 
from Morel, to Lombroso and Nordau, and finally Freud. Through the historical progress 
of this clinicalization, artistic subjectivity becomes the object of an intense cultural 
forensics, and artistic experience assumes the clinical status of a pathological process. I 
will establish the origins of this medicalized artistic subjectivity in the figure of the artist-
genius articulated by Kant in Critique of Judgment. Kant identifies individuals with 
exceptional artistic talent as genius, but, as my reading suggests, this status is ambiguous 
and undecidable. Kant’s aesthetics, while it establishes a privileged relationship between 
artistic genius and nature, nevertheless proscribes this relationship through a regulatory 
mechanism of reason – that of ‘taste’. In the nineteenth century, the concept of 
degeneracy is developed and given an epistemological status as a link between the 
disciplines of evolutionary science and heredity, alienism, criminology, social science 
and aesthetics. A. N. Morel’s Treatise on Degeneracy (figure 3.1) develops a concept of 
degeneration as a bio-social schema, tracing the subject’s progress from the ‘lowest’ 
 118 
biological determinations as an organism to its ‘higher’ civilized status as a moral and 
‘proper’ aesthetic agent, in Kantian terms. The ensuing medical problematization of 
artistic genius of Lombroso and Nordau linked the concept of degeneracy to the artistic 
subject or artistic genius. In Nordau’s Degeneracy, Charles Baudelaire is characterised as 
an exemplary figure of the cultural sociopath. In this discursive trajectory, I will show a 
genealogical development of the artist from the slightly suspicious Kantian misfit to the 
pathological, fin de siècle monstrosity. Psychoanalysis folded the techniques of clinical 
perception into those of literary hermeneutics, a convergence effectively completed and 
closed by Freud.
262
 In Freud’s writing, we find the psychoanalytic syndromes of the ages 
extrapolated from and explicated by the Oedipus tragedy. Art and literature become 





In the Critique of Judgment, Kant defines genius as an “innate mental aptitude [ingenium] 
through which nature gives the rule to art”,264 and which operates according to four rules. 
I cite the passage in which Kant establishes the parameters of his genius at length, as it is 
here Kant establishes a pattern of themes and conventions for genius on which the 
clinicalized artist case history is built: 
(1) (Genius) is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given: and 
not an aptitude in the way of cleverness for what can be learned according to some 
rule; and that consequently originality must be its primary property. (2) Since there 
may also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, i.e. be 
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exemplary; and, consequently, though not themselves derived from imitation they 
must serve that purpose for others, i.e. as a standard or rule of estimating. (3) It cannot 
indicate scientifically how it brings about its product, but rather gives the rule as 
nature. Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius, he does not himself 
know how the ideas for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to 
invent the like at pleasure, or methodically, and communicate the same to others in 
such products. (Hence, presumably, our word genie is derived from genius, as the 
peculiar guardian and guiding spirit given to man at his birth, by the inspiration of 
which those original ideas were obtained.) (4) Nature prescribes the rule through 
genius not to science but to art and this only in so far as it is fine art.
265
 
Originality, exemplarity, unconscious artistic facility, and an almost symbiotic 
relationship with nature, are necessary attributes of artistic genius. Kant also suggests that 
artistic genius issues directly from nature at birth. I contend, however, that by placing the 
genius in such close proximity to nature, and by setting him about his artistic activities in 
a manner that would suggest very little in the way of prior understanding, Kant bestows 
this character with a slippery, outlaw, even aberrant quality. As philosopher Avital Ronell 
has written, Kant’s genius “is a troubled and troubling figure” who “bears the mark of 
monstrosity” and “uneasily straddles between the sheer simplicity and the excess (of) an 
unaccountable natural force”.266 According to Ronell. Kant’s genius is a special case of 
“stupidity” and “while regularly sponsored and celebrated, is often depicted…as suspect, 
puerile, hopelessly out of it”.267 
The specter of monstrosity hovers around Kant’s genius. The philosopher asserts his 
lofty status “must be regarded as but a rare phenomenon,”268 yet simultaneously warns of 
the dangers posed to those who think of imitating him. While the genius’s “natural 
endowment for art must furnish the rule,” the rule is elusive and unknowable, for the 
artist is nature’s savant. He has no concept, no methodological way of nailing down or 
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formalizing his rule, for if the rule is logically defined and consciously applied, the 
genius ceases to be ruled by nature and therefore is not a genius. That defining rule, Kant 
instructs, can only be “gathered from the performance, i.e. from the product, which others 
may use to put their own talent to the test, so as to let it serve as a model, not for 
imitation, but for following.”269 Genius is; it cannot be learned or taught.270  
Kant’s distinction between artist and imitator, registered at an epistemic and 
characterological level, echoes the troublesome relationship between authenticity and 
representation, between nature and culture, that has haunted Western philosophy since 
the ancients. In the Republic, Plato elaborates a cautionary theory of mimesis that places 
artists and poets in the low rank of making imitations that have only a distant or distorted 
relationship to truth.
271
 Kant extends this Platonic skepticism to suggest something 
approaching a cultural epidemiology. While Kant’s genius is directed by nature, whose 
excess always poses a threat, an equal, perhaps more significant threat is posed by the 
misaligned excess of culture incited by the genius, who acts as a force of nature within 
culture, and who might initiate a flood of copies produced by slavish, ‘aping’, imitators:  
(Imitation) becomes aping when the pupil copies everything down to the deformities 
which the genius only of necessity suffered to remain, because they could hardly be 
removed without loss of force to the idea … many a deviation from the common rule 
becomes him well, but in no sense is it a thing worthy of imitation. On the contrary it 
remains all through intrinsically a blemish, which one is bound to try to remove, but for 
which the genius is, as it were, allowed to plead a privilege, on the ground that a 




While geniuses are the disseminators of nature’s rules, force and ideas, they are, at the 
same time, potentially, the purveyors of its monstrosities and deformaties. These become 
                                                 
269
 Kant, Critique, 168. 
270
 Kant, Critique, 168. 
271
 See: Plato, Republic, Book X, trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992) 264-290. 
272
 Kant, Critique, 181. 
 121 
dangerous when imitators copy only the appearance and not the unknowable substance of 
natural genius. In the hands of imitators and copyists these ‘blemishes’ and ‘deformities’ 
threaten to go viral. We might say the genius is a healthy carrier of culturally virulent or 
pathogenic material.  
The genius artist poses another threat that makes his status more ambiguous in Kant’s 
aesthetic economy, and that arises in the form of imitation Kant identifies as 
‘mannerism’. I cite the following passage at length, for the ideas Kant raises here have 
had remarkable tenacity, continued and amplified by generations of subsequent 
philosophical, anthropological and psychiatric treatments of artistic subjectivity. Kant 
wrote: 
Mannerism is another kind of aping – an aping of peculiarity [originality] in general, 
for the sake of removing oneself as far as possible from imitators, while the talent 
requisite to enable one to be at the same time exemplary is absent. There are in fact, 
two modes in general of arranging one’s thoughts for utterance. The one is called a 
manner (modus aestheticus), the other a method (modus logicus). The distinction 
between them is this: the former possesses no standard other than the feeling of unity 
in the presentation, whereas the latter here follows definite principles. As a 
consequence the former is alone admissible for fine art. It is only, however, where the 
manner of carrying the idea into execution in a product of art is aimed at singularity 
instead of being made appropriate to the idea, that mannerism is properly ascribed. 
The ostentatious [it is interesting to note that Kant deploys the French precieux], 
forced, affected styles, intended to mark one out from the common herd (though soul 
is wanting), resemble the behavior of a man who, as we say, hears himself talk, or who 
stands and moves about as if he were on a stage to be gaped at – action which 
invariably betrays a tyro.
273
 
The residue of this fear of purposeful or forced artistic production, and therefore the 
perception of its threat, emerges in Artaud and Rivière’s letters, for instance, in Rivière’s 
suspicion that Artaud is overstating or affecting his position as a troubled young poet in 
order to gain attention. 
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In this rich and crucial passage, Kant posits the double-bound concept of manner and 
method as a way of differentiating between an aesthetic and naturally driven action, and a 
logical, purposeful and therefore false action. This passage is important for the way this 
differentiation indicates the suspicion Kant, in general, reserves for the genius and 
particularly for identifying the danger posed by his influence beyond the prescribed 
domain of the fine arts. Feeling and peculiarity are proper when they are the means of 
creativity of the fine arts, but when pursued as ends in themselves, for the purposes of 
appearing exceptional, or in contemporary parlance, for ‘self-styling’, they are 
ostentations and mannered. In effect, they become symptoms of a moral and 
characterological flaw, indicated by the awkward self-awareness of Kant’s ‘tyro’, whose 
aping behaviors resemble those of the fool.  
With his definition of mannerism, I contend Kant subtly but purposefully blurs the 
distinction between the genius and his imitators, gathering them into an unruly cohort. He 
does this to set into play an anxiety about the ‘undecidable’ identity of the genius, which 
in turn serves to preserve, despite the privilege Kant accorded the relationship between 
art and nature, the moral stability and superior status of philosophy and science. This will 
be further expressed in the program Kant’s sets down to discipline geniuses and their 
coterie. Artists and tyros share an ardour that makes them susceptible to “lawless 
freedom.”274 The problem for both is imagination, which, “in spite of all its wealth, 
produces nothing but nonsense”. Kant proposes a mode of disinterested taste, functioning 
through the faculty of judgment, to bring imagination into line with understanding. 
Taste, like judgment in general, is the discipline or corrective of genius … It 
introduces clearness and order into the plenitude of thought, and in so doing gives 
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stability to the ideas, and qualifies them at once for permanent and universal approval, 
for being followed by others, and for a continually progressive culture.
275
  
Through taste, the aesthetic arm of reason, the prerogatives of judgment supersede artistic 
agency. Works of art, Kant concludes, are not simply the products of excessive talent but 
“the combination of taste and genius”,276 and thus worthy to hold their place in the moral 
economy of culture. The genius, while nature’s special agent, must be subject to reason if 
he is not to be mistaken for an amateur, imitator, faggot, or fool.  
In a move to proscribe the exemplary status of the artist, Kant distinguishes between 
the artistic genius and the ‘great scientist’. Kant is clear that, unlike scientists who are 
necessary to the continuation of society, and despite their exceptionality, artists are 
supplements to nature and culture. “The talent for science is formed for the continued 
advances of greater perfection in knowledge, with all its dependant practical advantages, 
as also for imparting the same to others”.277 Hence, Kant concludes, “scientists can boast 
a ground of considerable superiority over those who merit the honor of being called 
geniuses, since genius reaches a point at which art must make a halt, as there is a limit 
imposed upon it which cannot transcend”.278 
The genius is a minor figure in Kant’s aesthetic system, a figure whose entire purpose 
is to deduce the presence of a faculty of judgment underlying all forms of corporeal and 
somatic experience. While Kant’s aesthetics has been fundamental to modernism, and 
aspects of his theory of genius have inspired several generations of philosophers and 
artists, my reading has emphasized its directive and normalizing aspects. Kant’s genius 
stands at an unsurpassable limit at which art halts, a subjective analogue of the sublime. 
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As Terry Eagleton has written, the Critique of Judgment is a paradoxical text. On one 
hand, it theorizes a sphere of corporeal and cognitive freedom, a “generous community of 
ends, finding in the freedom and autonomy of the aesthetic a prototype of human 
possibility … at odds with feudal absolutism and possessive individualism”.279 On the 
other hand, Eagleton suggests that in the Critique, Kant establishes an aesthetic program 
based on the individual subject that could “escalate uncontrollably beyond this function 
[of aesthetic autonomy] to undercut the very foundations of rationality and moral 
duty”.280 Kant’s insertion of rational judgment through the faculty of taste resolves the 
threat posed by this paradox, but taste exerts control only after the fact, on the products of 
innate, unfettered aesthetic creativity. In this structure, judgment can only be coercive. 
The Critique of Judgment is a decidedly normative discourse of an emerging European 
middle class, at once emancipating and self-regulating. In the nineteenth century, this 
middle class, linked to an emergent political rationality of ‘bio-power’, will work hard 
and effectively, as Foucault has shown, to define, incite, and regulate its natural and bio-
social resources, including its most talented offspring. While the target populations of 
bio-power were primarily individuals and populations of the lower classes, the workers of 
factories, hospitals, military forces, and prisons but including those in universities and 
academies, I contend that the artistic genius becomes another discursive site where this 
fascination with defining a normative bio-social limit attains the epistemological status of 
a regulatory idea in the bio-physiological sciences.
281
 In the following section, I focus on 
these social-science and medical discourses in which the seeds of Kant’s suspicions of 
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the exceptional creative genius, grow and mutate into a bio-cultural panic about the 
monstrous. 
The Artist as Degenerate 
The hinge fastening the natural, biological, messy animal to the orderly and polished 
subject of reason was the clinical-moral concept of degeneracy. This concept, which 
assumes epistemological consistency by the middle of the nineteenth century, marked a 
new bio-medical schema of the subject that could be traced from the ‘lowest’ biological 
determinations of the organism, to its ‘higher’ determinations as a moral agent. As we 
shall see, in the second half of the nineteenth century, theories of degeneracy had also 
come to encompass artistic subjectivity and practice. In the following pages, I offer an 
overview of those discourses that facilitated this bio-discursive fusion. 
Again, it is a text by Immanuel Kant that connects the classically conceived medical 
treatments of the self, with the modern, bio-political and bio-social branches of 
anthropological human science. His Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View 
(1798), written in a popular style and published eight years after the Critique of 
Judgment, follows traditional philosophical texts of self-care and ethics traceable back to 
the pre-Socratics. Where Kant differs from his predecessors, is in the attention he pays to 
the role of geography, meteorology, the environment, natural ‘aptitudes’, and 
interpersonal factors on the development and constitution of human subjects. The text 
ruminates on the effects on the physical and cognitive activity of individuals of various 
factors, including relations between the sexes, physiognomy – crucial to criminologists 
and profilers of the nineteenth century – diet, digestive problems, hypochondria, dreams, 
the role of climate, geography, and even the nervous system, a relatively new branch of 
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science that was supplanting theories of humours. The breadth of these concerns indicate 
the emergence of a bio-social or bio-cultural epistemology.
282
 
As Foucault pointed out in his commentary on this text, Kant’s Anthropology must be 
placed within an archaeology of ‘moral medicine’ that links health to character, and 
disease with the improper exercise of individual freedom. According to Foucault, this 
genre of medical writing evinces a “huge anthropological drive to adapt the observation 
of illnesses to a metaphysics of evil, and to discover by which shared gravitational pull 
the collapse into pathological mechanism overlaps with freedom’s fall into sin.”283 It 
might seem that as belief in science supplanted religious belief, the determination of a 
new vocabulary for the old discourses of individual sin fell on the shoulders of medicine. 
Hence we have with these emerging medical discourses an underlying moral discourse. 
When Kant was writing his Anthropology, a formalized bio-medical discourse linking 
artistic talent and psychopathology, together with its clinical experts, was taking shape. 
This branch of social psychiatry focused on artists, poets, philosophers and scientists, and 
concluded that the occupational stresses of these individuals made them susceptible to 
psychiatric disorders. Philippe Pinel, in Treatise on Insanity (1798), published the same 
year as Kant’s Anthropology, writes: “certain professions conduce more than others to 
insanity, which are chiefly those in which the imagination is increasingly or ardently 
engaged”. Those most susceptible to vocation-related derangement were “priests and 
monks, as well as country people, terrified into the condition by the anticipation of hell 
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torments, (and) many artists, painters, sculptors, and musicians”,284 Pinel, who shared 
Kant’s moral panic over the unrestrained imagination, deduced a link between work and 
mental disorder from the registers of the asylum at Bicêtre where he worked.  
By the mid- nineteenth century, the belief in a work-related susceptibility to insanity 
was subsumed by a constitutionalist or congenital model of ‘mental deformity’.285 The 
descriptive classifications of artist-madmen was further elaborated as the causal logic of 
developments in organic pathology was applied to mental disorders. Artists, together with 
criminals, prostitutes, racial minorities, and other potential nuisances to middle-class 
order, become part of the new pathological cohort of the deviant.
286
  
Bénédict-Augustin Morel's Treatise on Degeneracy (1857) is the first text to formally 
posit a concept of degeneration as an all-encompassing theoretical category. Morel did 
not single out artists as special cases, but offered a general theory of dégénérescence. 
Crime, developmental disability, cretinism and other social and physical conditions were 
conceived by Morel as “phenotypic reversions” to primitive sub-human states, and his 
treatise linked these regressions to a range of factors from alcoholism to geology.
287
 Such 
concerns with degeneracy intersect with, as Canguilhem, Gilman, Foucault, and others 
have shown, a concurrent interest in the mentality of children
288
 and fascination with 
‘primitive’ or non-European societies, which had been gathering momentum since the 
mid-eighteenth century. Morel linked childhood masturbation, an ‘inherited disease of 
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cretins’, to moral pathology, and thus identified it as an indicator of the ‘primitive’ sub-
human origins of his culture. Morel characterized childhood as a wilder stage of human 
development, and thus determined certain behaviors had to be tamed by the pedagogical 
instruments of a proper, middle-class, up-bringing.
289
  
Cesare Lombroso’s The Man of Genius (1889) is the first comprehensive source book 
of artist-disorders of the nineteenth century. In it, Lombroso applies Morel’s concept of 
degeneracy to an analysis of the exceptional creative talent, which he classifies as a 
beneficial aptitude resulting from underlying ‘birth defects’. Lombroso is regarded as a 
leading figure of nineteenth-century criminology. His popularity, no doubt, had to do, in 
part, with the effectiveness of his writing, which, like the earlier anthropologies, 
discussed a variety of topics in a witty and engaging manner. While his text casts a 
profound bio-social suspicion over the biological and moral constitution of artists and 
writers, it is likely he was motivated, as was Freud, by literary ambitions. His literary 
finesse, coupled with a brute, empirical ‘will to truth’, is evident in the opening 
paragraphs of The Man of Genius:  
It is a sad mission to cut through and destroy with the scissors of analysis the delicate 
and iridescent veils with which our proud mediocrity clothes itself. Very terrible is the 
religion of truth. The physiologist is not afraid to reduce love to a play of stamens and 
pistils, and thought to a molecular movement. Even genius, the one human power 
before which we may bow the knee without shame, has been classed … as on the 
confines of criminality; one of the teratologic [birth defect] forms of the human mind, 
a variety of insanity.
290
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Lombroso continues, that this “impious profanation is not…altogether the work of 
doctors, nor is it the fruit of modern skepticism”291 but is rooted in ancient philosophy. 
He cites the writings of Plato, Aristotle and Democritus, which link the works of 
versifiers and rhapsodists to mania, melancholia, ‘congestion of the head’, and similar 
experiences of illness. Yet, the bilious, sanguine, or choleric passions of the philosophers 
seem quaint in comparison with the congenital pathologies afflicting artists and other 
creative types identified by Lombroso.  
Lombroso was instrumental in formalizing the field of nineteenth-century criminal 
physiognomy. For Lombroso the “paradox that confounds genius with neurosis” is 
grounded in empirically observable physical deformities, particularly those of the brain 
and skull. In Man of Genius, craniological morphologies support his thesis that “lesions 
of the head and brain are frequent among men of genius.”292 It is ironic that Kant’s skull 
(figure 3.2) was among those he used to support this claim. Kant, Lombroso observed, 
“presented an abnormal development of the left parietal bone”, a feature shared by the 
skulls of Dante and the surgeon, Bichat.
293
 
Much of Lombroso’s treatise is devoted to identifying the physical and psychic 
characteristics of artistic ‘mattoids’, a nineteenth-century term for a mad or eccentric 
person. Three subsequent sections examine the causes of deviance, including 
disquisitions on the effects of meteorology, race, disease and civilization; the art of the 
insane; and the etiology of degenerative psychosis in exceptional talents. The short 
chapter in this final section, “Sane Men of Genius” examines “unperceived defects” of 
Michelangelo and Darwin, thus casting moral suspicion on those few geniuses who seem 
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“to have completed their intellectual orbit without aberration, neither depressed by 
misfortune nor thrown out of their course by madness.”294 The attention Lombroso paid 
to what is now referred to as ‘outsider’ art, is crucial to the clinicalization of artistic 
subjectivity. He was perhaps the first clinician or critic to examine the artistic and literary 
works of mental patients, observing that “individuals who previously had not the 
remotest idea of art are impelled by disease to paint”.295 He also noted the greatest 
number of artistically-inclined “psychopaths” tended toward painting, followed by poetry 
and then architecture.
296
. Lombroso elaborates a compelling theory of artistic facture and 
mental illness, and contends that picture writing or scriptophilia, including ideographs, 
written script and language fragments in drawings are common attributes of ‘psychiatric 
art’. Works that blur the boundaries between writing and drawing, for instance, or which 
developed the visual and haptic pleasures of painterly facture, were especially 
interesting.
297
 Following Lombroso, commentators and theorists of anthropology, culture 
and the fine arts would refer to similar formal approaches to picture making that defy the 
‘proper’ boundaries between writing and drawing, as degenerate regressions or 
scriptophilic relapses. The mixing of drawing and writing would of course become an 
important even highly formalized technique used by Surrealists, Dadaists, and Artaud.  
Thus, the subjects and sequence of Lombroso’s study establish a path of evolutionary 
and clinical connections from artist to art works to mental illness, and from mental illness 
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to an ‘atavistic’ past. From this, Lombroso develops a comprehensive theory of the artist 
as clinical case, one that encompasses a broad anthropological program and establishes a 
constitutive relation between psychology and physiology through the bio-social theme of 
degeneracy.  
Lombroso’s treatise linking Morel’s theory of degeneracy with artistic genius or talent 
is not the last word on the topic. At the end of the nineteenth century, Max Nordau’s 
Degeneration (1892) set out to summarize, broaden and deepen the branch of cultural 
forensics opened by Morel and Lombroso.“ The notion of degeneracy,” Nordau writes in 
the opening dedication to Lombroso, “first introduced into science by Morel, and 
developed with so much genius by yourself [Lombroso], has in your hands already shown 
itself extremely fertile in the most diverse directions”.298 He cites psychiatry, criminal 
law, politics, and sociology as the significant threads from which this new science of 
degeneracy is woven, and credits Lombroso with shedding “a veritable flood of light”299 
on the subject of genius and its biological ties to degeneracy. He then claims for himself 
the role of discerning the specific ways degeneracy coalesces in art and literature. He 
shares Lombroso’s assessment of artistic talent’s causal connection to pathology; 
however, he is more severe in his assessment of art’s value to society. According to 
Nordau, every artist harbours an inner degenerate and there is no literary or artistic 
product of the current age that is not culturally pathological and dangerous. He writes 
with polemical verve: 
Degenerates are not always criminals, prostitutes, anarchists, and pronounced lunatics; 
they are often authors and artists. These, however, manifest the same mental 
characteristics, and for the most part the same somatic features, as the members of the 
above-mentioned anthropological family, who satisfy their unhealthy impulses with 
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Nordau’s text sets forth a concept of degeneracy as an all-encompassing descriptor of the 
modern bio-cultural historical milieu. He draws lavishly from discourses on hereditary 
decrepitude, references novel neurological-scientific notions, and provides demographic 
and statistical data in the manner of the British empirical social scientists at the time. 
Despite all this positivism and scientific grounding, the impact of Degeneracy is felt in its 
literary effect, its pathologic-literary evocation, its “dusk of nations” mood.301 Nordau 
devotes a third of his work to formulating a definition of the term fin de siècle, 
contending that while the phrase was popular and broadly applied in the fashion, lifestyle 
and arts at the time, its meaning was vague. For Nordau, the term connotes a larger 
cultural decline: 
In the civilized world, there obviously prevails a twilight mood which finds 
expression, amongst other ways, in all sorts of odd aesthetic fashions. All these new 
tendencies, realist, or naturalism, ‘decadentism,’ neo-mysticism, are manifestations of 
a degeneration and hysteria, and identical with the mental stigmata which the 
observations of clinicists have unquestionably established as belonging to these. But 
both degeneration and hysteria are the consequences of the excessive organic wear and 
tear suffered by the nations through the immense demands on their activity and 
through the rank growth of large towns.
302
 
In a similar manner, the more empirically disciplined, and more scientifically sound, 
social scientists in Britain established causal links between the physical degeneration of 
the working class and the dire conditions in which they lived and worked, Nordau, who 
lacked their scientific rigor and was motivated by a fierce, anti-modernist agenda, infers a 
causal relationship between the degeneracy of artistic modernism and the enervations and 
chaos of modern urban life.  
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Artistic deviancy, or modernism, is the cultural malaise of the modern age. It 
manifests in artists as ‘ego-mania’ and originates in the over-stimulated and unregulated 
regions of biological nature itself:  
Badly-conducting sensory nerves, obtuse perceptive centres in the brain, weakness of 
will with its resulting incapacity of attention, morbidly irregular and violent vital 




Degenerate artists are distinguished from common criminals by a lack of vigour; they 
dream and write while the criminal “has the resolution and strength to act”.304 Nordau’s 
perverted ego-maniac artists, writers and philosophers are only “malefactors in the 
platonic sense” in that they dream rather than acting; this platonic ideality does not 
mitigate the underlying pathology nor the threats posed, for the enthusiasms that artistic 
works incite spawn more “manifestations….of moral insanity, imbecility, and 
dementia”.305 For Nordau, writing, painting and philosophy are the means by which 
personal depravities are celebrated, rationalized as systems, reproduced and spread 
through society. In Nordau’s discourse, Kant’s genius and Lombroso’s mattoid have 
evolved into a considerably more dangerous and monstrous figure, while it also reveals, 
underlying the platonic suspicion of imitation and copies, an incipient antagonism toward 
the ‘feminine’, associated with dreaming, artifice, reproduction and representation.  
Nordau singles out Charles Baudelaire for particular attention, as one of his ‘index 
cases’. Following an extensive reading of the poet’s verse, prose, and critical writings 
(impressive if only for its breadth), Nordau concludes with something like an autopsy 
report: 
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He died of general paralysis after he had wallowed for months in the lowest depths of 
insanity … Baudelaire showed all the mental stigmata of degeneration during the 
whole of his life. He was at once a mystic and an erotomaniac, an eater of hashish and 




The ambiguous, paradoxical relationship of nature and culture present in Kant’s aesthetic 
discourse, are exaggerated and joined into a picture of Baudelaire as a co-morbid, double-
diagnostic mess. For Nordau, the poet-critic’s degeneracy is pathological, grounded in his 
faulty biology, and expressed through the un-natural excesses of cultural artificiality, 
immoral sexuality and drug use. Again, clinical and characteriological discourse assumes 
the shrill pitch of moral condemnation: 
Baudelaire has the ‘cult of self’: he abhors nature, movement and life; he dreams of an 
ideal immobility, of eternal silence, of symmetry and artificiality; he loves disease, 
ugliness and crime; all his inclinations, in profound aberration, are opposed to those of 
sane beings; what charms his sense of smells is the odour of corruption; his eye, the 
sight of carrion, suppurating wounds and the pain of others; he feels happy in muddy, 
cloudy, autumn weather; his senses are excited by unnatural pleasures only … the only 
thing which can distract or interest him is badness – murder, blood, lewdness and 
falsehood. He addresses his prayers to Satan, and aspires to hell...
307
 
The text is laden with such ornate and sensuous assertions that it is itself a fin de siècle 
discursive monstrosity.  
Nordau’s monstrous artist resurrects another aspect of Kant’s troublesome ingenium, 
the biosocial hazard it poses, which assumes comparable fin de siècle grotesqueness. The 
epidemiology of degeneracy, its infectiousness or communicability is clearly linked to 
writing. The exceptional talent of Degeneracy is no longer Kant’s healthy carrier of 
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potentially dangerous influences, nor is he Lombroso’s crippled producer of potentially 
beneficial works. In Nordau, he has become a zombie sovereign, cannibalized by his 
army of devoted epigones. This is announced in the following remarkable passage:  
As on the death of Alexander the Great his generals fell on the conqueror’s empire, 
and each one seized a portion of land so did the imitators that Baudelaire numbered 
among his contemporaries and the generation following – many even without waiting 
for his madness and death – take possession of some one of his peculiarities for 
literary exploitation. The school of Baudelaire reflects the character of its master, 
strangely distorted … (and refracts) his predilection for disease, death and purification 
(necrophilia) …308  
Nordau invokes the figure not of a madman, but of a great emperor in order to 
characterize the poetic and moral monstrosity of Baudelaire. This theme deserves further 
reflection, for the profound discursive link it forges between the figures of sovereign and 
artistic monstrosity in the modern period.  
Nordau’s Baudelaire and the other etiological caricatures of Huysmans, Nietzsche, 
Ibsen, Wilde and even Ruskin, who populate his text, exemplify a strain of modern 
artistic agency that, Nordau contends, lacks “altruism” and is free of any ties to the social 
pact.
309
 Their moral-aesthetic disinterestedness – Nordau’s twist of Kant’s definition of 
aesthetic experience – is articulated by the ‘art for art sake’ mentality expressed by 
aesthetes such as Oscar Wilde, whose trial commenced the year of Degeneracy’s 
publication, but is equally applicable to the a-morality of the French poète maudit. 
Nordau decries these aestheticisms as aspects of ego-mania, the character pathology 
linking the artist to the “born criminal”.310 Baudelaire is compelled, like a monstrous 
king, by his inherent unnatural nature (the definition of monster) to act freely with 
regards to his literary productions. Yet he is also a member of a cohort composed of 








cultural outlaws and nomadic figures. Nordau’s Baudelaire translates, transmits and 
comments on the works of Poe and DeQuincey with the purpose of establishing a 
‘satanic’ legacy, and assembles a covey of followers who perpetuate his ‘artistic 
perversity’, and they do so by aping Baudelaire.311  
The turn of Nordau’s discourse around origins, particularly in its concluding chapters, 
is noteworthy. Alongside a program linking strains of cultural, organic and psychic 
degeneracy to Parnassian, Diabolist and Symbolist literature and art, Nordau proposes a 
novel diagnostic field comprised of syndromes which can be deciphered in specific 
individuals. From readings of Henrick Ibsen’s plays and a psychological profile gleaned 
from biographical accounts of the author’s life, Nordau assembles a set of symptoms he 
coins ‘Ibsenism’ which for the most part coalesce around the dangerous sexual hysterias 
of Ibsen’s female characters.312 There is also ‘Tolstoi-ism’.313 Presumably, these 
character cases could be used to diagnose pathology in an artist with an analogous 
biography and artistic production. 
Such maneuvers, slipping from individual imagination to social pathology, are worthy 
of extended reflection, and would reveal the encroachment of a tendency to treat all 
aspects of culture as bio-medical problems. For my purposes, with regards to the 
evolving category of artist case history, the discursive collapse of artistic subjectivity and 
degeneracy into a doubled monstrosity reaches its watershed in Nordau’s caricature of 
Charles Baudelaire.  




 Nordau, 338. 
313
 Nordau, 144. 
 137 
In his final section, “The Twentieth Century”, which comprised two chapters, 
“Prognosis” and “Therapeutics,” Nordau begins his final assessments with a line so thick 
with atmosphere and abandonment it could have been written by Baudelaire:  
Our long and sorrowful wandering through the hospital – for as such we have 
recognized, if not all civilized humanity, at all events the upper stratum of the 
population of large towns to be –is ended. We have observed the various embodiments 




He suggests that a decadent culture needs a critical police made up of psychiatrists who 
will “speak to the masses … through general publications”.315 In a chilling fashion, he 
explains the need for such a police would not last long. Deviant culture will die in due 
course as a result of its own disabilities. In light of this, it is not surprising that some of 
Nordau’s central themes, degenerate art for example, were taken up by the National 
Socialists in Germany a few decades later, as clinical-cultural support for their antipathy 
to modernist art, and for their efforts to eradicate the “degeneracy” of the Weimar 
Republic. Ironically, Nordau, like Lombroso, was Jewish and a strong advocate of 
Zionism.  
Psychoanalysis 
Psychoanalysis posed the first challenge to degeneracy-based theorizations of the 
psychological subject, and subsequently of the artist genius monstrosity. Joseph Breuer 
and Sigmund Freud’s Studies in Hysteria (1895), was critical of the constitutionalist 
theories of psychological disorder such as Lombroso’s and Nordau’s. Freud and Breuer 
took specific aim at the work of Jean-Martin Charcot, with whom Freud studied in 1886-
87, and whose papers Freud translated into German. In part, Charcot’s project applied 
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Lombroso’s techniques of physiognomic profiling to the analysis and codification of 
hysteria in female patients. Charcot staged his encounters with hypnotized hysterics in 
the amphitheater of Salpêtrière Hospital, which housed nearly four-thousand indigent 
women, and where he was medical director. He performed these scenarios in front of rapt 
audiences of male clinicians who came from around Europe and the United States to 
attend (figure 3.3). 
Charcot’s attempts to trace an etiology of hysteria are notorious and well-documented. 
He amassed an enormous archive of photographic images that documente the attitudes 
passionelles of delirious residents (figure 3.4 – 3.7). The performative aspect of this 
project, the way it manifests a clinical complicity between doctors and patients,
316
 is 
relevant to the exchange between Artaud and Rivière. In the pictures of Artaud – press 
photos, film stills, self portraits, and late photographs taken at the asylums – there is a 
suggestion of a staging, and of a performative spectacle that resembles Charcot’s 
iconographic program. These pictures show an Artaud who is clearly working with and 
through his images (figure 3.8 – 3.10).  
Against such understandings of hysteria as the result of congenital weakness, Freud 
and Breuer proposed that the “hysteric suffers mostly from reminiscences”.317 They 
argued hysteria could be understood only by tracing its symptoms to traumatic 
experiences, particularly those connected with early sexual traumas. Freud’s “renovation 
of psychiatry”318 entailed a shift from the constitutional understanding of the psyche to 
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what Paul Ricouer has called a narrative topography.
319
 While degeneracy-based 
psychiatry treats symptoms as physiological manifestations of over-stimulated, 
congenitally-defective neurons, psychoanalysis treats symptoms hermeneutically, as a 
form of biographical or autobiographical literature. This radical shift in psychiatric 
diagnostics entailed a radical modification in the doctor-patient relationship. 
Psychoanalysis shifted the therapeutic exchange from Charcot’s staged scenarios to 
dreams, obsessions, desires and life events recounted and deciphered in the doctor’s 
office.  
Freud psychoanalytic program is organized along two axes: one devoted to the 
diagnosis and therapeutic treatment of psychically disturbed patients, and the other to an 
encompassing theory of culture, derived from Sophocles’s Oedipal narrative of incest and 
patricide. These two aspects cross at the literary level, in Freud’s carefully crafted case 
histories, which drew broadly from clinical and literary sources, particularly classical 
German, sources. As Ricouer, Ronell and others have shown, Freud was motivated as 
much by a desire to have an impact on our literary as well as our psychiatric 
understanding. Although his style is highly rationalist and impressive for its clinical 
empiricism, his texts allude to an ‘undecidable’ status, an indecision as to whether his 
project was scientific and/or literary.
320
  
While Freud shifted the emphasis from a bio-inheritance model to a symbolic reading 
of psychic troubles, he maintained a view of artistic talent as having its origins in 
psychopathology. Freud’s artist is no longer Nordau’s dissipated monster; now, he is an 
exceptional neurotic, whose motivation to produce works of art is rooted in a hidden 
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pathogenic conflict, more often than not involving repressed sexual or homosexual 
desire. Freud’s salient case is, of course, found in his essay Leonardo da Vinci and a 
memory of his childhood (1910), similar to Lombroso’s treatment of Michelangelo, 
discerns an inadequacy beneath the Renaissance master’s ostensible artistic and scientific 
perfection. Freud signals his awareness that the psychoanalysis of artists may “blacken 
the radiant [talents]”, but he does not back down from his clinical task. Psychiatric 
research, he writes, “cannot help finding worthy of understanding everything that can be 
recognized in those illustrious models, and it believes there is no one so great as to be 
disgraced by being subject to the laws which govern both normal and pathological 
activity with equal cogency”.321 The characteristics of Freud’s neurotic artist intersect 
with the Kantian aesthetic and anthropological programs, including speculations on the 
physiognomic indications of Leonardo’s genius, and reflections on the artist’s turn from 
painting to science which, for Freud, distinguishes Leonardo’s genius from being merely 
artistic. 
Freud spends the greater part of his essay interpreting a childhood memory recounted 
in Leonardo’s notebooks, of having been struck repeatedly in the mouth by a bird of prey. 
Freud treats the memory as a fantasy or reflective displacement of the trauma of 
homosexual desire. While Freud focuses on Leonardo’s personal sexual life, as the key to 
understanding his oeuvre, he contends this paragon of the Renaissance was sexually 
abstinent.
 322
 Again, what weighs in favour of Leonardo’s genius, according to Freud, is a 
subliminatory regulating system – Freud writes of Leonardo’s hesitation in finishing 
paintings – akin to the operation of good taste in Kant’s aesthetic system, which clips the 
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wings of speculation and desire, and re-invests an un-resolvable desire into the noble 
compensation of artistic mastery. 
The Freudian case history, as a link between narrative creation and psychological life, 
represents an advance for literary and clinical enterprises. In his prefatory remarks to 
Dora, he states the demonstration of “the intimate structure of a disorder and the 
determination of its symptoms” requires more than the empirical skill of clinical 
observation. The analyst had to “face the incompleteness of analytic results” and continue 
“where the authentic parts end” with literary construction.323 Alluding to German art 
historical discourses, notably Winckelmann and Lessing, Freud writes of his fragmentary, 
archeological approach:  
[Everything] that has to do with the clearing-up of a particular symptom merges 
piecemeal, woven into various contexts, and distributed over widely separate periods 
of time …  had no choice (in dealing with the finer structure of neurosis) but to follow 
the example of those discoverers whose good fortune it is to bring to light of day after 
their long burial the priceless thought-mutilated relics of antiquity.
324
  
In effect, this approach to therapy allows Freud to distinguish himself, to make a break 
with strict clinical empiricism and pursue his literary desire. Freud’s method of weaving 
objective observation with literary elaborations in his cases reflects his autobiographical 
or auto-fictional efforts to secure his literary stature. 
In this section, I have defined the category of the artist case history as discursively 
fashioned through a complicity between clinical and critical modalities; and traced its 
migration from clinical medicine to artistic subjectivity through the emerging scientific 
fields of cultural forensics and psychoanalysis. Kant’s ingenium was cited as a precursor, 
more precisely a marker of the shift toward a subjectivity-based aesthetics. It was also, as 
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I have shown, the site where suspicions of individual artistic activity were embedded, 
suspicions that, during the nineteenth century, became so amplified and distorted, as to 
constitute from this artist-position, a pathological menace.  
 
Part Two: The Exemplary Case  
 
By defining the artist case history as discursively fashioned, I do not suggest a strictly 
deterministic device imposed from the outside by orthodox literature, criticism, 
psychoanalysis or psychiatry to confine or manage modern artistic subjectivity (although 
this true). Instead, in this section, the questions I address are directed towards artists, who 
are confined by but also complicit in the formation of these discursive fields. What do 
artists make of these developments? How do artists radicalize a confining 
pathologization, and turn it into a productive one? I contend that Antonin Artaud presents 
an exemplary case. As the subject of psychiatric and critical treatments, he was also an 
artist who fashioned from these ordeals a radically critical and aesthetic position. Indeed, 
I argue, he made it performance. 
Artaud was not the first to make something of his case. There are important index 
cases in the eighteenth century that give rise to a new genre of autobiographical or 
confessional literature, and indicate the emergence of decidedly modern species of self-
reflexive psychological literary subject. These texts, contemporaneous with Kant’s 
reflexive critiques, include confessional memoires and what German literati called 
bildungsromane, which are told in the first person or perfect tense. Goethe’s epistolary 
Sorrows of Young Werther and Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1787 and 1796 
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respectively) are often cited as representative examples of the new psychological 
autobiography. Other pertinent examples abound, among them works that offer 
scrupulously detailed, self-analytical explorations of the authors’ emotional and 
intellectual lives. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions (1770) recounts in great detail, 
events in the philosopher’s life from childhood to middle-age, in order to glean insights 
into his character and, by extension, human nature in general.
325
 
Karl Philipp Moritz’s Anton Reiser is another example of autobiography in which the 
subject is treated to a new form of psychological self-reflection. Moritz was a leading 
exponent in the new field of experiential psychology and was the founder and editor of a 
journal which published essays on the topic. His youthful narrative, published in four 
volumes between 1785 and 1790, represents a concerted effort to formalize a genre of 
narrative writing that would address the challenges of psychological self-analysis. Moritz 
offers an account of his melancholia told through his young protagonist Anton Reiser. 
The piecemeal structure of the novel reflects the fragmentary subjectivity and associative 
inclinations of the protagonist-author’s thought process. 
While Artaud never grounded his performative position as a case in autobiography in 
the psychologically reflective sense – indeed, he was averse and even morally opposed to 
any forms of psychological or psychoanalytic self-understanding – the Rousseau and 
Moritz-Reiser cases are antecedents to Artaud’s presentation of himself. In his letters to 
Rivière, Artaud‘s mental case is strategically purposeful and hyperbolic, much like 
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Moritz’s Reiser. I propose that while the exchange is discursively prescribed, it also 
marks out the space of a new form of interaction, one in which artistic and critical wills, 
in the Nietzschean sense, contend for position and autonomy within a context saturated at 
all levels by medical power. As we will see, while Artaud embodies or acts out the role of 
artist case history, at the same time he resists the clinical-critical restraints imposed by 
Rivière, by taking a position of creative non-compliance. This becomes evident at those 
moments in the exchange in which Artaud shows a hyper-reflexive critical awareness of 
the discursive clinical machinations at work in the correspondence. At times, Rivière 
seems embarrassed by his own psychotherapeutic presumptions. 
The Case. 
To demonstrate my claim that Artaud crafted a psycho-therapeutic identity he could 
perform, a brief examination of some of the significant biographemes or biographical 
writings that make up a life chart of Antonin Artaud is in order. My purpose will be not 
be to call into question the medical and psychiatric ordeals that Artaud endured, nor to 
test the veracity or truth claims of the principal themes running through the biographies. 
It will be to draw out several common and recurring themes that may or may not touch 
upon the actuality of Artaud’s ordeals, and to show how these themes are embedded in 
the historical narrative of clinicalized artistic subjectivity. My purpose is also to glean 
from these accounts a sense of the significant real life eventsncluding clinical and critical 
subjections, that had a direct impact on Artaud's thought and practice.  
Three significant crises mark Artaud’s case: a severe childhood illness; his first 
significant psychiatric breakdown, coincident with the outbreak of World War I; and his 
second major crisis, in the early months of 1938 when Germany defied the Treaty of 
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Versailles and unified with Austria (the Anschluss). We know Artaud, in spite of his 
psychosis, engaged artistically with these events. His drawing-text Spell for Hitler, pitted 
with cigarette burns, was mailed from Ireland to the Reichstag in September of 1939, at 
roughly the time of the Munich Agreement. This last period of crisis precipitated a 
sequence of embarkations, first to Mexico, then Ireland, and finally his grueling 
deportation back to France. Upon return, Artaud was confined to the sprawling Rodez 
asylum where he remained during the violent years of World War II until his death in 
1947.  
Childhood & Adolescence 
The case of Artaud invariably starts with early-childhood encephalitis at age four. All the 
biographical accounts of his life characterize his childhood and adolescence as a 
succession of emotional and psychiatric episodes, including the manifestation of a speech 
pathology that would continue into adult life. In the shadow of this medical introduction, 
the biographies describe Artaud’s childhood creativity as an auto-therapeutic release from 
familial, especially maternal, chaos. With the onset of psychotic episodes in his adult 
years, his artistic production is linked to illness and insanity.  
The accounts, even recent ones, invoke familiar and culturally pervasive tropes of 
psycho-biographical narrative. A biographical note by Ronald Hayman in the catalog 
published in 1996 to accompany the Museum of Modern Art exhibition of Artaud’s 
works on paper, associates the medical and psychological difficulties of his childhood to 
dire Oedipal triangulations. Hayman contends, these alternate between love-hate torments 
of stereotypically borderline women in a matriarchy of sometimes abject mothers, 
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including his mother, grandmother, aunts, and sisters; and terror of an austere, distant and 
isolated father. There is, also, a hint of incest. Hayman writes: 
(As) a child he had difficulties in expressing himself. His stammering may have 
originated in his troubled relationship with his mother. A Levantine Greek married to 
her cousin, a shipping agent, Euphrasie Artaud bore nine children, but only three 
survived infancy and at four Antonin was ill with what may have been meningitis … 
His powders were sometimes mixed with jam, and he couldn’t always distinguish 
between pain inflicted to punish him and pain caused by sickness. Nor could he 
always tell whether the source was internal or external … Nothing in his childhood 
was stable; reassurance was tentative and temporary. Stammering and terrifying 
contractions in the facial nerves and tongue alternated with periods of tranquility.
326
 
Artaud biographer Bettina Knapp admits there is little material on the artist’s childhood, 
but describes Artaud’s childhood as, initially, a time of maternal plenitude:  
Not much is known about Artaud’s early years, and he himself spoke little of them. 
It would seem, however, that he had a very special affinity for his grandmother; her 
warmth and understanding, that particular wisdom and gentleness which comes 
with old age, made him feel for her what he had never experienced nor would 
perhaps ever again: a closeness and a calmness, a sense of belonging and inner joy. 
He used to sit and watch her by the hour kneading the dough with her strong and 
sturdy fingers, for what would be delicious cakes dipped in honey.
327
 
Knapp suggests Artaud’s nearly fatal meningitis set his psychic world on a course of 
continuous lifetime disorder. The psycho-biographical matrix that folds together familiar 
discourses on family pathology, childhood disease, and creativity, so striking in Hayman, 
is toned down in Knapp’s account, but is present. She informs us that upon his return 
from his visits to his grandmother in Smyrna: 
(He) was under constant medication and unblinking supervision … and again plunged 
into the tense atmosphere created by an over-solicitous mother and anxious father … 
[His mother] was forever concerned about her son’s health. She gave him no freedom 
to develop, instead created, inadvertently of course, in the highly sensitive youth a 
tremendous sense of dependency and guilt at having been the cause of so much of his 
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mother’s suffering. Though feelings of extreme tenderness were directed toward his 
mother, he began to rebel at such a crippling situation as he grew older…328 
In Knapp’s account, Artaud spent his adolescence developing his interest in the arts as a 
way of escaping familial conflict and the overbearing presence of his mother. His creative 
self-absorption and quietism were disrupted by outbursts or mixed episodes directed at 
his mother: 
His altered attitude manifested itself rather in the increasingly important role his inner 
world played in his life. Only in this realm, he reasoned, could he roam entirely free. 
But sometimes his feelings of anger were uncontrollable and retorts which hurt his 
mother deeply burst forth. Minutes later, however, the young Artaud would be 
pounding on his mother’s door, begging for forgiveness.329 
Artaud’s own descriptions of these childhood disturbances and physical ordeals, unlike 
the biographic elaborations, are recounted without psychoanalytic reflection. Throughout 
his life, Artaud’s auto-pathography, expressed in a constant stream of letters, drawings, 
and other texts, is characterized by a sustained refusal of the symbolic.
330
 While he does, 
on many occasions, reference the Freudian family romance and its triangulation of 
Mommy-Daddy-Baby, he does so to contest it. Instead, he describes his psychic and 
physical sufferings in exquisitely physiological terms.  
We might compare Hayman’s description of young Artaud’s facial twitching and 
stammering, to the letter Artaud wrote to George Soulie de Morant, which likely is 
Hayman’s source. Artaud describes the onset of the facial contortions often experienced 
by pronounced stutterers:  
I have noted from my earliest childhood, between the ages of six and eight, these 
periods of stuttering and of a horrible physical contraction of the nerves and the 
tongue, following periods of calm and perfect facility … There is a certain sensation 
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of emptiness in the facial nerve, but an active emptiness, so to speak, which physically 
took the form of a kind of vertiginous magnetization in the front of the face.
331
  
Artaud frequently uses the face as what theorist and disabilities-studies scholar, Petra 
Kuppers has described as a semiotic site of “embodied schizophrenic experience” in his 
writings, drawings and performance.
 332
 Kuppers contends that all Artaud’s writing and 
drawing indicates a “physiological turn of mind”.333 To take this point further, I suggest 
his insistence on conveying an embodied experience of his diagnoses – his experience of 
emptiness is an “active emptiness” – is often expressed in the re-figured language of 
clinical anatomy. This physiological consciousness, together with his aversion to 
psychoanalytic reduction, is evident in Artaud's effort to articulate his experience in his 
early exchange with Rivière. As Derrida pointed out, Artaud “never writes about his 
drawings and paintings, but rather in them”.334 This drive toward artistic immanence or 
immediacy is worked out at all levels of Artaud’s project; in the letters to Rivière, it is 
expressed as an ordeal and confrontation with what we might call the ‘rationality of 
literature’. He continues to explore the possibilities of the simultaneous play of rendered 
figures and text in his later writings and drawings. In his performances, Artaud sought a 
visceral immediacy by eliminating scripts, directions, traditional narrative content, and 
the like.  
From the biographical accounts, we are able to glean an accurate chronology of young 
Artaud’s many psychiatric hospitalizations. He spent most of his late adolescence in 
clinical residential programs. Physically, he was healthy enough to be conscripted to 
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military service in 1916. After nine months, his stay of duty was terminated due to an 
unspecified sleeping disorder (some accounts claim he feigned sleep walking) and his 
family sent him on a series of ‘cures’ at residential clinics, including Saint-Dizier in 
Lyons, Lafoux-les-Bains, Dvonne-les-Bains, and Bagneres-de-Bigorre. An extended stay, 
from 1918-1920, at Le Chanet, the sanatorium run by Dr. Dardel in Neuchatel, 
Switzerland, provided a period of relative stability. During this cure, Artaud’s life-long 
friend and noted biographer, Paule Thevenin, tells us that Artaud truly developed an 
interest in painting, drawing and engraving, a time she refers to as his Swiss Period.
335
  
At the time of the Rivière exchange, Artaud’s primary focus was on painting and 
drawing. Thevenin produces a tender and informal biographical portrait of the young 
artist. She describes his paintings and drawings created at Le Chanet as “small in size, 
show[ing] sensitivity, taste, and a certain feeling for color”.336 She suggests Artaud had 
been “deeply moved by the anxious landscapes of Edvard Munch”,337 and his landscape 
and still life paintings certainly demonstrate Artaud’s interest in contemporary painting, 
and the influence of the post-Impressionists, Fauves, and Symbolists.  
Following his stay at Dr. Dardel’s sanatorium, Artaud spent a brief time in Marseilles 
before arriving in Paris in 1920. Shortly after he experienced another unspecified 
psychiatric crisis, and his parents placed him under the care of Dr. Edouard Toulouse, the 
medical director of the psychiatric asylum at Villejuif. Toulouse occupies a significant 
position at the intersection of the clinical and cultural domains at the time. He was 
respected psychologist whose treatment of psychiatric disorders followed the most recent 
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medical developments, including the therapeutic uses of painting, literature, and drama. 
In conjunction with his clinical practice, Toulouse was founder and editor of the cultural 
review Demain, in which many of Artaud’s early poems, articles, art and theatre reviews 
were published. Toulouse introduced Artaud to the noted director of le Theatre de 
l’Oeuvre, Aurelien-Marie Lugne-Poe, who was associated with the Symbolist poets in 
whom Artaud had a great interest. This introduction led to his first dramatic role in a play 
by the noted French Symbolist writer Henri de Regnier. Lugne-Poe later wrote of 
Artaud’s performance: “his make up, his behavior, were of a painter lost in the midst of 
actors”.338 Due to Artaud’s difficulties with stammering and his lack of formal 
professional training as an actor, he was re-directed to set and costume design. Lugne-
Poe’s description is notable considering Artaud’s later insistence on the primacy of 
images in the Theatre of Cruelty (1932). During this time Artaud developed an addiction 
to opium. Some contend he became addicted under the supervision of Toulouse, who 
treated him for chronic pain. We might also consider Artaud’s addiction in the context of 
modern European literary practice, where opium use traces back through Baudelaire and 
Coleridge, as excoriated by Nordau. Equally, many artists and writers, notably Cocteau, 
took up its use in the traumatic years during and immediately following the war. Some 
commentators contend, Hayman among them, that Artaud’s argumentative, effusive, 
boastful style in his letters to Rivière, stems from the effects of the opiate.  
Toulouse, Artaud’s doctor and cultural mentor, was also a prominent advocate of 
eugenics, and founder of the Société de Biotypologie, which called for mandatory psycho-
physiological testing of students and factory workers. Toulouse’s larger ambition as a 
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clinician, Thevenin informs us, “was to isolate and study the mechanisms of genius, and 
… [he] had for that purpose chosen a number of highly intelligent persons of his time”.339 
These included Zola, Poincare, Mallarmé, Dadet and many others. Toulouse’s practice 
was something of a bio-clinical amalgamation of psychoanalytic and constitutionalist 
psychiatry, and hereditary theory, akin with his predecessors, Freud and Lombroso.  
The Correspondence 
Early in 1923, Artaud submitted a small selection of his poems to Jacques Rivière, editor 
of the Nouvelle Revue Française, to whom he had been introduced by Toulouse. In a 
short but friendly letter, dated May 1, 1923, the editor rejects Artaud’s poems, but invites 
his to visit the Revue.
340
 There is no record of what transpired in the office of the Revue, 
but Artaud’s first letter, responding to their engagement, on June 5, adopts from the start 
the hyperbolic rhetoric of performance. First, he insists on the “absolute acceptability,” 
and of the “existence”341 of the poems as literature, then launches into a discourse on the 
incommensurate distance between words and thoughts, representations and lived 
experiences. He admits to Rivière his failed attempts at poetry, but suggests it is not 
simply a personal problem. It is, he contends, the fundamental problem of all European, 
specifically literary writing. Words cannot carry the weight of a body’s experience. 
Another element of bio-aesthetics arising in these letters, and appurtenant to Artaud's 
reflexive turn, is a novel, empirical understanding of language. In them he treats language 
as what we might call a semiotic substance, indicating the early stirrings of his resistance 
to the symbolic levels of language, a resistance that develops into an avant-gardist revolt 
in subsequent texts. He also takes issue with the use of language as representation and 
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description. This might seem a Platonic suspicion of imitation, were it not for his later 
use of glossolalia, word fragments, word-salads, spells and incantations, and his 
insistence on the voice, on the materiality of the text, to assume the force and mass of an 
unsignifiable embodied or somatic experience.  
Derrida has demonstrated that Artaud’s gripe with language is not that of Platonic 
idealism, that its lowly status is a failed reflection of a higher ideality, but rather is with 
modern European poetry’s metaphysical over-determination, its exile of language to the 
outskirts of corporeal life. For Artaud, his experience as a thinking subject is the effect of 
a violent effraction of language into and through his corporeal existence. He continually 
returns to this notion of a language that issues and ‘falls away’ from corporeal 
experience. For Artaud, the problem of writing is precisely the metaphysical demands 
placed on it. It strays from the body and is put to work by a ‘spirit’ which constructs its 
domain outside the living organism.
342
 This crucial point, that writing emerges from a 
place outside the body, seems entirely lost on Rivière. Still, in the most exquisitely 
crafted and lucidly written exchange, Artaud embraces the position of a mental patient 
and rhetorically transforms text into the ailing body of the mind. “I suffer from a horrible 
sickness of mind,” he writes: 
My thought abandons me at every level. From the simple fact of thought to the 
external fact of its materialization in words. Words, shapes of sentences, internal 
directions of thought, simple reactions of the mind – I am in constant pursuit of 
intellectual being. Thus as soon as I can grasp a form however imperfect, I pin it 
down, for fear of losing the whole thought. I lower myself, I know, and suffer from it, 
but I consent to it for fear of dying all together.
343
 
In spite of this failure, Artaud suggests the emergence of a new set of linguistic figures 
from his failed poems, and particularly from those awkward expressions for which 
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Rivière reproaches him. He says he embraces these “figures of speech,” yet they 
introduce into his thought a “profound uncertainty”, and point to a general metaphysical 
“insufficiency” not only of his personal mental condition, but of literature’s current 
relationship to meaning. Still, he implores Rivière to understand that “out of the central 
feeling which dictates [his] poems” and for the strong images or figures “which [he] has 
been able to find, in spite of everything, [he] proposes these poems for existence”. Artaud 
discerns, for the first time, a literal substance in the figures haphazardly emerging from 
his poems. He seems to suggest the novelty of such literality might restore corporeal 
immediacy to writing or speech, and thus, its mental health and cohesion. 
This corporealized textual practice is a radical departure from traditional artistic and 
literary approaches. In subsequent texts, Artaud will define all forms of textual or literary 
production as waste expelled by a signifying body. Julia Kristeva, writing from both 
psychoanalytic and literary camps, proposes that in the Rivière letters, Artaud begins to 
formulate a textual practice that rejects the symbolic function of language, and “dissolves 
the linguistic sign and its system [word, syntax]” which are the “the earliest and most 
solid [guarantees] of the unified subject”.344 With this early effort to establish a practice 
in language that resists the symbolic, Artaud is painfully aware he is making himself 
susceptible to clinical-critical reduction. He warns: “All this, which is very badly 
expressed, threatens to introduce a dangerous ambiguity into your judgment of me.”345 
He is quick to retrace himself, sometimes taking on an obsequious tone, as if sensing that 
what he writes will be conflated with his experience as a psychiatric patient, and hence 
dismissed as the fragmentary products of insanity.  
                                                 
344
 Kristeva, “The Subject in Process”, ed. Patrick French and Roland-Francois Lack (London: Routledge, 
1998), 134. 
345
 Artaud, 32. 
 154 
Judgment is a significant theme threading through these letters. Artaud seems to play 
on its reverberations in Kantian aesthetics, and on its role as an instrument of moral, 
literary, and indeed clinical expertise. His letters reflect his conflicted situation with 
respect to his desire for the esteem of those in positions of cultural authority. For 
example, in one letter, he writes: “I have to cure myself of the judgment of others”,346 but 
later, his closing reads: “I surrender myself to your judgment”.347 It is as if judgment is 
the disease he rejects, but it is also, possibly, its cure. This coincidence of opposing 
desires is not without irony but is also, likely, a true reflection of his desire to be 
understood for all his paradoxical complexity.  
Rivière’s response to Artaud's first letter indicates a degree of suspicion, a suspicion 
that again carries both aesthetic and psychoanalytic undertones: “I was so touched that 
you chose to confide to me. There are in your poems, as I told you from the beginning, 
awkwardnesses and above all oddities which are disconcerting. But, they seem to me to 
correspond to a certain studied effort on your part than to a lack of control over your 
ideas”.348 In psychoanalytic literature, a studied effort may be associated with a host of 
problems arising around fantasy or avoidance. Freud would approach the studied efforts 
of his patients in analysis as significant and worthy of further investigation, while a 
psychiatrist following a standard method would treat instances of studied “narrative 
truth” as indicative of a “characterological” or “borderline disorder”.349 We recall that for 
Kant's ingenium, any studied effort in conceiving or producing a work of creative genius 
moves into the shady area of mannerism, or, a logically considered aesthetic creation. 
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The ‘aping of peculiarity’ produced by imitators of the creative genius is merely 
ostentatious rubbish, the products of the tyro.
350
 Hence, this suspicion Rivière announces 
early in their epistolary relationship carries a host of implications for the young poet, the 
least of which is his status as an inexperienced tyro. But Rivière’s articulation of his 
suspicion suggests that he senses a performative aspect in their exchange, and that he is 
aware to some extent that Artaud is acting out for the purposes of demonstrating a set of 
poetic concepts or ideas. 
Six months passes after this initial exchange. Their correspondence resumes in late 
January, 1924, when Artaud responds:  
It was last May that I made you a little mental confession, I would like to finish that 
confession today, to go on with it, to go to the very end of myself. .I do not seek to 
justify myself in your eyes, it is a matter of indifference to me whether I seem to exist 
in the eyes of anyone ... I flattered myself that I was bringing you a case, a distinctive 
mental case, and curious as I thought you were about all mental distortions … I 
thought thereby to draw your attention to the real value, the initial value of my 




This letter declares the self-flattering performance of his exemplary status as both mental 
case and literary talent. In doing so, Artaud casts Rivière in the role of clinician-critic. 
Later in this letter, Artaud describes the “defects of form” Rivière had identified, as a 
consequence of his “sagging” thought and “central collapse of the soul.” He insists this 
enervation is a natural consequence of the physiological ordeal of thought as he navigates 
the metaphysical system imposed from a kind of epistemological outside. His mind's 
energies dissipate at “each of the terminal stratifications ... [as it passes] through all the 
stages, all the bifurcations of thought and of form”.352 Language and experience may co-
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exist in the same space, but that space is hopelessly, beautifully, fractured, and they do 
not join together.  
The letters are also used by Artaud to continue to refine his materialist theory of mind. 
He describes consciousness as an entity that is finely grained and composed of a subtle 
physical substance identical to that of language, but not language: “You are familiar, are 
you not, with the subtlety, the fragility of the mind? Haven't I told you enough about it to 
prove to you that I have a mind which exists literally as T. exists, or E., or S., or M.? “353 
In a (feigned) tone of supplication, he implores Rivière, his physician-critic, to “restore to 
my mind the concentration of its forces, the cohesion that it lacks, the constancy of its 
tension, the consistency of its own substance”.354 
Rivière will respond two months later, and once again express his bafflement and 
suspicion at the “precision” of Artaud's “self-diagnosis”,355 which he contrasts with the 
“vagueness” and “formlessness” of his creative work.356 However, he pronounces his 
therapeutic impotence with regards to his case. “I acted like those doctors,” he writes, 
“who think they can cure their patients by refusing to believe them, by denying the 
strangeness of their case, by forcing them back into the normal. It is a bad method. I 
regret it”.357 Rivière notes the tormented quality of Artaud's handwriting, which seems to 
attest to his illness, but he is struck by the clarity and lucidity with which the young poet 
describes his mental erosion. He elaborates a prognosis, and in so doing, firmly situates 
his position within what we might call normative orthodox literature. He recommends 
Paul Valery's Evening with Monseiur Teste, to posit “the fragile autonomy of the mind”; 
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Artaud's insists to the contrary, on its subtle corporeality, and then declares his belief that 
the imagination must be clipped and curtailed, a position resembling Kant’s with regards 
to unbridled imagination. Cancer and bodily infection are the metaphors Rivière uses to 
express his ideas:  
That the mind has its own existence, that it has a tendency to live on its own 
substance, that it grows over the personality with a kind of egoism and with no 
concern for keeping the personality in harmony with the world … Regarded in itself, 
the mind is a kind of canker; it reproduces, it advances constantly in all directions … 
there is no escape from pure thought but death.
358
  
Rivière equates the formlessness of Artaud's poems to the lack of obstacles the author 
confronts, and to the allowances made to chance. Recalling Nordau’s artistic monstrosity, 
Rivière refers to contemporary Dada poetry as the product of “[the] direct expression of 
that monster which every man carries within him but which he usually seeks instinctively 
to chain with the bonds of facts and experience”.359  
From monstrosity, Rivière’s prognosis moves to the theme of excess, noting Artaud’s 
“fragility of mind” might be “another sickness which comes from an excess of force, an 
overflow of power”. Excess, which in Kant is attached to nature and unfettered ornament, 
and which is monstrously conflated with degeneracy in Nordau, becomes an illness for 
Rivière. Artaud's failure as a poet, he suggests, his “affliction” is “the result of the 
excessive freedom” he allows his talent. “To be taut, the mind needs a boundary and it 
needs to come up against the blessed opacity of experience. The only cure for madness is 
the innocence of facts”.360 Rivière goes on to deride the Surrealists for their conjuring of 
“assailing phantoms” from a “poetic fourth-dimension”; Artaud was one of the first 
members of this movement.  
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Within Rivière’s clinicalization of artistic subjectivity is a dire economy. Taking an 
almost Nordauean moral stance against artistic freedom, he links “pure thought” and 
artistic “egoism” to cancer, madness and death, advocating instead for a coherent and 
normative aesthetic. The true but undisciplined artist will spawn its imitators, and 
judgment will follow: “the punishment for this flight is close at hand,” he warns, “the 
captured phantom (referring to Surrealism) finds to avenge him twenty internal phantoms 
which paralyze us, which devour our spiritual substance”.361 Rivière argues, following an 
idea posited by Kant and amplified in nineteenth-century discourses on degeneracy, that 
the creative ingenium is a wild force that needs discipline in order to address the needs of 
a normative society, and comport with the greater good: 
As long as you [he refers to Artaud’s ‘case’] let your intellectual force pour out into 
the absolute it is tormented by eddies, riddled with helplessness, exposed to predatory 
winds that disorganize it; but as soon as, driven back by anguish to your own mind, 
you direct it at this immediate and enigmatic object, it condenses, intensifies, becomes 
useful and penetrating and brings you benefits; that is, truths expressed with all the 
three-dimensionality that can make them communicable, accessible to others, in short. 
Something which transcends your suffering, your very existence, something which 
enlarges and consolidates you, which gives you the only reality that man can 
reasonably hope to conquer by his own forces, the reality of others.
362
 
He ends the letter imploring Artaud to “send me everything you write”.  
Written from a position of sufficiency, and from the safest possible clinical distance, 
his office at the Revue, Rivière’s dire prognostications incite Artaud to even more prolix 
stretches. Artaud must explain himself, and does so with precise, performative force, 
grounded in acute analytical thinking. Artaud seems to preside over the entire exchange 
with a profoundly serene awareness, a critical prescience that turns the clinical gaze upon 
itself, and belies his alternately pliant and polemical tone. Artaud writes:  




 Ibid., 41. 
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A man possesses himself in flashes, and even when he possesses himself, he does not 
reach himself completely … Nevertheless, this man exists, I mean to say that he has a 
distinct reality which redeems him. Should he be condemned to oblivion simply 
because he can give only fragments of himself?
363
  
The self-scrutiny of this performative turn, is an important feature of self-reflexive 
clinicalized artistic experience. Maurice Blanchot, in his essay on the exchange, sums up 
the situation. He gives Rivière considerable credit, though underscores the editor’s 
inability to sufficiently grasp the significance of Artaud’s creative-critical effort: 
Jacques Rivière is impeccably understanding, attentive and sensitive. But, in their 
dialogue there is a clear degree of misunderstanding which nonetheless remains 
difficult to define … Artaud keeps a constant watch over this misunderstanding. He 
sees that his correspondent is seeking to reassure him by promising that the future will 




The misunderstanding revolves around Rivière’s belief in Artaud’s confused status as 
failed poet and/or mental patient. Artaud, with a certain humor, expresses his position 
close to the end of their exchange. He dispatches to Rivière a note that is “clear at the 
expense of being well-written … literature properly speaking interests me rather little.”365 
As Blanchot points out, Artaud is “not concerned with thinking clearly, seeing clearly, 
with having coherent, appropriate, well-expressed thoughts, all of which aptitudes he 
knows he possesses.”366  
The implications of Artaud’s hyper-critical/clinical turn, are not entirely lost on 
Rivière, and it is precisely on the order of a case that Rivière proposes to formalize and 
reel in their exchange: “An idea has occurred to me,” he writes Artaud, in reference to the 
publication of their exchange of letters: 
                                                 
363
 Artaud, 34. 
364
 Maurice Blanchot, “Artaud,” The Blanchot Reader, ed. Michael Holland (Oxford & Cambridge: 
Blackwell, 1995) 130. 
365
 Artaud, 45. 
366
 Blanchot, 130. 
 160 
I mean that we would give the addressee and the writer fictitious names. Perhaps I 
could draft a reply based on the one that I sent you, but more developed and less 





What Rivière proposes for Artaud’s ventured, fragmentary works, products “of a mind 
which is not yet in possession of itself” is a clinical-critical treatment. The adaptation 
raises many questions, among them the difficult issue of attribution and more specifically 
who or what is served in this case by not sticking strictly to the ‘referential pact’ of 
authorship. The history of psychoanalysis is plagued by this problem; one recalls a host 
of cases from modern critical/clinical literature: Friedrich/Elisabeth Nietzsche, 
Freud/Schreber, Lacan/Pantaine. However, Artaud resists the clinical confidentiality 
Rivière hopes to bestow on the letters, one that would imbue the exchange with the sense 
that it had been created for the purposes of demonstrating a set of literary notions from a 
specifically clinical point of view. Rivière would, of course, be given a more developed 
and less personal, clinical advantage. Artaud agreed to publication “but only provided 
that we give the reader the impression that he is not involved with something fabricated. I 
do not insist on signing the letters with my name,” he concedes, “but it is absolutely 
necessary for the reader to feel that he has in his hands the elements of a true story … the 
reader must be given all the elements of the discussion.”368While the exchange, as it was 
published, retains its clinical confessional aspect, Artaud’s insistence on maintaining the 
link between his authorship and his life, between madness and the work, writing and the 
body, affirms his position not simply as a mental patient, but more importantly, as a 
distinctive literary case.  
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It may be, as Blanchot suggests, that Artaud’s performative drive toward an embodied 
aesthetics may open him to the critical complaint that he is “the victim … of the illusion 
of the immediate”. However, each letter entails scrupulous ruminations on the ways “in 
which he is banished from the immediate which he calls ‘life’; this comes about through 
a rupture so conspicuous as to introduce into his very core the affirmation of a perpetual 
deviation which become what is most distinctly his own.”369 I go further, and assert that 
the forces which deprive Artaud of the ‘immediate’ of his living experience and of his 
poetry and art, are the normalizing and complicit apparatuses of the clinical and critical 
which have set down the discursive framework for Artaud’s ordeal as a case-history, his 
“perpetual deviation” as Blanchot would have it. Throughout the exchange of letters, 
Artaud performs something remarkable. He resists many of the alienating critical/clinical 
reductions of his editor/doctor, and vigorously rescues his madness from that “space of 
indecision” in which literature and the clinic had confined and silenced it. In his last 
letter, he restates his position: “My particular weakness and my absurdity consist in 
wishing at all costs to write and to express myself. I am a man who has endured great 
mental suffering and as such, I have the right to speak.”370 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have traced the modern clinicalization of artistic subjectivity, and defined 
a particular instantiation of this clinicalized subjectivity in the figure of the artist as case 
history. I began with the theoretical basis for this particular case, citing the work of 
Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. For Foucault, clinical power exercises its authority 
over the cultural domain by linking artistic and poetic works to psychological structures, 
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and artists and poets to a psycho-pathological typology. For Derrida, modern critical and 
clinical thought emerge simultaneously and commit the same discursive violence by 
appropriating the lives and works of artists and poets and restructuring them as critical 
and/or clinical cases. This was followed by an examination of the special talent of the 
Kantian ingenium. It is my contention that the exemplarity of Kant’s genius is defined as 
much by its special relationship to nature and to the works of art it produces, as it is by 
the undecidable, subjective status it holds in comparison to its counterpart, the scientist. I 
then examined the extension of Kant’s aesthetic in nineteenth-century discourses from 
the field of criminal anthropology, notably those by Cesar Lombroso and Max Nordau, 
and Freudian psychoanalysis, in which artistic talent is conflated with psychopathology. 
Finally, I discussed the exemplary case of Antonin Artaud, whose life-long medical and 
psychiatric setbacks and subjections were, in effect, inseparable from his career as a poet, 
critic, polemicist, vanguard dramatist, actor and visual artist. With the Artaud case, the 
two divergent genealogical sprouts of Kant’s genius, the valorized creative subject, and 
nature’s Lombrosian deformity, are brought, simultaneously, into play. Between these 
extremes, Artaud wrestles with his critical and clinical subjections and, in Foucauldean 
parlance “is led to observe himself, analyze himself, recognize himself … and experience 
himself in a game of truth.”371 It was also my purpose to discern in this exchange how 
Artaud, in effect, hyperbolically acted out his position as case history and, sometimes in 
the form of extended bouts of painful self-reflexivity, interrogated the ways psycho-
clinical rationality had infiltrated critical discourse. Artaud’s détournement of his clinical 
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and critical confinement points to a new modality of artistic performativity – that of 
clinical performativity, which will be taken up in the next chapter. 
 164 
Chapter Four 
Artistic Embodiment and Clinical Performativity 
 
Art is a distraction. So is life. (Hannah Wilke) 
 
 
In January 1974, Joseph Beuys lived for a week in the Rene Block Gallery in Manhattan. 
What resulted was his performance, I like America and America likes me. For the 
duration of the performance, the gallery had been refurbished, or perhaps defurbished, 
into a bare-life confinement chamber. Beuys stayed in this cage – a kennel of sorts – with 
a coyote, living in an elaborately staged ‘shamanic’ encounter with the animal. Each day, 
gallery attendants brought food and bundles of The Wall Street Journal, used by Beuys 
and the coyote as bedding, waste-disposal materials for excretions, and perhaps reading 
material, at least for Beuys. The accumulation of the papers became, as the days past, a 
solidified,stratified, time line. Throughout the action (Beuys preferred the Fluxus-
inflected terminologies linking art to life-as-zoë) artist and coyote were photographed by 
Nicole Koupsack in their many well-planned “interactions,” which have since assumed 
iconic stature post-World War II art. These images show Beuys in his ‘shamanic’ garb, 
wrapped in felt blanket and holding a shepherd’s staff, attempting to engage the coyote 
who is photographed stalking anxiously about the chain-link cage, and sometimes 
tugging at the shaman’s robe. (While there is a tradition of animals performing in 
carnivals and circuses, and there is, no doubt, a conscious carnival-esque quality to 
Beuys’s action, the coyote’s participation can only be thought of as unfortunate).  
The crucial aspect of this action is the manner in which it started. Once Beuys 
disembarked, wrapped in his signature felt, from the airplane that brought him from 
Berlin to New York, Beuys was strapped onto a hospital gurney and transported by 
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ambulance accompanied from John F. Kennedy Airport in Queens to the Manhattan East 
Broadway gallery (figure 4.1). At the end of his performance, Beuys was returned to the 
airport in the same manner, on a hosital gurney and in an ambulance. The action, rich was 
staged as a therapeutic encounter with nature, a medical intervention. 
This action, clearly and self-consciously positions the artist, Beuys, as a bridge 
between bios and zoë, and the sequencing of individual incidents and encounters, the 
framing devices, the isolation unit, all convey a sense of emergency or emergence. 
Beuys’ oeuvre is well situated in the rubric of bio-aesthetics. The artist’s assumption of 
the shamanic role – in Deleuzean parlance, a clinician of civilization - which he 
performed with a certain irony, is also quite seriously grounded in traumatic aspects of 
Beuys’ autobiography. Born in Krefeld in 1921, Beuys served in World War II as a 
soldier-pilot in the Nazi Luftwaffe and was captured and imprisoned at Cuxhaven, 
England from 1945-46. In 1944, Beuys had been shot down by Russian forces over the 
Crimean Mountains and, according the artist, was rescued by the local Tatars who nursed 
him using pre-modern treatments. Beuys reported he had been wrapped in fat and felt, to 
warm and heal his bruised limbs. These became Beuys’ signature materials.  
Beuys’ case carries direct genealogical links to bio-aesthetics’ cultural antecedents, 
particularly German idealism, Romanticism and the Kantian legacy. He purposefully 
chose unrefined, un-aesthetic materials: piles of fat, yards of felt, lead plates, drawings 
done with iron rust, or the artist’s blood. It is not by accident that one of my copies of The 
Critique of Judgment features a collage of a fern leaf pressed by Beuys.
372
 The artist 
discussed his ties to German Idealism, to the philosophy and aesthetics of Kant and 
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 as well as to naturalists, geologists, vitalist nature philosophers and medical 
doctors of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He stated in an interview, 
“(In) my activity, art as I practice it means the natural sciences as I wanted to practice 
it.”374 While he embraced the modern sciences he was averse to “the extreme 
specialization of fields”375 and to rarified methods of analysis, particularly the detached 
optical modalities of clinical observation discussed in Chapter Two. 
Beuys openly resisted the modernist instrumentalization of the optical, to the surface 
gaze. “We’re trained,” he stated in an interview, “to think only in terms of physical 
reality, surface appearances, in terms of the retinal image … that picks up everything like 
a camera,” a somewhat ironic comment in light of the role of photography in 
documenting his performances. Beuys equates the ‘retinal’ with clinical ‘coolness’, 
suggesting “one must do something with the eye so that it can somehow grasp the 
warmth process.”376 Beuys’ discourse on the eye and its warmth, reverberates with post-
Baumgartian and post-Lessing notions linking individual senses to specific artistic media, 
and with their synesthesic interpenetrations. Moreover, Beuys offers a vitalist-inflected 
counterpoint to Greenberg’s retinalism: 
If one leaves the eye as it is, it will, let’s say from the contemporary cultural 
perspective, tend rather to cool down and differentiate things, divide and analyze them 
like a camera, separating things out from each other in a crystalline way. That is 
particularly the case with the eye. Hearing is somewhat different. That’s why it’s 
important to hear images and sculptures with the ear as well. For this, one has to set in 
motion much more inward, deep-seated machinery, which creates this warmth, this 
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evolutionary warmth, which enables us to become beings capable of carrying 
evolution forward – in my view this is important.377 
Beuys’ discourses, this included, are rich with bio-clinical topoi linking natural, 
biological, evolutionary and geological processes to history and culture. Beuys’ 
reflections linking sensory experience, and biological, evolutionary, and geological 
processes often cycle back to his own biographical corporeality. When, for example, 
Volker Harlan suggests to Beuys, in all sincerity, that he might “have different organs” 
for the reception of stimuli (re-casting in a positive light Lombroso’s secret anatomy), 
Beuys retorts that aesthetics should  broaden its scope to consider “the constellation of 
forces present,” and for him this entails “something I have to pursue back into my 
childhood experiences, where I had an inkling of something wholly different.” He goes 
on to speak of “form” and “inner impulses” citing “the different interrelationships of 
forces” that occur in crystal as opposed to bone. The personal aesthetic experience of 
warmth, Beuys suggests, changes over time as the body’s materiality and articulations 
age in the course of a life, and as bodies move and change across scans of historical and 
evolutionary time. These reflections resonate with passages in Critique of Judgment 
where Kant describes the interlocking forms of natural ends.  
Beuys produced a large body sculptural works in the 1960s and 1970s that share the 
reductive affinities of American minimalist art and Italian arte povera. These sculptures 
often doubled as performance props and make references to the laboratory, and to the 
biopolitical conflagrations of biology, aesthetics, Agamben’s notion of “bare life,” and 
genocide. An inventory of his sculpture materials includes canisters corroded by caustic 
chemicals, cans of vintage industrial oil paints, laboratory bottles, glass vitrines, and bio-
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degradable materials such as gelatin, honey, wax, and blood. His medical motives are 
evident in his ubiquitous use of the International Red Cross affiche, painting, stamping, 
drawing, and sewing the organization’s signature red cross into works and action 
fragments, while also employing military- issue flashlights and blankets, & so forth, 
which he used in an ever-changing exhibition and performance contexts.  
Beuys’ career as artist/natural scientist, autobiographer, traumatized veteran (or case 
history) and shamanic Red Cross performer, occupies a significant place in the historical 
progress of post-World War II bio-aesthetics. The artist’s efforts encapsulate the ordeal 
of embodiment that has been installed at the core of bio-aesthetics since the eighteenth-
century as it progresses to late twentieth-century performance. Beuys’s case points to the 
emergence of a new strain of late twentieth-century performativity, as his 1974 I like 
America … instantiates, that is biographically linked to the artist’s own medical 
experience. It is the purpose of this chapter to identify this new performativity, which I 
call clinical performativity. Specifically, my focus will be on the acute manifestation of 
this clinical performativity emerging from the formalist theoretical and critical fevers of 
the vanguard 1960s and 1970s New York art world. I will focus on a caseload of late-
twentieth-century critical discourses and performance works with the purpose of 
highlighting what I consider to be a significant turning point in the ongoing engagement 
of clinical epistemology and artistic theory and practice, and in the unfolding bio-
aesthetic progress of artistic embodiment toward full-blown clinical performance. The 
first case consists of a famous exchange of critical articles on the topic of minimalism 
published in the pages of Artforum between three highly visible figures in the post-
Greenbergian mid-1960s New York art world – sculptors/critics Donald Judd and Robert 
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Morris, and critic/art historian Michael Fried. The exchange highlights the difficulty in 
containing or accounting for the encroachments of the body into Minimalism’s expanding 
aesthetic field of the mid-1960s. As Judd and Morris push the material logic of formalism 
further into the field of embodied performance, Fried asserts the Lessing-Greenberg 
doctrine of medium specificity and produces a discourse that is decidedly immunological 
in its response. The second case, the work of Hannah Wilke, commences as a feminist 
critique of Minimalist forms, which eventually includes theatrical incorporations of her 
own body into her exhibitions. Of special interest are a powerful series of late multi-
media and performance works, from the 1980s and early 1990s, which take up the artist’s 
medical struggles with metastatic lymphoma. Focusing on these two cases, which are 
historically contiguous, I will follow the passage of the body from the laboratory 
aesthetics of post Greenbergian and minimalist aesthetics to its appearance in the 
feminist-inspired, autobiographically charged modality of clinical performativity. 
The Judd-Morris-Fried and Wilke cases taken together offer us a sort of bio-aesthetic 
assay of the essential features and clinical mechanisms at work in the artistic drive toward 
artistic embodiment and performance. Through the archaeological schema of bio-
aesthetics these clinical mechanisms, as we have seen, have been at work at the center of 
aesthetic discourse and artistic practice since the eighteenth century. The clinical 
mechanism at work in Lessing’s aesthetics, which empirically observes and identifies the 
material and formal specifications of artistic mediums as it suppresses explicit assertions 
of the corporeal referent (the body in pain), has migrated to late twentieth century 
Greenbergian and minimalist discourse. Yet, we might say that “the body” continues its 
passage through these discourses and confronts first diagnostic, then immunological 
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resistances. With Wilke’s case, this body in the late twentieth century finally forces itself 
into visibility as a new performative strategy, that of clinical performativity. 
Any mention of performativity (clinical or otherwise) requires some mention of the 
work of feminist philosopher Judith Butler, as hers is the most influential discourse on 
the topic to date. Butler’s argument in Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity, and its follow-up Bodies that Matter: On The Discursive Limits of “Sex,” is that 
gender is performative and teases normative gender from its essentialist moorings in 
naturalized sex anatomy.  Butler’s theory incorporates central concepts from Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory, Althusserian ‘interpellation,’ and Monique Wittig’s concept of a 
de-polarized, de-sexed ‘gender.’ Gender arrives to subjects from the outside and is 
transposed onto or interpolated into bodies, as (and through) language. It is a normative, 
subject-structuring system, a system that encompasses “both the regulation of sexuality 
and its psychic articulations.”378 Butler’s concept of performativity pushes beyond the 
normative categories of “true sex, discrete gender, and specific sexuality”379 toward a 
new understanding of gender agency. Butler’s gender theories have been instrumental to 
an evolving queer understanding of sexuality and gender which undoes a “causal or 
structural link between them.”380  She proposes that drag performance challenges 
“naturalized knowledge” and re-figures gender as a creative opportunity to revise our 
understanding of the ‘real.’ This understanding moved gender away from clinical 
anatomy (in Foucault’s sense) and into the domain of self-styling and invention. 
“Performativity,” she writes, “describes this relation of being implicated in that which 
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one opposes, the turning of power against itself to produce alternative modalities of 
power, to establish a kind of political contestation that is not a ’pure’ opposition, a 
‘transcendence’ of contemporary relations of power, but a difficult labor of forging a 
future from resources inevitably impure.”381 My own category of clinical performativity 
follows a similar turn; the clinic, or clinical mechanism, functions as a set of anatomical, 
medical and psychiatric protocols imposed on the subject and on perception and 
experience.  Artaud, as we have seen, transformed his painful ordeals with psychiatric 
and critical powers into new and alternative forms of artistic, literary, theatrical and 
theoretical resistance, subjections into a new form of artistic resistance. In Wilke’s case, 
as we will see, the clinic – which Wilke was at first hesitant to subject herself to – 
subjects her to its own painful, hopefully restorative, treatment regimes; like a drag artist, 
Wilke devises performative strategies which in sometimes parodic fashion call attention 
to, or exaggerate, its impact on her body.    
A Disorder of Specific Objects 
The constellation of critical writings I am about examine may be placed under the rubric 
of post-, perhaps more precisely, para-Greenbergian thought prevalent among a New 
York-based group of artists and critics associated with “post painterly” and more 
specifically Minimalist and installation sculpture at that time. The theoretical-polemical 
texts, Donald Judd’s “Specific Objects” (1965), Robert Morris’ “Notes on Sculpture” 
(1966), and Michael Fried’s “Art and Objecthood” (1967), all published within the pages 
of Artforum, form a symptomatic knot as they perseverate around a fulcrum of 
Greenbergian notions, particularly those pertaining to the empirical-positivist assertion of 
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medium specificity, the place and function of the beholder, and ineluctable and ever 
shifting drive toward embodiment.  
The texts form a tangle of rivalry with Greenberg’s discourse and with each other; 
Fried clearly opposes Judd and Morris for the Greenberg “title.” Yet each text is caught 
within the same corporeal-discursive bind, and preserves and recapitulates the clinico-
empirical logic of Greenberg’s analysis as it seeks at the same time to master and surpass 
it. Fried’s writing ostensibly works to extend the Greenbergian program to account for 
and critique (and ultimately, to dismiss) an emerging category of three-dimensional 
works by Judd and Morris. Both artists were working with variously shaped surfaces and 
sculpted or manufactured objects, assembled within an exhibition space that has been 
extended and refurbished to function as something of a theater or laboratory (figure 4.2). 
Morris began to incorporate performance into his practice, as he did in Arizona (1963), a 
dance piece produced with the Judson Dance Theatre, and in the performance Site (1964), 
produced in collaboration with artist Carolee Schneeman (figure 4.3). There is little doubt 
Morris was aware of the implications of what Jones calls the “Pollockian performative,” 
that is to say the performative aspect of Jackson Pollock’s floor-based approach and the 
significance of Hans Namuth’s photographs to the work’s reception. Morris’s 
performative practice began in dance. His work with the Judson Dance Troupe 
introduced concepts of ‘real time’ and ‘real space’, or as I see them, laboratory time and 
space, into the formalized choreographic schema. What all of the critical texts were and 
are troubled by is of an underlying disordering – the disordering of a referent, and of a 
disruptive continuously shifting materiality, which emerges in these performances. Each 
text lingers on this troublesome materiality as it haunts, optically hovers about, projects 
 173 
or erupts into the expanding aesthetic field. Each of the writers adopts the bloodless style 
of clinical or laboratory writing – this is especially true of Morris’ notational formatting; 
yet all this writing veers closer to the discourse of “embodiment” and portends or 
provides the critical pretext for the various formal, performative, theatrical and/or 
obstreperous intrusions of actual bodies into artistic practice for which the publication of 
Fried’s seminal “Art and Objecthood” functions as fulcrum. 
Robert Morris and Donald Judd were highly influential artists, and produced some of 
the most lucid and engaged art criticism at the time. Like most of their generation, and 
like Fried, they were influenced by Greenberg’s ideas, and took up the key tenets of 
Greenberg’s thought. Their art and their criticism follows a logical progression 
from”Modernist Painting”, from the optical experience of colour in painting, which 
Greenberg coined “the illusion of modalities,” to the tactile domain of sculpture, of 
artistic objects in what both Judd and Morris contend is literal space. Their effort was to 
resist what they considered Greenberg’s too restrictive planarization of visual art and, of 
course, his emphasis on painting. Like Fried, they had metabolized Greenberg’s 
impeccable style and empirical drive, and while they dispensed with his overall 
qualitative assessments, they followed through on Greenberg’s fierce analytic effort to 
pin down the material-base structures of art, to further ground these base structures in the 
phenomenology/physiology of biological being, and to place these developments within a 
larger historical framework. They were also driven by a desire to push or extend aspects 
of Greenberg’s modernist program beyond the domain of pictures, and even beyond the 
parameters of sculpture as it is traditionally understood. 
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In “Specific Objects” published in Artforum in 1965, Judd defines a new category of 
three-dimensional art which is “neither painting nor sculpture”382 and incorporates 
aspects of two-dimensional painting into the traditional specifications of modernist 
sculpture. He cites Duchamp’s Readymades as well as Robert Rauschenberg’s recent 
combines and Jasper John’s collages. Judd evinces clearly a post-modern understanding 
of the discursive conditions and underpinnings of art, and contends that late modernist 
painting and sculpture have become “more defined … and more proscribed” within 
modernist conventions, critical mediations, and exhibition spaces. For Judd, “the main 
thing wrong” with modernist painting “is that it is a rectangular plane placed against the 
wall.”383 Greenberg’s planarization of painting had been historically necessary, Judd 
suggests, but it too forcefully “establish(ed) the rectangle as a definite form” and lost its 
flexible creative value as “a neutral limit.”384 Modernist sculpture is too “composed,” the 
materials have become too fixed (colourless wood and metal), and the “hierarchies of 
clarity and strength” prevail. The more lifelike disruptions by Duchamp’s Readymades 
and the relief and assemblage works of Johns and Rauschenberg suggest new, different 
“beginnings.” Judd further contends that this work pushes further into three-
dimensionality as “real space,” and by doing so manages to dispense with “the problem 
of illusionism,” and concludes that “actual space is intrinsically more powerful and 
specific than paint on a flat surface.”385 We find that Greenberg’s insistence on the 
referent has, in Judd’s discourse, shifted from the flat surface of the picture plane to 
quotidian three-dimensional space and to Minimalism’s “shaped objects.” Again, while 
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the young artist takes up against the older established critic in an effort to expand the 
parameters of artistic practice, he posits “specific objects” within the suzerainty of a 
modified Greenbergian gaze. 
Morris’s “Notes on Sculpture” published in Artforum between 1966 and 1967  
conforms to the central logic of the Lessing-Greenberg discourse, but by making the 
position of a corporeal beholder explicit, pushes this logic further towards a discourse of 
embodiment. Morris first asserts, indeed with greater rhetorical vehemence than either 
Lessing or Greenberg, the doctrine of medium-specificity, and in particular the medium-
specificity of sculpture:  
In the interest of differences, it seems time that some of the distinctions sculpture has 
managed for itself be articulated. To begin in the broadest possible way it should be 
stated that the concerns of sculpture have been for some time not only distinct from 
but hostile to those of painting. The clearer the nature of the values of sculpture 
becomes the stronger the opposition appears. Certainly the continuing realization of its 
nature has had nothing to do with any dialectical concerns with which advanced 
painting has been occupied for about half a century.
386
 
Morris’s texts that together comprise “Notes”, assume an air of empirical truth-telling, 
adopting that authoritative stance of clinical and scientific discourse that is now so 
familiar as a mode in which critical and theoretical discourse asserts its credibility. 
Morris’s account of the specificity of sculptural forms also asserts a natural-historical 
progress of these forms, the historical model of development that follows the logic of the 
natural sciences, a trace of Matthew Arnold’s “master current,”387 and which is a central 
guiding feature of Greenberg’s criticism. Morris (like Judd) writes in an elaborately 
inflected scientistic style of critical ponderance (also a characteristic of his artistic 
practice, as we shall see), a style geared to appeal to the highly specialized Artforum 
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readership. Morris expends considerable empirical effort, following the analytical-critical 
protocols of Greenberg, on the distinctions between painting and sculpture, and how the 
material authority of minimalist sculpture dispels the spectre of representation, illusion 
and the figural that still haunts painting. Morris is, ostensibly, taking issue with 
Greenbergian aesthetics, yet he replicates its logical formulation and clinical-empirical 
mechanics. I cite the following passage at length: 
Certainly the continuing realization of (sculpture’s) nature has had nothing to do with 
any dialectical evolution that painting has enunciated for itself. The primary 
problematic concerns with which advanced painting has been occupied for about half 
a century have been structural. The structural element has been gradually revealed to 
be located within the nature of the literal qualities of the support. It has been a long 
dialogue with a limit. Sculpture on the other hand, never having been involved with 
illusionism could not possibly have based the efforts of fifty years upon the rather 
pious, if somewhat contradictory, act of giving up this illusionism and approaching the 
object. Save for replication, which is not to be confused with illusionism, the 
sculptural facts of space, light, and materials have always functioned concretely and 
literally. Its allusions or references have not been commensurate with the indicating 
sensibilities of painting. If painting has sought to approach the object, it has sought 
equally hard to dematerialize itself on the way. Clearer distinctions between 
sculpture’s essentially tactile nature and the optical sensibilities involved in painting 
need to be made.
388
  
Once he establishes the purity of sculpture’s self-referentiality, Morris launches into more 
precise declensions of sculpture’s three-dimensional relational space, and the special role 
of the beholder in all of this. He cites Tatlin, Gabo, Rodchenko, and the Russian 
Modernists, whose early-modernist works incorporated constructed objects, painted 
surfaces, bold typography, photographs and film imagery, and following their protocols 
of faktura, he argues for the use of modern industrial materials and techniques. He also 
elaborates on Mondrian, Cubism, and Neolithic metalwork. At the same time, the text 
recapitulates the central issues and problems of the Lessing-Greenberg discourse, and, by 
linking sculpture to the tactile, harkens back to the critico-physiological-sensory, post-
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Laocoön discourse of Herder. Herder had, we recall, identified the concepts of Plastik 
and Kraft, which he assigned to their respective senses of sight and touch: sight to 
painting, tactility or touch to sculpture.  
In Morris’s polemic drive to demonstrate analytical mastery over the Lessing-
Greenberg discourse, his notes become more firmly entrenched in the terminology of the 
actual. Morris’s writings recapitulate the productive and problematic issues at the core of 
bio-aesthetics. Modernism’s struggle with the ‘structural,’ the critical-empirical drive 
toward “the literal qualities of the support,” the seemingly paradoxical presentation (to 
the sense) of a ‘disembodied’ opticality, and this “long dialogue with the limit” (whose 
degree zero I contend is the unsignifiable biological body itself), these are all 
articulations of the central themes, the central Foucauldean “statements”, which are 
repeated, reasserted and reworked within the framework of a bio-aesthetic episteme. 
Morris’s hyper-empirical assertions of the actuality of sculpture, and the “sculptural facts 
of space,” mixed with snippets of gestalt theory and neuroscience, writing of colour, 
texture, shape, and flatness as “strong gestalt sensations” and grounding the experience of 
space in the “kinesthetic clues, memory traces, and physiological factors … of parallax 
vision and the structure of the retina and brain”389 are all indications of his struggle to 
articulate the modernist problem with the bio-aesthetic, the problem of pure self-
referentiality when confronted with the body of the spectator. Kant’s a-prioritization of 
space takes a decidedly laboratorial turn and is grounded in the physiological structures 
of the brain and its sensory bio-apparatus.  
For Judd and Morris (and Fried, as we will see) the figure assumes an important, yet 
somewhat unstable, unfixed place within the matrix of the actual. If the early Russian 
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Modernists provide a historical touchstone for the aesthetics of the actual, of “specific 
objects,” more recent late-modernist examples of sculpture by David Smith and Anthony 
Caro have, for both Judd and Morris, retreated to a more aesthetically conservative 
compositional or additive approach. The trouble, for Judd and Morris, with such 
sculpture is the manner in which the works maintain an affiliation with ‘naturalism.’ In 
essence, a large free-standing sculpture by David Smith retains the old compositional 
logic of figural sculpture: “a beam thrusts; a piece of iron follows a gesture; together they 
form a naturalistic and anthropomorphic image. The space corresponds.”390 Judd’s 
problem with the traces of an animated body is, essentially, a reformulation of Lessing’s 
ordeal of sculptural forms, of the old representational and compositional uses or habits of 
naturalism traced into actual shapes in space. It is, once again, the bio-aesthetic ordeal of 
representation as it confronts the multifaceted corporeal referent. For both artists the 
resolution to this problem resides in the more forceful assertion, indeed the hyper-
Greenbergian assertion, of the specific materiality of sculptures as objects-in-themselves. 
It is also important to note the seemingly paradoxical place of the figural, more 
specifically the anthropomorphic in this. Tthe figure returns or remains, not only in the 
incipient anthropomorphism of Caro’s and Smith’s work, but in the flat declamatory 
manner in which modernist paintings assert themselves, and even, as Fried will contend, 
in the non-art theatricality of objects and their beholders. For Judd and Morris, the 
project of specific objects, the empirical space opened by minimalism, put a new 
emphasis on the place of the beholder. “The better new work,” Morris writes: 
Takes relationships out of the work and makes them a function of space, light, and the 
viewer’s field of vision. The object is but one of the terms in the new aesthetic. It is in 
some way more reflexive because one’s awareness of oneself existing in the same 
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space as the work is stronger than in previous work, with its many internal 
relationships. One is more aware than before that he himself is establishing 
relationships as he apprehends the object from various positions and under varying 




Morris continues, elucidating the ways in which the movements of the viewer, interacting 
with the sculptural object, with shape in real space, constitute the fundamental relational 
structure of minimalist, and also performative, art. Embodiment assumes this relational 
“actuality,” which of course Fried will contest as a species of dangerous theater. 
Michael Fried’s important essay “Art and Objecthood” was published in Artforum in 
June 1967 as a riposte to Judd and Morris, and represents the third, crucial point in an 
acutely triangulated rivalry over Greenberg’s legacy. The historical significance of this 
text to the other cases taken up in this chapter must be underscored. “Art and 
Objecthood” was perhaps the most widely read post-Greenbergian work of criticism of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, and some of the most significant performance and body-
based art practice directly engaged with it. The text is often regarded as the last important 
work of late modernist criticism (though Douglas Crimp’s 1981 The End of Painting 
might also hold that position
392
), maintaining as it does an essentially Greenbergian 
outlook, and it is viewed as something of a period piece today. Still, it set a rigorous new 
standard for the extended critical-theoretical essay. One thinks of its relevance to the 
writings of Rosalind Krauss, Annette Michelson, Douglas Crimp, Yves-Alain Bois and 
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others who filled the pages of Artforum and October and dominated theoretical and 
critical discourse well into the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Again, the text evinces a clinically emphatic turn on Greenberg’s approach and I 
would suggest shares the medical suzerainty of Rivière, as it adapts Greenberg’s 
distinctively evaluative stance in an extended diagnostic assessment of Judd’s and 
Morris’s works and writings. Yet, “Art and Objecthood” is also a symptomatic text. 
Despite its high-minded tone and its empirical-clinical semblance, the text is marked up, 
at times even disfigured, by a profound perseverance of the underlying yet not yet named 
problem of ‘embodiedness,’ and the human figure returns to haunt the text in many 
different (and sometimes differing) guises. “Art and Objecthood” takes on the 
heterogeneity of (bio)aesthetic stimuli with the familiar set of clinical-critical tools; 
however, certain phrases, concepts, linguistic fixations so to speak, circulate but never 
alight upon the underlying disorder, which is the troublesome bio-aesthetic sense of the 
body/referent as it erupts into the field of artistic manifestations and signifiers.  
The text opens as a challenge to the nomenclature, to the common consent that had 
accrued to the term “minimalism.” Fried, in the manner of a diagnostician, offers what he 
considers to be a more apposite label to “(the) enterprise known variously as Minimal 
Art, ABC Art, Primary Structures and Specific Objects … I prefer to call it, literalist 
art.”393 As we shall see, the incipient medical logic of Fried’s position will become more 
clear in his conscious use of medical and diagnostic terms which place “literalist art” 
within a schema of health and disorder. This medical logic is granted additional authority 
when Fried tacks it onto a Kantian framework which opposes “taste” – which we recall in 
the Critique of Judgment is something like the paradoxical aesthetic antinomy and analog 
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of reason – to “sensibility” which is that aspect of the sensory apparatus that empirically 
apprehends “things themselves” prior to their understanding as concepts.  
“From its inception,’ Fried writes, “literalist art has amounted to something more than 
an episode in the history of taste. It belongs rather to the history – almost the natural 
history – of sensibility, and it is not an isolated episode but the expression of a general 
and pervasive condition.” With the damning words almost natural history, Fried 
announces the failure of minimalist art. The art of Judd and Morris does not attain the 
stature of taste, but remains in that rather dull purely empirical domain of things 
themselves and this points to a general artistic malaise, a malaise of sensibility. “What is 
at stake,” Fried writes, “… is whether the paintings or objects in question are experienced 
as paintings or as objects and what decides their identity as painting is their confronting 
of the demand that they hold as shapes.”394 Fried further contends that unlike recent 
literalist art, “the most important painting of the last several years” (by Noland, Olitski 
and Stella) has dealt with the “conflict” that has “gradually emerged between shape as a 
fundamental property of objects”395 without forsaking the ‘medium of painting’. That is 
to say, Noland et al. managed to produce paintings that simultaneously account for 
painting’s “objecthood” without ever producing works that would be mistaken for mere 
objects. Fried, perhaps unconsciously, evokes Kant’s purposiveness without purpose. 
Hence, these painters have secured for their works lasting positions within the history of 
taste, and they have done so by taking up the historical injunction to critically and 
empirically account for the materiality of shape without ever, as the literalist artists do, 
allowing their paintings to slip over into that domain of pure sensibility, of mere things-
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in-themselves whose apprehension to sense is determined entirely upon their shapes. 
“Otherwise,” Fried cautions us, if paintings are pushed too far toward and beyond that 
empirical limit “they are experienced as nothing more than objects.” 396 
It is within this paradoxical logic, expressed succinctly within the afore-cited passages, 
that Fried’s diagnostic discourse seems to describe a process by which the modernist 
critical-empirical drive which continuously brings to the fore art’s own corporeality, its 
supports, the tooth of the canvas, the manual maneuvers of brushwork, clay, steel, as well 
as the material specifications of the space of the beholder, turns like an immunological 
disorder to undermine art’s bodily coherence:  
Modernist painting has come to find it imperative that it defeat or suspend its own 
objecthood, and… the crucial factor in this undertaking is shape, but shape that must 
belong to painting (author’s italics) – it must be pictorial, not, or not merely, literal. 
Whereas literalist art stakes everything on shape as a given property of objects, if not 
indeed as a kind of object in its own right. It appears not to defeat or suspend its own 
objecthood, but on the contrary to discover and project objecthood as such.
397
 
If, for Fried, paintings or sculptures are to continue to maintain bodily coherence as such, 
part of painting and sculpture’s corporeality – its objecthood – has to be immunologically 
countered with its pictorial or sculptural function. Iterating Greenberg’s declension of the 
quadrilateral canvas, the critic also asserts the importance of this shape as painting’s 
body-limit; if shape tumescently extrudes into the space of the beholder it assumes a 
disorderly and even monstrous comportment.
398
 Fried goes on to offer his assessment of 
this “condition of non-art” in the following passage: 
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There is, in any case, a sharp contrast between the literalist espousal of objecthood – 
almost, it seems, as an art in it own right – and modernist painting’s self imposed 
imperative that it defeat or suspend its own objecthood through the medium of shape. 
In fact from the perspective of recent modernist painting, the literalist position evinces 
a sensibility not simply alien but antithetical to its own: as though, from that 
perspective, the demands of art and the conditions of objecthood were in direct 
conflict. 
Here the question arises: What is it about objecthood as projected and hypostatized by 




We find in the aforementioned passage a paradoxical bracketing of modernism’s 
empirical assertion of medium specificity, Fried seems to reverse its direction, and 
suggests that somehow it must turn on itself, and suspend the referent in order to maintain 
art’s signifying semblance. Indeed, there are large doses of formalist antibody coursing 
through the veins of Fried’s diagnostic text. As it sets out to contain and protect painting 
from the contagion of objecthood, Fried’s writing becomes symptomatically fraught, 
finding object’s problems at every microcosmically small level. Again, the blind knot 
around the impossibility of directly, concretely representing modern physical anguish 
found in Lessing’s text, and the manner in which Lessing’s treatise does not fully 
distinguish between painterly and sculptural properties as such, comes to muddle Fried’s 
text. When Fried compares “specific objects” to “recent modernist painting,” one might 
expect this slip would not have eluded the rigour of Fried’s critical probity. But, I 
contend, such messied-missing-the-point, captures in essence the immunological ordeal 
of Fried’s discourse, in which are embodied a number of internal disorders. Firstly, it 
manifests tensions of undecidable definitions of medium specificity arising from 
modernist painting’s rivalry with the emergent (non) sculpture. Secondly, Fried’s text 
reflects or manifests his critical rivalry with the new theory and his efforts to secure his 
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place within and with the support of the Greenbergian legacy. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, “Art and Objecthood” manifests a more general anguish of critical and 
aesthetic discourse that, since the eighteenth century, had feverishly grasped at the zoë-
like referent threatening to re-figure/dis-figure art, and which Fried equates with a 
paradoxical conception of the “theatrical”, where reduction to a purely self-referential 
work of art either becomes an elaborate spectacle, playing itself to its audience’s 
expectations as a kind of high-art kitsch, or enacts itself in its audience, thus referencing 
the audience’s bodies, and so becoming, literally, embodied.  
The “literalist espousal of objecthood,” he writes “amounts to nothing other than a 
plea for a new genre of theater, and theater is now the negation of art.” Fried associates 
Minimalism’s empirical assertion of actual space with the theater primarily because it 
includes the spectator, and he calls Morris’s work out on this: “Literalist sensibility is 
theatrical because, to begin with, it is concerned with the actual circumstances in which 
the beholder encounters literalist work. Morris makes this explicit … the experience of 
literalist art is of an object in a situation – one that, virtually by definition, includes the 
beholder …”400 
Fried’s text continues in its analyses and diagnosis of the theater of objecthood and 
produces a sometimes difficult to follow play of shifting figures. Yet, this dire state of 
literalist affairs, this death-drive to objecthood, also produces, Fried tells us, “a theatrical 
effect or quality – a kind of stage presence.”401 This presence assumes the stature of a 
demiurge and harbours a menacing “obtrusiveness,” and “aggressiveness” which “extorts 
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from the beholder” a “special complicity.” 402 Fried contends that Morris’s literalist art 
“demands that the beholder take it into account, that he take it seriously” and that the 
“fulfillment of that demand consists simply in being aware of the work … in acting 
accordingly.” For Fried, it would seem that Minimalist art’s assertion of the actual (which 
is paradoxically also the theatrical) has the effect of undermining the autonomy of the 
beholder, making the beholder, literally, the subject. That modernist painting also 
imposes its protocols of “awareness” on the beholder, and so demands that it be taken 
seriously seems lost on Fried. In evaluative fashion, the critic simply seems to prefer 
modernist seriousness to minimalist or literalist seriousness. But there is something in the 
indeterminate scattering of objects and spectators disparately about the arena that troubles 
and repels Fried. The “experience of being distanced,” he contends, seems to be a crucial 
component of minimalist art, and this experienced distance places the beholder in a 
vulnerable place: “(The) beholder knows himself to stand in an indeterminate, open-
ended – and unexacting – relation as subject to the impassive object on the wall or floor.” 
I cannot help but recall Artaud’s experience of emptiness as an ‘active’ emptiness. Yet 
for Fried even in this desolating de-personalizing space, Morris’s objects, his draped or 
hung felts and precariously balanced steel plates and beams, transform into unsettling 
anthropomorphic figures through their engagement of an imminent sense of temporality. 
“In fact,” he writes, “being distanced by such objects is not, I suggest entirely unlike 
being distanced, or crowded, by the silent presence of another person; the experience of 
coming upon literalist objects unexpectedly – for example, in somewhat darkened rooms 
– can be strongly, if momentarily disquieting in just this way.”403 Hence, Judd’s and 
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Morris’s argument against the (additive or composed) appearance of the figure in welded 
steel modern sculptures by Anthony Caro and David Smith is in obverse fashion 
articulated by Fried who argues that a literalist work by the other Smith, Tony, titled 
“Black Cube” is “something like a surrogate person – that is, a kind of statue.” Fried 
supports his claim citing the function of the pedestal (a support made of wood two by 
fours) that bolsters the artist’s “Black Box” (1963-65). But for Fried, Tony Smith’s and 
Morris’s works manifest or embody the “unitary” and “holistic” forms of “other persons” 
not only through the traditional sculptural means of pedestals and statuary, but through 
the “predilection for symmetry” and for their use of “pneumatic” or hollow structures:  
(The) apparent hollowness of most literalist work – the quality of having an inside – is 
almost blatantly anthropomorphic. It is … as though the work in question has an inner, 
even secret life – an effect that is perhaps made most explicit in Morris’s Untitled 
(1965), a large ringlike form in two halves with fluorescent light glowing from within 
at the narrow gap between the two.
404
 
Fried cites Tony Smith’s interest in pneumatic structures and biomorphic forms, and then 
reclaims and redirects the modernist injunction against naturalism: “I am suggesting, 
then,” he writes, “that a kind of latent hidden naturalism, indeed anthropomorphism, lies 
at the core of literalist theory and practice.” In Fried’s text, this latency suggests a kind of 
incipient disease process lurking within the zombie-like body of literalist art:  
The latency or hiddenness of the anthropomorphism has been such that the literalists 
themselves, as we have seen, have felt free to characterize the modernist art they 
oppose, for example of David Smith and Anthony Caro, as anthropomorphic – a 
characterization whose teeth, imaginary to begin with, have just been pulled. By the 
same token however, what is wrong with literalist work is not that it is 
anthropomorphic but that the meaning and, equally the hiddenness of its 
anthropomorphism are incurably theatrical … the crucial distinction that I am 
proposing is between work that is fundamentally theatrical and work that is not 
[author’s italics].405 
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From here Fried’s text takes on more polemical and diagnostic vehemence in contesting 
the theatrical and “theater’s profound hostility to the arts” and what he contends is, in 
actuality, “the absence of the object in … the theatricality of objecthood.”406 The origin 
of literalist art’s reflexive insistence on its own objecthood is modernist, and the “risk, 
even the possibility of seeing works of art as nothing more than objects did not exist … 
(but) began to present itself around 1960 (and) was largely the result of developments 
within modernist painting.”407 Once again, the familiar paradoxical complicities of taste 
and idea, sensate and conceptual, judgment and reason, empirical and rational, surface in 
the simultaneous auto-critical assertion of art’s objecthood, and its simultaneous auto-
aesthetic/auto-immune suppression.  
Roughly, the more nearly assimilable to objects certain advanced painting had come to 
seem, the more the entire history of painting since Manet could be understood – 
delusively, I believe – as consisting in the progressive (though ultimately inadequate) 
revelation of its essential objecthood, and the more urgent became the need for 
modernist painting to make explicit its conventional – specifically, its pictorial – 
essence by defeating or suspending its own objecthood through the medium of shape.
408
  
At root is the infectious influence of the theatrical on the objecthood of painting. While 
the literalist sensibility is “a response to the same developments that have largely 
compelled modernist painting” both to assert and “undo its objecthood,” it is “corrupted 
or perverted by the theater.” Again, Fried invokes an immunological model to describe 
the disorder that modernist painting manages to fight off, and yet which afflicts the 
literalist sensibility: 
[What] has compelled modernist painting to defeat or suspend its own objecthood is 
not just developments internal to itself, but the same general, enveloping infectious 
theatricality that corrupted literalist sensibility in the first place and in the grip of 
which the developments in question – and modernist painting in general – are seen as 
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nothing more than an uncompelling and presenceless kind of theater. It was the need 




Interestingly, Fried offers an obverse version of Artaud’s polemic, which sought out the 
negation of art (and the traditional understanding the theatrical) through a “theater of 
cruelty” which would eliminate the playwright (who produces texts) and break down the 
boundaries of the stage to include spectators/beholders with the actors, thus asserting 
their collective, lived bio-aesthetic experience against the contrived theatrical ‘double’ of 
an extraneous text and witnessed scene. Fried cites the case of Artaud, with that of 
Brecht, when he identifies the threat, as he sees it, theatricality poses to all the arts, 
including the theatre:  
The success, even the survival, of the arts has come increasingly to depend on their 
ability to defeat theater. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than within theater 
itself, where the need to defeat what I have been calling theater has chiefly made itself 
felt as the need to establish a drastically different relationship to its audience.
410
  
We have in this set of critical and theoretical writings by Judd, Morris and Fried, a 
triangulated, shifting and reversible set of shared terms. Each discourse takes up the 
Greenbergian-Kantian injunction to critique, engaging this directive as differently-
nuanced instrumentalizations of the empirically-oriented bio-aesthetic drive. Each uses 
the same terms of medium specificity, the figure, the anthropomorphic, the space of the 
actual, shape, the beholder, naturalism, and the strange manifold of space, to structure a 
supporting skeleton of concepts for determining sculptural identity. While Judd and 
Morris push the boundaries of which materials are included within the category of 
sculptural medium beyond bronze, stone, and gestural welded steel, so as to include the 
specificity of the readymade and early Russian Constructivism, Fried contests this species 
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of ‘objecthood’ as a theatrical perversion that threatens art’s survival. In contrast to these 
sculpturally-perverse objects, Fried holds up recent developments in modernist painting, 
such as the curved canvases of Frank Stella, which he contends simultaneously account 
for their own status as shaped objects yet never succumb to theatricality and hence 
maintain their identity as paintings. Fried’s text assumes a diagnostic approach, at times 
adopting familiar medical terminologies. In many ways Fried’s position toward Judd and 
Morris echoes that of Riviere in his letters to Artaud, and expounds on a higher-order of 
aesthetic value against the enervated literalism of “specific objects.” Yet Fried has 
perhaps inadvertently taken a hit of the infectious ‘actual.’ His text is fraught with the 
disorder of ‘specific objects’ which I have likened to an immunological ordeal. In “Art 
and Objecthood” shapes, figures, beholders, hollow replicants, foreign bodies, menacing 
anthropomorphic surrogates, and so forth, all take up against each other in a life-and-
death struggle for art’s (bodily) survival. But this textual immunological ordeal is also a 
symptomatic recapitulation of the disordering impact of the corporeal referent on artistic 
experience that I contend forms the productive core of Western aesthetics—née bio-
aesthetics – since the eighteenth century.  
The new domain of sensibility, of unmediated and yet-to-be signified sensate 
experience which Kant identified as the empirical base from which understanding and 
knowledge is built, is both the ontological-biological basis of cultivated rarified “taste,” 
and the corporeal-empirical referent (in Friedean parlance, the “theater of objecthood”) 
which threatens to rise up in all of its materiality to overcome the signifying coherence of 
art, and the aesthetic subject. In is interesting to note, on the topic of taste, Kant’s two-
tiered definition of it; it is at once highly personal, subjective, and associated to what 
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each finds agreeable (food, sex), the principle of which that each individual is in 
possession of his own.
411
 Yet Kant associates with this strain of taste “a faculty of desire” 
and the delight that it derives “pathologically conditioned” by stimuli from coming into 
direct contact with nature. Kant delineates a purer strain
412
 which does come too close to 
“the existence” of its object but is associated with the contemplative appreciation of 
beauty in works of art,
413
 and which Jones’ has quite persuasively linked to a repressive 
masculinist apparatus.
414
 Again, the proliferation of discursive paradoxes inscribed into 
single terminologies, embedded within larger discourses would seem to bear then, 
according to my reading, the clinical logic of contagion and immunological suppression 
that informs aesthetics since the eighteenth century. I would also suggest that this 
immunological suppression is targeted at the emerging body itself, a body which will 
comes into full visibility in performance-based practices, and particularly in the new 
forms of clinical performativity that this chapter sets out to identify.  
In the early 1960s Morris produced several works that preceded or accompanied his 
theoretical writings and performance-based works, and that underscored the empirical 
referentiality of his materials while they functioned as surfaces marked by his corporeal 
trace. Morris was inspired by Jasper Johns’ 1955 encaustic assemblage-painting, Target 
with Plaster Casts. From the mid 1950s, John’s work, like that of his colleague and 
companion at the time Robert Rauschenberg, blurred high modernist margins of medium 
specificity by incorporating flatly painted surfaces, readily identified emblematic images 
referencing flat or abstract objects, such as maps, flags, targets and numbers; found 
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objects; and plaster casts of various body parts – nose, hand, genitals, mouth, ear, foot, 
and so forth. The key overall feature of these earlier works being a skin-like sheath of 
encaustic enhanced oil paint applied in deliberate, tactile brushstrokes. Johns has worked 
consistently with a modern semiotic matrix of objects and signs. The use of encaustic 
wax and its body-signifying properties has a long artistic history dating to the Egyptians, 
and to ancient Coptic portraiture; the use of wax by sculptor Medardo Rosso in the early 
twentieth century comes to mind; more apposite is perhaps the early nineteenth-century 
use of wax in medical manikins, as Jordanova has shown, and in the late-nineteenth-
century production of moulages in the medical laboratory studios of Jules Emile Pean, 
who produced an exhibition of diseased body parts.
415
  
Morris produced a series of Imprints and Body Casts (1963-64) which use body traces 
in ways that recall Johns’ work; however, Morris purposely removed any sense of touch 
(and the personal or subjective qualities that accrue to touch) from the trace and produced 
objects that, while they do not draw up portraits of disease in the manner of Jules Emile 
Pean, do resemble the impersonal remnants of test sites or laboratory armatures from 
physiological endurance experiments. Untitled (Footprints and Rulers) (figure 4.4), a cast 
lead ‘relief’ from 1964, features two lead planks marked bearing Morris’s footprints; the 
planks are affixed at the top with two cast rulers; another work from the same sequence 
Untitled (Hand and Toe Holds), features two lead planks bolted to the wall five feet 
apart; they are marked where hands and feet (top and bottom, respectively) have gripped 
each element. A certain “scientific propriety”416 holds in check any subjective implication 
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of the corporeal mark; in fact Morris’s laboratory approach seems designed quite 
precisely to empirically contain and reduce the body’s material interactions to mass and 
force, and its trace to mere data.
417
 
Morris further explored the body index in works which clearly manifest the 
procedures and aesthetics of the laboratory, and treats himself as test subject. The 
medical rendering of the subject, and the bio-aesthetic transformation of the artist as case, 
are evident in works such as Self Portrait (EEG) of 1963 which features the artist’s 
electroencephalogram in a metal and glass frame with lead labels. The index of Morris’s 
brain’s voltage fluctuations functions also as a cultural index of his own identity as artist, 
as self-portraiture. In a subsequent related work Memory Drawings (1963) Morris further 
followed the methodological protocols of research and experiment; comprised of a 
sequence of handwritten and signed pages, Morris’s work sets out to summarize the 
“physiological basis of memory,” and reviews the latest developments in neuroscience, 
the physiological structures of the visual cortex, the uses of the latest medical 
indexical/scanning devices, and the significance of all this to memory and artistic 
production. However, the piece is also a sequence, or series, in which the artist attempts 
to re-write the precise words from the previous page. The progress of memory’s ‘body’ is 
marked as a manually repeated text arranged in sequence. Morris quite literally draws up 
the “minute distinctions” that accrue over time in memory’s physical/physiological labor 
to retain and recount knowledge, and this suggests the constitutive role that repetition and 
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difference plays in the bio-material construction of larger cultural meaning. Cultural 
memory he writes, is produced “either spatially through preservations of models, 
pictures, maps, etc., or temporally through sequential records in print, audial (sic) 
recordings, and more recently electronic means.”418 
Morris’s bodily forays into works which entail, in Friedian parlance its “theatrical” 
overextension, are numerous and varied. Some of these works involve endurances or 
bodily “tasks” staged within a consistent laboratorial gauntlet of structures such as 
mirrors, screens, frames etc. Some of his performances entail the recitation, or lip-sync, 
of texts, and of course dance (Judson). One performance work is worth calling particular 
attention to, for it provides a kind of allegorical coda to the set of issues that circulate 
around Greenbergian aesthetics, and the empirical-critical assertion of the materiality of 
the flat picture plane. The work was performed as part of a dance program which 
included works choreographed and performed by Lucinda Childs and Yvonne Rainer, 
and sets by Robert Rauschenberg. Site (1964) was performed in collaboration with artist 
Carolee Schneemann, who posed as Manet’s Olympia behind a large white rectangular 
plywood panel. Amidst the sound of an offstage jackhammer, Morris, wearing a mask 
cast from his own face by Jasper Johns, appears on stage to slide the white panel to 
another side of the stage revealing Schneeman who maintained her recumbent Olympian 
pose throughout the performance. Morris engaged in a number of beautifully 
choreographed, quite athletic maneuvers with the board – spinning it on its corners, 
lifting it above his shoulders, flipping it from side to side, exerting pressure so that the 
plane arcs or twists, and so forth – all actions carried out to demonstrate, and make felt, 
the plane’s flat materiality in theatrical space. Schneeman’s ‘pictorial’ performance 
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provided a fixed counterpoint or compliment. The work served as an empirical 
explication, à la Greenberg, of the material three-dimensionality of the two-dimensional 
picture plane. The performance concludes with Morris sliding the plane into its original 
position in front of and concealing Schneeman as reclining Olympia. 
Amelia Jones maintains a somewhat disparaging critical demeanor toward the work of 
Morris, and senses something of an implicit “misogyny” that characterizes the 
“performative masculinity (of) male body art” in general, which she further contends 
“often continues to work under the assumption of a bipolar, heterosexist gender 
model.”419 Morris’s position in Site as clothed, active, artist-subject viz. Schneeman’s 
“objectification” as naked display model, would act out the traditional dis-symmetrical 
gender relations that Jones contends have privileged male artistic subjectivity. We find 
these same roles reinforced in Klein’s earlier 1950s paint actions and in the later, more 
aggressive assertions of “hypermasculine” normative, albeit masochistic, heterosexual 
desire in Vito Acconci’s later work in the 1970s. The arrangement might also be said to 
mirror the traditional relationship of the early nineteenth-century clinicians to their 
medical subjects. Of course one of Jones’ primary goals is to elucidate and critique the 
gender apparatus which, according to her narrative of body art, seeks to maintain and 
formally suppress under the masculinist suzerainty of aesthetic disinterestedness (which, 
we recall, she associates with ahedonia, and the repression of the corporeal) any stirrings 
of “feminine theatricality.” Jones however, does not elaborate on any of Morris’s 
performance works, nor his personal and professional partnership with Lynda Benglis, 
one of the avatars of feminist artistic practice she highlights; however she does site his 
notorious parodist (and queerly inflected) 1974 image in S&M garb for an exhibition at 
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Castelli-Sonnabend Gallery in New York, which she contends “simultaneously 
challenge(s) and reinforce(s) dominant codes of masculinity.”420 In Site we might concur 
with Jones that Morris who takes up a demonstrative position against Schneeman’s place 
mark for Manet’s recumbent courtesan maintains his “place as the hyperbolic self to the 
feminine’s other.”421 That having been said, Morris was an important figure in the 
emerging performance/body practices in the early sixties, and produced dance and 
performance works with Yvonne Rainer and Lucinda Childs many of which entailed the 
naked display of his own body.
422
 
The Fried, Judd, and Morris ensemble, form a singular if rivalrous interplay of 
discourses and practices, indeed a case, which manifests the progress of the clinical-
empirical drive as it works itself out on “embodied existence,” or engages with the 
underlying bio-aesthetic referent. If Fried’s text dismisses the immanent 
“theatricalisation” by the literalists as they bring the bodies of beholders, artworks, and 
themselves into close proximity to each other, “Art and Objecthood” also makes a 
symptomatic display of the paradoxical structure of embodiment and its myriad effects. 
More significantly, these texts and practices mark out the expansion of Greenberg’s 
surface gaze; following its clinico-empirical logic Greenberg’s flat operating table opens 
onto a gallery test site, and in Morris’s works the aesthetics of the operating table are 
expanded and developed into the aesthetics of the laboratory. With Morris’s early 
Imprints and Body Casts the artist subjects his own body to a number of physiological 
procedures and produced objects which document the indexical interaction of the body 
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and artistic materiel in the manner of clinical or laboratory demonstrations. Morris’s use 
of medical indexing devices – the EEG for example – to produce explicitly medical self-
portraits, and the eventual insertion of his own body (clothed and unclothed) into the 
performative site traces out a direct arc of development from Greenberg’s flat 
examination table to the theatrical examination room where the artist becomes or acts out 
his or her status as test subject or case-history. 
Morris’s works from this period tend to work under the auspices of a strict empiricism 
and treat or reduce the bio-graphical in literalist fashion to its various indexical 
modulations. However, the biographical does emerge in the performative works of other 
artists at this time, and does so in a fashion that suggests new links between artistic 
production and personal medical history – or, autopathography – in ways Artaud would 
not have imagined. In the following case, a new form of clinical performativity 
emergences amidst the dry laboratory domain of specific objects and mediums, one that 
entails an artist’s concerted effort to make a case for herself as the object of both 
contemplative and non-contemplative appreciation, and the subject of her own medical 
biography and artist-witness to her own corporeal demise. 
The Artist as Medical Subject: Hannah Wilke’s Autopathography 
On my thirtieth birthday, in 1970, my mother had a mastectomy. (Hannah Wilke). 
Earlier, I briefly discussed Jones’ category of performative agency, the Pollockian 
Performative, comprised of an aggregate of photographs and film clips by Hans Namuth 
and others showing the artist at work on a large drip painting, and disseminated in both 
the art and popular media in the early 1950s. Jones’ contends this performative 
assemblage shifted aesthetic attention – via the non-intentional art and popular press – 
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from the Greenbergian fixity of wall-bound abstract paintings to the unfixed field of 
action and performance and set the stage, so to speak, for the body and performance 
practices that followed. The clinicalization of artistic subjectivity which I discussed in the 
previous chapter in relation to Antonin Artaud may also be reconfigured as the index of a 
new performative artistic agency. I would suggest that Artaud’s case, decades before 
Pollock’s, is also accompanied by an assemblage of performative affects which include 
stock depictions of Artaud in his film and stage performances, photographs of him as 
asylum resident, as well as many drawn and painted self portraits created in his rooms at 
the clinic Ivry-sur-Seine. Groupings of these images often accompany published editions 
of Artaud’s writings, as well as texts and catalogues about his work, including an English 
edition of The Theater and its Double published in 1958 in New York by the formidable 
Grove Press. Artaud’s performativity, like Pollock’s, also eludes the traditional category 
of intentional subjectivity, yet unlike Pollock’s it is presided over by a hyper-lucid critical 
awareness of what is happening. Indeed, as the Artaud-Rivière exchange veered into a 
discourse of patient and doctor (more precisely that of mental patient and psychiatrist) 
Artaud was aware of its clinical turn and evinced a powerful critical-reflexivity over the 
interlocution. It is this inflection of critical agency and self-awareness that distinguishes 
Artaud’s case from Pollock’s, and suggests a new modality of clinical performativity that 
I will examine in the following pages. 
Hannah Wilke was an important figure in the second-wave feminist art movement in 
New York in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. Immersed in the formal problems of 
Minimalist (or literalist) and post-Minimalist sculpture, installation, and performance, 
Wilke began, in the early to mid 1960s, to produce her signature terra cotta “pinched” 
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sculptures based on vaginal forms. Executed years prior to Judy Chicago’s Dinner Party 
(1974-76), these works may be placed within a larger constellation of feminist art which 
took on modernist and minimalist formalism; Barbara Zucker, Mariam Schapiro, Joan 
Semmel, Harmony Hammond, Eva Hesse, and others, all incorporated variously stylized 
versions of the female anatomical sex, and feminine-coded materials into the familiar 
masculinist framework of minimalist and post-minimalist sculpture and its industrial-
based medium-specificities.
423
 Wilke’s earliest Box and Excremental sculptures, ca. 
1960-1963, are fired unglazed brown terra cotta ‘pinch-pot’ structures that incorporate 
the haptic traces of her fingers and thumbs into vulva, sphincter, and O’Keefe-like floral 
forms. Scharlatt Rousse (1965) features four small terra cotta vaginal and/or anus-like 
reliefs in dark bronze-like glaze. While they make clever allusions to Morris’s more 
scientistic indexical slabs, they are imbued with a sense of sensual pleasure, touch, 
warmth, all descriptors coding the “feminine.” It must be pointed out that Wilke’s genital 
imagery also resonates with nineteenth-century racist gyno-physiologies found in Cuvier, 
Lombroso and others, which contrasted the genitalia of Hottentot women to those of 
European whites. These illustrations, as Sander Gilman points out, were drawn with the 
purpose of ‘empirically’ demonstrating the inherent differences between the races of 
women. The nineteenth century perceived the Hottentot woman as “the epitome of … 
sexual lasciviousness” and her “primitive sexual appetite” was inscribed into the 
corporeal forms of her ‘primitive’ genitalia as malformations and biological errors. The 
violence of this discursive construction moved in many directions, and projected 
‘concupiscence’ onto the genital features of any number of social undesirables including 
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 Wilke’s echoing of this physiological-physiognomic 
might be understood as a redress to these anatomies.  
Into the early 1970s Wilke’s sculpture incorporated more developed Post-Minimal 
forms. Her One-Fold Gestural Sculptures (1973-74) comprises one hundred seventy-six 
folded terra cotta forms coated in a layer of smooth pink latex arranged in a rectangular 
field on the gallery floor; the individual pieces resemble genitalia, of course, but also 
make critical and aesthetic reference to floor arrangements of bricks and tile by Carl 
Andre. (Harmony Hammond’s contemporaneous, and stunning, braided rag rug 
sculptures performed a similar feminist deconstruction.) Wilke also produced, pace 
Lynda Benglis’ Contraband (1968) and Jones’ Pollockian Performative, a body of floor-
poured latex pieces which were then re-configured into hanging wall pieces; Of Radishes 
and Flowers (1972) features a baroque drapery of shiny pink latex veils, and calls to 
mind Morris’s early hung felt pieces, but also contemporaneous works by other women 
artists, notably Eva Hesse, Rosemary Mayer, and Barbara Zucker, which treated or teased 
the novel rubber based material into smooth textured folded forms redolent with 
histological associations. Due to the highly perishable nature of these organic based 
substances, many of Wilke’s latex pieces (like those of Hesse and the others) were lost. 
An important 1972 latex piece purchased by Abstract Expressionist painter Willem de 
Kooning Chocolate Pancakes crumbled to pieces shortly after he bought it.
425
 
Wilke continued to produce ceramic and latex pieces well into the late 1980s and early 
1990s until just before her death, but in 1973 and 1974, her engagement with sculptural 
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materials that embodied haptic material specificity took a new turn, and performance 
began to figure in her work. The first step in this transition may be traced to a large series 
of small, gnocchi-like or vaginal forms made of gray kneaded erasers that Wilke arranged 
on a variety of surfaces including vintage postcards, as well as in grid-like clusters on 
large white panels or museum boards. Responding to what critic Edit deAk called the 
“anonymous grayness” of these pieces, Wilke began using masticated chewing gum, a 
material more intimately connected with her own body – a body she now began to 
incorporate into her imagery. In a series of 28 photographs made with fashion 
photographer Les Wollman, titled S.O.S. Starification Object Series, An Adult Game of 
Mastication (1974-1975) (figure 4.5) Wilke – a profoundly beautiful woman – applied 
little chewed whorls of bubble-gum to her body and assumed a familiar sequence of 
fashion poses, topless or mostly nude, with nuanced references to art and film (clear 
antecedents to Cindy Sherman’s work). As Nancy Princenthal has pointed out, the bits of 
chewed gum produce sometimes paradoxical corporeal associations (consider a busy city 
sidewalk!), from the erotic to the abject: “In some poses looking like jewels, in others 
like blemishes, or sores, the gum is, always, a beckoning license to touch. A work shaped 
by both mouth and hand, these tender buttons, scattered all over Wilke’s body, suggest 
themselves as a means for operating the body they adorn – a very sticky form of 
connection between viewer and subject.”426 The theatricalization of sculptural practice, 
the performative impulse to register the corporeal referent which in Wilke’s work is also 
expressed in an erotic gesture that includes, even seduces, the beholder, these are new 
inflections of the same bio-aesthetic determinations –shot through with different gender 
ideologies and political purposes – that we found in formalist aesthetics. 
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Indeed, Wilke’s “starification” performances exemplify – like Morris and Judd’s 
‘specific objects’ – what Foucault called, “the constitutive character of corporeal 
spatiality” in the bio-aesthetic clinicalization of modern and contemporary artistic 
experience. Wilke’s “starification” series also engages the “return to finitude” that is set 
into play by the ontological assertion of biological being; as Foucault has suggested, 
modern medical experience establishes in “the beautiful enclosed form of 
individuality”427 an ever-present insistent relationship to mortality which the clinical 
sciences since the early nineteenth century have associated with the indeterminable 
network of temporal processes set into play by zoë. Foucault cites literary figures, 
Hölderlin and Nerval, to underscore the “lyrical” aspect of this transformation. Wilke, as 
Princenthal points out, evinces a profound awareness of the relationship of beautiful star-
ified individuality to the theme of mortality in her S.O.S. series. In a 1975 panel 
discussion, she stated: “One strength of American art right now is that we’re involved 
with a culture that’s about destructiveness. Some of the best art has a planned 
obsolescence. I alternate between the idea of some of my works disintegrating, because 
it’s hard to admit that you’re going to die yourself.”428 Wilke’s poured and folded latex 
pieces, like those of Eva Hesse, succumbed to their own processes of bio-chemical 
finitude. In any case, Wilke links the fragile nature of her materials to her mortal body, 
and while this calls up the great vitalist transformation process of biological becoming 
and change, it also carries the ontological inscriptions of individual finite biological 
beings. 
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According to her journals, Wilke’s career took a decisive turn in 1970 on her thirtieth 
birthday, on the day her mother, Selma Butter, underwent breast cancer surgery. Wilke 
began the series of photographs that would follow her mother’s grueling ten-year 
experience with the disease and its treatment. These photographs, which document the 
physical transformations of the surgery and subsequent chemo and radiation therapies is a 
performative tour de force on the parts of both Wilke and Butter. Butter, the daughter of 
early twentieth-century immigrant Polish Jews, subjects herself to her daughter’s 
photographic gaze and makes a powerful display of how mortal disease and its treatment 
mark the surface of the living body. Portrait of the Artist with her Mother, Selma Butter, 
(1978-81) (figure 4.6), perhaps the most famous of the images, is comprised of two 
photographic portraits, one of Wilke and the other of her mother, placed side by side. 
Wilke’s young, beautiful figure, portrayed nude from mid-waist up, is adorned with 
starifications (trinkets, talisman, charms). Wilke directs her gaze at the viewer in a 
fashion that evinces both seductiveness and strength. Selma Butter’s face is turned away 
from the camera in a gesture that seems to register the angered knowledge of her own 
abject appearance, her post-mastectomy scarred and radiation blistered chest in full view. 
Selma’s scarifications carry out a moving exchange with the curative elements that adorn 
her daughter’s lovely breasts.  
The photographs documenting Selma’s physical demise were eventually gathered in 
the exhibition In Memoriam, Selma Butter (Mommy) (1979-83), that featured three large 
framed arrangements of photographs (figure 4.7). Each composition featured six 
photographs of Butter documenting her appearance at different stages of decline. Beneath 
each grid of photographs is a sequence of three abstract collages composed from the 
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flattened spaces around Selma’s figure, and beneath each of these compositions Wilke 
placed type-face captions comprised of single words in the following sequences: Form, 
Cause, Make / Support, Foundation, Comfort / Bond, Intimate, Part. Wilke extends 
Memoriam into the space of the beholder in the form of three arrangements of her 
signature vulva forms, arranged in twos, painted in primary colors blue, red, and yellow, 
placed on small plinths on the floor in front of the images (figure 4.7). The shapes are 
larger than those deployed in other works, and have attained a certain cocoon or 
sarcophagus-like aspect. Princenthal likens them to wombs.
429
  
Wilke’s work recapitulates the central issues of embodiment that have installed 
themselves at the center of clinically aestheticised experiences and forms. The artist 
treats her mother’s images to any number of familiar formal maneuvers: the grid formats, 
the modernist abstract re-compositions of the negative spaces around Selma’s figure 
which suggest (pace Russian modernism) illustrations or plans for three dimensional 
sculptures, the relationship of discursive forms to visual ones, the introduction of primary 
colors, and the incorporation of sculptural elements, all of these, taken together map the 
theatrical progress of specific objects as they are mobilized by the artistic drive toward 
plastic embodiment. This entire ensemble, of course, is set in motion around a cycle of 
photographs an artist has taken of her dying mother, and which maps the visible changes 
born of her fatal disease; hence the representation of malady that points so decisively to 
the biological finitude of “man” in the biopolitical age and that so troubled the German 
idealist aestheticians makes its appearance; and it is quite precisely bound to the 
biography of the artist. 
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Intra-Venus (1991-1993) is perhaps the most noted among Wilke’s last works. The 
work consists of a series of photographs and video clips many taken by her partner the 
artist and photographer Donald Goddard. The images alternate between the extremes of 
parody and brutal clinical documentation (figure 4.10 and 4.11). It was initially the 
artist’s intention to title the entire cycle of works Cure, however the pieces were not 
exhibited until after her death in 1994. The title was chosen by Goddard from a group of 
‘performalist’ self portraits that feature explicit post-treatment images of the artist with 
intravenous needles and attachments fixed to various ‘ports’ in her hands, breasts and 
groin, where chemotherapies and other infusions were delivered into her bloodstream. In 
these pictures, which recall her Portrait of the Artist with her Mother as they are 
presented as double or triple self portraits, Wilke strikes poses reminiscent of her earlier 
works; for example Intra-Venus Series # 4, July 26 and February 19, 1992, seems to 
offer the obverse “diseased” versions of two images from her Starification series. In 
another set, Intra-Venus Triptych [“Marilyn Monroe”], 1992-93, Wilke assumes poses 
derived Marilyn Monroe’s famous pin-ups featured in the first, 1955 issue of Playboy 
Magazine, with hospital bandages on her back and sides, hair thinning from the chemo 
treatments. (These pictures may be read as, perhaps, richly inflected medical 
counterpoints to Warhol’s Marilyns). Wilke makes many poignant, sometimes cunning 
art historical allusions that call up or excavate the lyrical conjunction or integration of 
“death into medical thought,”430 and the further introjection of this structure into modern 
and contemporary artistic subjectivity and practice. One post-chemotherapy self-portrait 
of Wilke wrapped in a blue hospital blanket seems to suggest the beatific agony of the 
mater dolorosa in Grunewald’s Isenheim Altarpiece; another features the artist in a pose 
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that could be derived from racist illustrations, of the “Hottentot Venus” from Cuvier and 
Lombroso. And yet another portrays the artist with her eyes closed, and mouth open in 
what looks to be a camp send-up of that expressive corporeal moment of mortal anguish 
which Lessing’s aesthetics acknowledged but would, we recall, according to Richter, 
only allow into artistic representation in the form of elaborate formal maneuvers and 
tropes. One especially riveting self-portrait portrays the artist lieing her back naked in a 
partially filled bathtub, her legs spread and vagina fully exposed as running water pours 
over her face. There is a clear allusion to the realist Courbet’s famous The Origin of the 
World (1866), and to Duchamp’s Étant Donné (which she had made reference to in 
numerous earlier works), to Bonnard’s recumbent bathtub figures, and also to Wilke’s 
own earlier painted latex, ceramic and chewing gum works. 
Wilke also produced a great number of other works – drawings, paintings, mixed 
media assemblages, which called up the progress of modernist, literalist and post 
modernist ‘specific objects’ yet channeled through her hospital experiences. Why Not 
Sneeze…(1992) features a wire mesh bird cage which has been made the artful receptacle 
of Wilke’s empty prescription bottles and syringes (figure 4.8), and makes reference, of 
course, to Duchamp’s Why not sneeze, Rrose Selavy (1921); a sequence of Brushstrokes 
drawings were made from strands of hair that fell out during chemotherapy treatments 
and were collected from the artist’s hairbrush and affixed to sheets of paper (figure 4.9); 
another set of lovely poignant watercolors made on hospital pillowcases depicts vases of 
flowers the artist received during her hospital stays. There are a number of late 
watercolor self-portraits that bear striking similarities to those produced by Artaud during 
his final months (figures 4.12 and 4.13). 
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Tamar Tembeck, who has written compellingly of “autopathographic” nature of 
Wilke’s last works, points out that the links between artistic representation and illness 
reach back to antiquity as “objects invested with restorative powers … as amulets and 
talismans.”431 Citing the critical contributions of Gilman and Susan Sontag, she points to 
their role in codifying abjection and cites nineteenth-century anthropological and medical 
images of syphilitic and the mentally ill. Hence, for Tembeck, representations of illness 
pose this double stature as instruments of both therapeutic power, and medical exclusion 
and stigmatization. And while she does not specifically cite Jacques Derrida’s critical and 
philosophical ruminations on the topic of the “pharmakon,”432 she does cite 
‘pathographic’ representation’s function as such and states that “art can enable finding a 
cure within a poison, which here [in the pathographic image] takes the form of creativity 
within disease.”433 Tambeck’s analysis of Wilke’s later work, including the Selma Butter 
series, emphasizes this therapeutic aspect, which she links to an ancient performative 
aspect of the creative act itself. 
What distinguishes Wilke’s clinical performativity from Artaud’s is, of course, that 
after some procrastination (which may have contributed to her demise), that she 
voluntarily subjected herself to the clinical gaze in the hope that she would be healed. 
Indeed, the therapeutic and restorative intention of Wilke’s work, particularly the work 
she produced in response to her mother’s illness, is evident. And surely, 
auto/pathographic representations, and the creative response to the pharmakon are as old 
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and as various as the experience of illness itself. But the clinicalization of illness 
produces new structures and new experiences. In Artaud’s case the clinic in its 
psychiatric and critical manifestations, much like the conventions of the European theatre 
which he continuously inveighed against, imposed itself as restrictive and even life 
threatening. Ambivalence, and her loathing and horror at the brutal impact of clinical 
subjection, are certainly captured in Wilke’s late self portraits; however, we sense that 
she has resigned herself to her fate, and through a remarkable feat of clinical 
performativity – and Artaudian cruelty -- incorporated, like a pharmakon, the clinical 
gaze itself into her diseased and medicalized body and turned it back upon the space of 
clinical and critical subjection, her doctors, and her critics.  
Conclusion 
In the previous pages, I have described the ordeal of artistic embodiment and clinical 
performativity as an ongoing reflexive struggle between artistic conventions – painting, 
sculpture, theater – and an emerging biological referent of the body, or the bio-referent. 
This bio-referent (or zoë), despite the ferocious empirical probity of the laboratory 
sciences and its artistic analog the reductive modernist drive toward medium specificity, 
remains true to its life-like capacity of eluding or exceeding signification. The Fried, 
Judd, Morris “case” presents this ordeal in a mixture of analytical, experimental, and 
formal procedures inflected with diagnostic, formalist and theatrical associations. This 
exchange highlights the de-stabilizing effect of artists’ bodies as they intrude further and 
further into the surfaces of formalism’s ostensibly disembodied field of vision.434 My 
reading advances that there is an immunitary logic at work in these writings; while Judd 
and Morris promote the zoë-like proliferation of figures, shapes, and eventually the 
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bodies of artist-performers into the aesthetic field, Fried sets out to counter this 
‘theatricalisation’ with a reformulated Greenbergian immunological schema of medium 
specificities. My purpose was not to contest Jones’ assertion of the disembodied-ness of 
male-gendered formalist aesthetics but to suggest that this male-gendered disembodied-
ness may be understood as an immunological response within material logic of formalism 
itself. Indeed, my reading has staged this exchange as an auto-immunological ordeal, 
through which Greenbergian formalism quite literally breaks out of its own skin and into 
the space of performance.  
The work of Hannah Wilke has provided an apposite counter-case. As a member of 
the second-wave American feminist art movement, Wilke’s earliest sculptural works 
reassigned minimalism’s seemingly neutral gender and empiricist assertions 
incorporating anatomical renderings of the female sex into ceramic and latex relief, floor, 
and pedestal sculptures. In the late 1960s and early 1970s in the aftermath of the heady 
Judd-Morris-Fried exchange, further bolstered by the feminist injunction to politicize (in 
this case, aestheticize) the personal,
435
 she produced an ambitious stream of multi-media 
works that incorporated her body and biography. These include a powerful photographic 
essay that juxtaposes topless fashion-quality photographic self portraits against stark 
depictions of her mother following breast cancer treatments. Her final multi-media works 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s comprises an extended “autopathography”; “Intra-
Venus” consists of a stream of photographs, sculptures, watercolors, videos that 
document the artist’s own struggle with metastatic lymphoma and its treatment, 
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producing for herself a new position of agency amidst the dreaded space of clinical 
subjection. 
Taken together, the Judd-Morris-Fried and Wilke cases recapitulate the productive 
tension installed at the center of aesthetic discourse since the eighteenth century. The 
clinical mechanism which is at work in Lessing’s aesthetics, which empirically observes 
and identifies the material and formal specifications of artistic mediums as it suppresses 
explicit assertions of the corporeal referent (the body in pain), has migrated to late 
twentieth century Greenbergian and minimalist discourse. Yet, we might say that “the 
body” continues its passage through these discourses and confronts first diagnostic, then 
immunological resistances. With Wilke’s case this body in the late twentieth century 
finally forces itself into visibility as a new performative strategy, that of clinical 
performativity.  
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Conclusion: Artists, Curators, Clinicians 
Doctors say I’m the illest cause I’m sufferin from realness. 
(Kanye West & Jay-Z) 
 
 
According to Roberto Esposito, from the moment in 1984 when Michel Foucault offered 
us a new understanding of biopolitics as a concept separable from its daily experience, in 
The History of Sexuality, “the entire frame of political philosophy emerged as profoundly 
modified.”436 This does not mean, however, that our “classical categories” of political 
understanding (law, sovereignty, democracy) “suddenly left the scene – they continue to 
organize current political discourse.” Esposito contends, rather, “that their effective 
meaning(s)” have lost their interpretive capacities, and that the machinations and ordeals 
of current times must be re-framed within a larger category of biological life, or zoë in 
Agamben’s sense, the forces of which have been systematically located and released by a 
multi-faceted biopolitical apparatus which has been in the works at least since the early to 
mid-eighteenth century.  
I suggest, our tidy periodizations and sub-periodizations into art historical and critical 
categories, our parsing and declension of modernism and postmodernism, while useful, 
are no longer sufficient. A new historical interpretive approach might be fashioned out of 
critical bio-politics. The overall goal of this project has been to sketch, within the 
framework of bio-politics, some contours describing an artistic sub-category, I coin “bio-
aesthetics.” I have done this by locating a set of clinical mechanisms at work within the 
individual domains of aesthetics, artistic perception, subjectivity and performativity. It 
has been my contention that the drive toward embodiment, toward the referent, or 
perhaps more precisely toward the real, expressed in formalism’s zeal for medium 
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specificity, and in the modernist drive to ground artistic experience within the somatic, 
was set into play by a unique clinical configuration, a “discourse of truth”437 emerging 
from laboratories and clinics in the eighteenth century. These discourses expounded a 
science of “bodies and life processes.”438 The emergence of a “science of the subject” 
with its emphasis on the confessional, on philosophical and critical reflexivity, on 
“introspection, lived experience” and a “never-ending demand for truth”439 produced 
conditions that compelled artists to insert their lives and bodies into their works. 
Though the historical sweep of what I have attempted is broad, extending beyond the 
parameters of what we understand as modernism and post-modernism, my archaeology of 
a discourse of bio-aesthetics adheres to a chronological scheme. My historical trajectory 
extends from Kant and his milieu including texts by Baumgarten, Lessing, La Mettrie and 
van Haller, through to the twentieth-century modernist criticism and theory of Foucault, 
Greenberg, Deleuze and Guattari, and ending with the post-modern performance-based 
practices of Hannah Wilke at the end of the century. Wilke’s work has provided 
something of a summation (perhaps a somation), after Artaud, of the clinical 
determinations this thesis set out to locate and plot across the map of modernism. I might 
have drawn on any number of examples, including those that connected performance to 
medical experience: Bob Flanagan, Kim Jones, or Jo Spence, who produced a similar 
stream of performance and photographic works which mapped her experiences with 
cancer, similar to those by Wilke. Wilke’s case is significant in light of its historical 
relation to the symptomatic display of embodiment in the Morris, Judd, and Fried 
exchange; as a member of the 1960s second-wave feminist art movement in New York, 
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Wilke re-figured and eventually inserted her own body into the formalist-minimalist 
repertory of serial forms, grids, installation formats, and “specific shapes” which were the 
topic of such contention in the critical exchange. Her late work occupies a crucial 
historical juncture at which the reflexive modalities of clinicalized aesthetics and 
perception converge with those of the clinicalized subject in a very specific fashion.  
The clinical mechanisms I have identified continue to shape developments in 
contemporary art, as well as, I might add, the world of contemporary mass culture 
including television and pop music. Clinical performance has been absorbed into the 
artistic and popular culture mainstream, fueled no doubt by the gargantuan growth of a 
parvenu collector culture and its global market system. Some of today’s most widely 
discussed and exhibited visual and performance artists – among them Tracy Emin, 
Matthew Barney, Orlan, Damien Hirst, Rebecca Beecroft and a recently refurbished, 
Cher-ified Marina Abramovic – deploy the imagery and aesthetics of modern medical 
experience, the endurance techniques of the laboratory, and “reality-style” autobiography 
and/or autopathography, in what are often highly produced, media savvy multimedia 
museum and gallery spectacles. An examination of these more recent developments 
would comprise a different study, and one that no doubt would have to consider the 
impact of the burgeoning global art market system and the accession of the post-
postmodern museum by a much larger arts and entertainment industry. This thesis has set 
out to establish an early- or pre-history of these developments, one that situates a set of 
key art historical developments from the mid-eighteenth to late-twentieth century within 
a clinico-aesthetic archaeological framework.  
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My secondary purpose has been to re-position the philosophy and aesthetics of 
Immanuel Kant with regards to art and art history. While Kant’s writings have had a 
considerable influence on certain figures within the field of art history his overall 
reception has been – Jones’ excoriation is an exception – rather tepid. What I have drawn 
out are some of the traces of an archaeology that links Kant’s thought to the ordeal of 
artistic embodiment and to the great profusion of bodies in postmodern and contemporary 
art. Baumgarten’s treatises, informed by the emerging life sciences, were the first 
writings to sketch a “sensate discourse” linking art to a corporeal aesthetics. However, it 
was the philosophy of Immanuel Kant that incorporated both the reflexive testing 
protocols of the laboratory and the experiential body of the clinical test subject into a 
comprehensive doctrine of aesthetics. While the body is not specifically represented in 
Kant’s discourse, it ingeminates throughout his sprawling and exquisitely detailed 
epistemology as a constantly evolving set of corporeal terminologies. We might even 
describe the body with regards to Kant’s writings as an inverted teleology, the genie-like 
flicker of the ultimately un-signifiable zoë, which guides the critiques from within their 
discursive machinery as they drift from a discourse on reason to a discourse on 
subjectivity and aesthetics. It is this same inverted teleology, or something like it, that I 
suggest is at work beneath the clinical permutations of artistic experience in each of the 
domains I have examined.  
What I have not emphasized enough, perhaps, is the critical aspect of Kant’s project; 
indeed, accompanying ‘the body’ in its journey from philosophy to aesthetics is a species 
of what might be called embodied reason. This dense but interactive critical self-
attentiveness is bound to the actual, to space and time, and to the reality of biological 
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being to which it seems to bear witness. For Kant this reflexivity was also linked to 
critique, and to the moral agency of the modern subject. In his famous essay “What is 
Enlightenment?” first published in late 1784 in a monthly Berlin journal, Kant issued 
something of tacit injunction to critique that links “enlightenment” to “man’s release 
from his self-incurred tutelage.” In the oft-cited passage Kant writes that “Tutelage is 
man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-
incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution 
and courage to use it without direction from another.”440  
I have situated Kant’s subject-bound critical reflexivity within the larger schema of 
clinical epistemology. Indeed, the cases that make up my study evince a certain troubled 
relationship to embodiment; I’ve focused on those sites or instantiations in which bodies 
and clinical-critical discourses are caught within a kind of crucible, and the clinicalization 
of artistic experience across theoretical and experiential domains comprises a set of what 
I often refer to as reflexive clinical ordeals. In light of this bio-aesthetics and its clinical 
procedures and styles may seem to cast a rather menacing deterministic shadow over 
significant art historical developments. This is to some extent prefigured in my 
theoretical sources; according to Foucault biopolitics sets into play fierce mechanisms of 
disciplinary power, and Agamben’s further elaboration of an omnivorous anthropological 
apparatus, which reduces human and animal subjects to the condition of bestialized 
biological ‘bare life,’ casts bio-politics negatively, as a politics and economy not of life – 
or zoë – but of death. With respect to the ordeals and subjectivisations endured within my 
clinical archaeology Kant’s philosophy is something of a Derridean pharmakon. His 
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critiques provide epistemological encapsulation of clinicalization, yet the drift from 
philosophy to aesthetics is also life-affirming, and clinical probity may be turned back 
upon the mechanisms of subjectivisation to free subjects from the (self-incurred) 
interpolations of the clinic.  
It was also my purpose to draw out the ways that even in those extreme experiences of 
medical and psychiatric subjection compelling forms of resistant, non-compliant, even 
transcendent artistic agency were fashioned. Artaud insisted on the artistic, critical and 
personal validity of his own position, and configured a new critical approach that 
manifested in the letters with Rivière as a hyper-critical awareness of, and resistance to, 
the clinical machinations at work in their exchange. In a similar manner, Wilke’s ordeals 
of embodiment, from her earliest feminist resistances to the seemingly implacable 
masculine materialism of minimalist sculptures, to her final passage through cancer and 
the clinic, evinced the resolution and courage of Kant’s enlightened subject.  
The performative outbreak of ‘the body’ that, in my account, culminates with Wilke’s 
artistic autopathography, again, is not meant to mark the full development and closure of 
clinical performativity, or bio-aesthetics. Indeed, the chronological cut-off of my 
dissertation is significant. While Wilke produced her final works, bio-aesthetics was 
passing through something of a fissional threshold and a period of dramatic bio-political 
dissemination. Tthe AIDS epidemic was in its early stages and presented new impetus for 
artists to confront and capture the experiences of the disease, as well as to artistically 
confront the machinations of clinicalization, racism, homophobia and other forms of 
subjectivization and exclusion set into play around it. The work of David Wojnarowicz, 
Mark Morrisroe, the blood-spectacle performances of Ron Athey, as well as the artist 
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collaborative efforts of Group Material, Gran Fury, General Idea, and so many other 
collectives made up of artists and non-artists alike – Queer Nation and Act-Up, for which 
artist Ken Moffett produced enormously effective and widely disseminated printed 
matter, pushed performative practice into new modalities of artistic activism. 
Other important artistic and critical developments in the mid- to late-1970s wedded 
Kantian disinterestedness to Kantian critique in new and productive ways. In 1977 critic 
Douglas Crimp, who would later play a crucial role in AIDS activism, organized a show 
at Artists Space in New York titled “Pictures” which included works by an emerging 
group of artists - among them Troy Brantuch, Louise Lawler, Richard Prince, Sherrie 
Levine, and Jack Goldstein, many of whom had studied at the California Institute of the 
Arts (or CalArts) in Los Angeles with postmodern photographer John Baldesarri. These 
artists had dispensed with the notion of embodiment per se and turned a disinterested 
clinical eye on the art apparatus itself. They produced mostly photo-based works that 
focused on the ways that museums create and sustain artistic value and meaning. Crimp, 
we recall, cited Foucault’s archaeology in his 1980 essay On the Museum’s Ruins and 
approached the museum as a space of subjectivisation, and confinement and identified 
these artists with a new form of photography-based institutional critique.
441
  
Two examples of recent works by artists that take up the problem of clinicalized 
artistic subjectivity will function as a brief coda. Both are curatorial treatments of other 
artists’ works by contemporary artists whose parallel careers – both were included in the 
1991 Whitney Biennial – are situated at the historical nexus of AIDS activism, the 
performative outbreak of the body in late twentieth-century art, and institutional critique 
theoretically articulated by Crimp. The two projects, by sculptor Robert Gober (b. 1954) 
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and installation and performance artist Nayland Blake (b. 1960) are separated by twenty 
years, 2012 and 1989 respectively. While Gober and Blake approach their artist subjects 
in similar fashion (I would contend that Gober has drawn heavily from Blake’s earlier 
work) mixing up artworks, texts, biographical and medical material, further blurring – in 
bio-aesthetic fashion - the distinction between the lives of artists and their works, they 
produce very different kinds of cases. 
Robert Gober’s recent exhibition of the work of mid-twentieth century American 
abstract painter Forrest Bess (1911-1977) provided a slightly off-center, second-floor side 
gallery centerpiece for the 2012 Biennial. Bess is known for small idiosyncratic 
paintings, often painted on found scraps of wood and framed in makeshift weathered 
wood slat frames. The paintings feature simple, formally compelling compositions of 
circles, triangles, stars, ladders, and hieroglyph-like designs on landscape-like backdrops, 
or carefully textured fields of colour. Bess elaborated upon the meaning of his imagery in 
letters and typed codices that cite modernist painters, as well as 1940s and 1950s 
discourses on anthropology, yoga, sexuality and psychoanalysis. The artist studied 
architecture at Texas A&M University and the University of Texas in the 1940s, and 
produced most of his works in the oily heyday of Abstract Expressionism and 
Greenbergian Color-Field painting. He also maintained a number of fascinating 
correspondences with notable cultural figures including Carl Jung and art historian Meyer 
Schapiro (figure 5.1 and 5.2). His correspondence with Shapiro is extensive; he engaged 
the receptive art historian in Jungian explanations of his work citing current articles on 
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sexology and cultural anthropology expounding on such topics as androgyny, 
hermaphroditism, and a “new form of homosexuality.”442  
In the early 1950s Bess began to seek the advice of doctors and psychiatrists on the 
possibility of attaining gender-reassignment surgery. The topic had begun to enter into 
wider public discourse in 1952 when Christine Jorgensen (1927-1989) who was among 
the first individuals to undergo surgical gender-reassignment, became a highly visible 
public figure and passionate advocate for transsexual people.
443
 Lacking Jorgensen’s 
resources, Bess would eventually go so far as to perform genital/gender altering surgeries 
on himself, and he documented these alterations in notebook drawings and photographs. 
In any case, Schapiro was a sympathetic champion of the artist’s work, and a supportive 
friend. Bess’s paintings were exhibited regularly in solo and group shows at the 
legendary Betty Parsons Gallery in the 1950s and 1960s alongside works by Clyfford 
Still, Jackson Pollock, Mark Rothko, and others. Aside from occasional trips to New 
York, the artist spent his working years as a bait fisherman in his home town Bay City, 
Texas, and lived in a small cabin which he assembled from scratch. In his declining years 
Bess lived on a small stipend which Schapiro helped him procure through the Mark 
Rothko Foundation, and was cared for by a younger Bay City gay couple Harry Burkhart 
and James Wilford, who amassed a large collection of his works (recently auctioned at 
Christie’s). Bess died in a nursing home in 1977, at which time there was little or no 
interest in his work. 
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Early reviews of Bess’s exhibitions portrayed him as a “character” or primitive.444 
However, in the late 1970s interest in Bess’s work grew among a young generation of 
New York abstract painters: Thomas Nowskowski, Elizabeth Murray, Mary Heilman, 
and younger Andrew Masullo and Chris Martin –found in Bess’s unique style an 
aesthetically compelling alternative to Abstract Expressionism, Color-Field, Minimalist 
and other strains of formalist painting that dominated abstract painting at the time.
445
 In 
1981 a posthumous small retrospective exhibition of Bess’ work was organized by the 
Whitney Museum; it was at this time that curatorial treatments of his work took a 
decidedly clinical turn.  
In an introductory brochure to his Whitney show, curator Barbara Haskell described 
the artist (not unlike traditional descriptions of his New York contemporaries who 
patronized the Cedar Bar in the 1950s) as alternating between “the roughneck son of an 
itinerant oil laborer,” a “rugged liquor-drinking fisherman,” and a “sensitive, gentle 
painter.” 446 But the short essay also includes an account of Bess’s “self-surgery” 
extrapolated from his notes: “During the fifties,” she writes, “he became fanatical about 
disseminating his theory of immortality: he advocated uniting male and female by means 
of a surgically produced fistula into the male urethra, which made possible urethral 
orgasm.”447 Bess’s last years are cast in dire clinico-biographical tones: “He became 
increasingly eccentric in the early seventies [after his last show with Parsons], during the 
time when his rhinoplyma, a nodular swelling of the nose, was becoming more 
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pronounced; after a brief period in a mental hospital, he was admitted to a nursing 
home.”448 Articles and critical reviews since the Whitney show invariably cite the 
clinically salient aspects of the “case” sketched out by Haskell.449 
Gober’s curatorial installation includes eleven paintings, together with an assortment 
of the artist’s notes, scrapbooks, codices and letters. The exhibition also includes a black 
and white photograph taken by the artist of his altered genitalia which features a large 
vagina-like hole between the base of the penis and scrotum (figure 5.3). The snapshot 
functioned as something of an unsettling Barthesian “punctum,”450 (though it was not an 
“accident” in Barthes’ sense, but rather carefully placed by the curator to produce such an 
effect), literally a wound around which the entire exhibition produced its subject. Gober 
assembled these materials in table vitrines arranged at intervals along gallery walls 
between the sparse installations of paintings; selections of the artist’s writings were 
deployed as wall texts, without any further curatorial commentary. The entire exhibition 
was bathed in warm low-intensity light (similar to that used in museum displays of 
Gober’s sculptural works) and pooled around the vitrines and paintings. This highlighted 
the rich textural and tonal aspects of Bess’s paintings, some of which incorporate areas of 
rich impasto which the artist – like his contemporary Alfred Jensen – squeezed directly 
from tubes (figure 5.4). The distinctive lighting accentuated the “archival” qualities of the 
yellowing documents and letters. 
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As effective as the presentation was, Gober stuck closely to what Carol Berkencotter 
calls “the formal features of the clinical case history.”451 Indeed, I suggest the seamless 
ambiance of the exhibition, the way it captured the truth of Bess’s ordeals, compellingly 
linking together his life and his art through an aesthetically elegant and casually staged 
ensemble of paintings, personal notes, and the significant inclusion of the photograph of 
the artist’s self mutilation, was in fact the discursive effect of the clinical mechanisms 
identified in this thesis. Even the use of Bess’s own words in wall texts, a gesture that for 
all intents and purposes was intended to release the artist’s true meanings, functioned, in 
this case (it didn’t have to as we shall see) as a form of anamnesis which further fleshed 
out the artist as case history. The Whitney contends, in a printed brochure that 
accompanies the show, and on its website, that “Bess wanted to show his medical 
theories alongside his paintings” and that Gober’s installation “realizes this.” 452  
Twenty-three years to the month before Gober’s Bess opened, in March 1989, 
Nayland Blake, then a San Francisco-based recent graduate of CalArts (where he studied 
with John Baldessari) was asked by curator Lawrence Strider to organize an exhibition of 
his work at the University of California, Berkeley Museum of Art MATRIX Program. 
For the work, titled The Schreber Suite (figure 5.5 – 5.9) Blake consulted a famous 
nineteenth-century text by one of Freud’s famous Three Case Histories, Daniel Paul 
Schreber, Memoir of my Nervous Illness. The case of Daniel Paul Schreber is, of course, 
a cornerstone of the psychoanalytic movement; Freud appropriated Schreber’s memoir– 
he never treated or met Schreber – to support his theory linking psychotic paranoia to 
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 Ten years earlier Carl Jung had mentioned the case in 1906 the year of 
its publication in Germany. And Jacques Lacan, in his mid-twentieth century renovation 
of Freudian psychoanalysis, made recourse to the “subjectivity of Schreber’s delusion” in 
his structuralist theory of psychosis.
454
 There have been, since the mid-1960s a number of 
psychoanalytic, sociological and cultural treatments of Schreber’s case.455 
Daniel-Paul Schreber was a respected nineteenth-century jurist when in 1893, having 
been appointed to Germany’s highest Supreme Court of Appeals, he suffered a nervous 
breakdown and was committed to a public asylum at which time he commenced an 
elaborate account of his experience which he completed in 1902. The memoir recounts in 
elaborate detail the physiological, sensory, emotional, and sexual and gender 
transformations he endured over the course of his nervous illness, as he becomes God’s 
mistress and is impregnated by the rays of the sun with a race of new humans. Schreber 
submitted the text as part of his formal petition for release from the asylum, which was 
eventually granted.  
With this memoir Schreber displays, like Artaud in his correspondence with Rivière, a 
clinical prescience over the remarkable narrative and, like Artaud, is unsparing in his 
criticism of his psychiatrist, Professor Fliechsig of Leipzig. He is also convinced of the 
truth of his experience, and insists that while his hallucinations and delusions may be 
explained in psychiatric terms, they must also be understood as metaphysical experiences 
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quite independent of clinical significance; “I started this work,” Schreber begins his text, 
“without having publication in mind ... Yet I believe that expert examination from my 
body and observation of my personal fate during my lifetime would be of value both for 
science and the knowledge of religious truths.”456 As with Artaud’s exchange with 
Rivière, we have a multiplication of clinical reflexivity working out in Schreber’s text; he 
strives for scrupulous empirical accuracy in his description of his fantastic experiences, 
yet his descriptions also demonstrate an uncanny understanding that what he has 
experienced is of clinical value in the study of both mental illness and religious 
experience.  
Blake consulted the psychiatric and biographical literature on the case; however, he 
approached Schreber’s memoirs as a modernist work, a Surrealist novel, art. He also used 
the text as a source-book or manual, deriving from it the conceptual basis for his 
installation and for the production of a suite of sculptural objects. These include a number 
of free-standing assemblages and wall hangings which he calls Work Stations constructed 
from medical equipment and S&M fetish accoutrement. These “stations” look rather like 
sculptural realizations of drawing illustrations in medical books by Daniel-Paul 
Schreber’s father, Daniel Gottlob Moritz Schreber. The father Schreber was a very 
influential nineteenth-century orthopedic doctor renowned for the development of 
“orthopedic appliances” – elaborate constraining devices that were intended to correct 
physical deformities in children.
457
 A number of these “work station” sculptures were 
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included in the 1991 Whitney Biennial which also included, appropriately enough, 
Robert Gober’s floor sculpture Untitled, 1991 which features a sack or pillow case-like 
shape with male and female anatomy fashioned from beeswax and human hair.  
Blake used descriptions of the anatomical gender-altering violence Schreber alleges he 
endured – the narrative details how organs were removed or moved to other parts of his 
body – as curatorial cues for a corresponding set of détournements performed on the body 
of the museum. For example, Blake altered the normative gender coding of the museum’s 
restrooms, and had facsimiles of the mirrors made with Schreber’s descriptions of his 
gender alterations printed on them. Blake exhibited these mirrors both in the restrooms 
and as sculptures in the formal gallery space. He also plundered works hidden the 
museum’s permanent collection, focusing on pieces that were produced at or around the 
time of Schreber’s writing by often forgotten or unknown artists and arranged these as 
something of an alternative history of early modernism; he also used selections of 
Schreber’s texts as curatorial commentary for the works.  
Perhaps the most beautiful work in the exhibition is the large wall-piece Diagram of 
the Heavens (1989), which calls up Duchamp’s Large Glass and also takes a cue from 
minimalist aesthetics. Blake selected passages of Schreber’s memoir that describe the 
“miraculous” effects of the sun’s rays on Schreber’s nerves, and etched these stretches of 
writing onto transparent glass shelves which were arranged in tiers on a large expanse of 
gallery wall. The text streamed down from sheds of sunlight through a gallery skylight 
onto the walls and floors beneath and produced the effect that one had come into contact 
with Schreber’s ideas, indeed with artistic or poetic ideas, quite free of the clinical 
baggage of symptoms, pathology, paranoia, and nervous illness. 
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In his essay “What is an author?” Foucault describes what he calls “the author 
function” which, he contends, is a relatively recent “moment of individualisation in the 
history of ideas.”458 The author function serves to bring together after an individual has 
died what are often quite disparate and incompatible personal (not all of them written) 
affects under the rubric of the “work” and a proper name. “When Sade was not 
considered an author,” Foucault asks, “what was the status of his papers? Were they 
simply rolls of paper onto which he ceaselessly uncoiled his fantasies during his 
imprisonment?”459 How is it possible, he asks further, “(to) define a work amid the 
millions of traces left by someone after his death?”460  
We may pose Foucault’s author question to the Bess and Schreber cases. To Gober’s 
Forrest Bess we might ponder the status of these paintings, papers and photographs when 
the artist was alive and spent the greater part of his days like so many others in Bay City 
at the time, fishing for a living on the Gulf Coast’s West Matagorda Bay. Without any 
critical sense, it seems, Gober’s exhibition has dissolved Bess’s “artist function” (and 
even his “fisherman function”) into the clinical function of the artist case history. Gober 
has enjoyed considerable institutional and critical support over the years, not least of all 
from the Whitney Museum; the artist-curator has in effect institutionally confined Bess 
and completed the clinical profile of Bess that was begun by the museum thirty-one years 
ago. 
The Schreber Suite provided Gober with an artistic-curatorial precedent; however its 
impact was quite different. Indeed, Blake seems very aware of the “author function” and 
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perhaps consulted Foucault’s text which speculates on “a form of culture...in which 
fiction would not be limited by the figure of the author ... and would develop without 
passing through something like a necessary or constraining figure.”461 The Schreber Suite 
approached Schreber’s Memoir archaeologically, as a text which reflects a set of 
historically interconnected ideas about sexuality, the body, fetishism, gender, artistic 
subjectivity, and pathology.
462
 Blake also approached the memoir as work of modernist 
literature drawing from its aleatory and creative potential to produce a suite of objects 
and interventions that were in the Kantian sense both critical and aesthetic. The Schreber 
Suite multiplied and scrambled the clinical gaze to plunder the creative potential of the 
text outside the clinic. Blake produced what might be called a critique of clinical-
aesthetic reason, and released Schreber’s autobiography from the constraining figure of 
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Figure 1.1. Alexander Baumgarten. Aesthetica Scripsit.  
Title-page. 1750. From Aesthetica Scripsit. 
Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1961. 
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     Figure 1.2. Albrecht von Haller. A Dissertation On The Sensible  




      
 
Figure 1.3. Julien Offray de la Mettrie. L’Homme  






Figure 1.4. Agesander, Athenodoros and Polydorus (attributed). Laocoön Group or 
Laocoön and  
His Sons. c. 25 BCE. Marble. Vatican Museums, Rome. 
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      Figure 1.5. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. Laokoön oder  
Über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie (Laocoön:  
An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry).  
Title-page. 1766. Berkeley, CA. 
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    Figure 1.6. Johann Joachim Winkcelmann. Gedanken über die Nachahmung  
der griechischen Werke (Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Works). 
Title-page. 1755. Dresden. 
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   Figure 2.1. Paul Cézanne. Mont Sainte-Victoire Seen from Les Lauves. 1901-1906.  





Figure 2.2. Marie Francois Xavier Bichat. Traite Des Membranes en General et de Diverses 
Membranes  
en Particuliar. Title-page. 1800. Paris. 
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   Figure 2.3. Lincoln Watkins. “Healthy Blood moving….” Diagnosis By Means Of  




   
 
  Figure 2.4. Lincoln Watkins.  “Unhealthy blood”, Diagnosis By Means Of The 
Blood.  
New York and London: Physicians Book Publishing, 1902, 67. Photograph. 
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Figure 2.5. Francis Bacon. Three Studies for a Crucifixion, 1962. Triptych. Detail, 
panel three.  






Figure 2.6. Edouard Vuillard, Portrait of the Artist’s Mother and Sister in the Studio. 1891. 
Oil on canvas, 46.3cm x 56.5cm. Museum of Modern Art, New York.  
 
 254 
     
 
    Figure 3.1. B.A. Morel. Traite Des Maladies Mentale. Title-page. 1750.  
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      Figure 3.2. Cesare Lombroso. “Kant’s Skull”, The Man  
of Genius. London and New York: Walter Scott and Charles  






Figure 3.3. André Brouillet. Un Leçon Clinique à la Salpêtrière. 1887. Oil on canvas. 







       
 
Figure 3.4. Paul Regnard. “Extase”, Attitudes Passionelles,  
Iconographie, vol. II, plate 21, 1878. Photograph. 
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       Figure 3.5. Paul Regnard. “Hysero-Epilepsie”,  
Attitudes Passionelles, Iconographie, vol. II,  




      
 
     Figure 3.6. Paul Regnard. “Hysero-Epilepsie”, Attitudes  
Passionelles, Iconographie, vol. II, plate 20, 1878. Photograph. 
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    Figure 3.7. Paul Regnard. “Crucifiement”, Attitudes Passionelles. 
Iconographie,  




    
 
Figure 3.8. “Antonin Artaud in The Cenci”, 1935 (left), and “On the grounds of 
the asylum with  
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Dr. Ferdière”. From Antonin Artaud: Selected Writings, trans. Helen Weaver. New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976, 204-205. Photographs. 




Figure 3.9. “Antonin Artaud, as Cecco in Marcel Vandal’s ‘Graziella’” 1925 (left) 
and  “As Gringalet,  
in Louitz-Morat’s ‘Le Juif Errant’” 1926. From Antonin Artaud: Selected Writings. New 
York: Farrar,  





Figure 3.10. “Antonin Artaud, in his room, February 1948, shortly before his death, at 
the clinic in Ivry-sur-Seine”. From Antonin Artaud: Selected Writings. New York: Farrar, 





Figure 4.1. Joseph Beuys. Coyote: I Like America and America Likes Me. 1974. Video still. 





Figure 4.2. Robert Morris. Untitled (Fiberglass Cloud). 1967. Translucent fiberglass  and 





Figure 4.3. Robert Morris and Carolee Scheeman. Site. 1964. Video still. Museum of Modern 
Art, New York. 
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  Figure 4.4. Robert Morris. Untitled (Footprints and Rulers). 1964. Lead over wood 
and  





Figure 4.5. Hannah Wilke. S.O.S. (Starification Object Series): An Adult Game of Mastication. 





Figure 4.6. Hannah Wilke. So Help Me Hannah Series: Portrait of the Artist and her Mother. 






Figure 4.7. Hannah Wilke. In Memoriam, Selma Butter (Mommy). 1979-83. Photographs and 
floor sculptures. Hannah Wilke Collection and Archive, Los Angeles. 
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    Figure 4.8. Hannah Wilke. Why Not Sneeze…? 1992. Wire bird cage,  
medicine bottles and syringes. 7 x 9 in. Ronald Feldman Gallery, New York. 
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     Figure 4.9. Hannah Wilke. Brush Stroke. 1992. Artist’s hair  
on Arches paper. Ronald Feldman Gallery, New York. 
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   Figure 4.10. Hannah Wilke (with Donald Goddard). Intra-Venus, June 10, 1992/  
May 5, 1992. 1992-93/ Chromagenic supergloss prints. 71 ½ x 47 ½ each. Ronald  






Figure 4.11. Hannah Wilke (with Donald Goddard). Intra-Venus, August 17, 1992/ 
August 9, 1992. 1992-93. Chromagenic supergloss prints. 71 ½ x 47 ½ each. 
Ronald  
Feldman Gallery, New York. 
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      Figure 4.12. Antonin Artaud. Autoportrait. (11 mai)  




     Figure 4.13. Hannah Wilke. Intra-Venus Face. 1992. Watercolor  
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on paper, 12 ½ x 9 ½ inches. Museum of Modern Art, New York. 
   
   
Figure 5.1. Forrest Bess. Letter to Meyer Schapiro. n.d., Meyer Schapiro Archive 
papers,  




Figure 5.2. Forrest Bess. Untitled. n.d. Polaroid photograph. Betty Parsons Gallery records 
and personal papers Archive. Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution, 
Washington, DC. 
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  Figure 5.3. Forrest Bess, Untitled. n.d. Polaroid photograph, Betty Parsons Gallery 
records and  





Figure 5.4. Forrest Bess. Untitled (No. 5). 1949. Oil on canvas, 10 x 12 7/8 in. Cartin 
Collection. 
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Figure 5.5. Nayland Blake. The Schreber Suite. 1989. Exhibition brochure. 





Figure 5.7. Nayland Blake. The Schreber Suite. 1989. Exhibition brochure. University of 
California, Berkeley Art Museum and Pacific Film Archive, Berkeley, CA. 
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Figure 5.8. Nayland Blake. The Schreber Suite. 1989. Exhibition brochure. 
University  












Figure 5.9. Nayland Blake. Untitled (“Miracled Birds”). 1989. Mixed media. 2 x 5 x 1 in. 
 
 
 
 
 
